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NOTE ON SOURCES
There is now a large body of published work on the 
subject of terrorism but, for a number of reasons, very 
little of it has been written by the terrorists themselves.
The clandestine nature of their operations is partly 
responsible. Also, with some notable exceptions like the 
Brazilian Carlos Marighela, few modern terrorists have tried 
to construct a coherent theoretical base for their actions. 
Instead, they have tended to eschew written statements for 
'the propaganda of the deed', relying on the international 
news media to carry their message to the public. Some 
material written or recorded by terrorists, however, can be 
found in contemporary periodicals, official papers and other 
secondary sources. Because it is usually included to support 
a point of argument such material must be treated carefully, 
but can still be useful for the purposes of a study such as 
this.
As discussed in the thesis, statistics on terrorist 
incidents are notoriously unreliable, varying widely with 
the definition of terrorism used, the size of the data base 
and, often, the ideological position of the collection agency. 
Yet, here again, the material published by bodies such as 
the US State Department's Office for Combatting Terrorism 
and the Rand Corporation can be very useful, providing that 
its shortcomings are kept in mind. If not precise figures, 
such studies can indicate levels of magnitude and reflect 
trends in terrorist operations over time.
The growing interest in terrorism among scholars and 
officials has also prompted a number of collections of 
documents relating to the subject. As these works 
conveniently and accurately reproduce the texts of resolutions 
and conventions scattered throughout the records of 
international organisations and national governments, they 
have been used in preference to the original sources.
VNOTE ON TERMS USED
It has been said that 'terror like love may be difficult 
to define but [is] readily recognizable to the involved'.
While some of the problems of terminology inherent in a 
study of terrorism are touched upon in this thesis, it is 
necessary at the outset to establish an understanding of some 
of the terms used.
Terrorism is a highly complex phenomenon and viewed in
a political context is susceptible to a wide range of
interpretations. As a consequence, the definition of
terrorism has long been a subject of controversy and numerous
attempts have been made by politicians, officials and scholars
2to devise a form of words that can be universally accepted.
To date it has proven impossible to satisfy the demands of 
politics but the needs of scholarship can be met by a number 
of proposed definitions. For the purposes of this study I 
have followed that suggested by Grant Wardlaw:
political terrorism is the use, or threat 
of use, of violence by an individual or 
group, whether acting for or in opposition 
to established authority, when such action 
is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or 
fear-inducing effects in a target group 
larger than the immediate victims with the 
purpose of coercing that group into acceding 
to the political demands of the perpetrators.
Most acts of terrorism have international repercussions of 
some kind, but the term 'international terrorism' is used to
J.B. Bell, 'Terror: An Overview' in M.H. Livingston (Ed),
International Terrorism in the Contemporary World (Greenwood 
Press, Westport, 1978), p.38.
2 Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory3 tactics and
counter-measures (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982), 
pp.3-17. See also John Dugard, 'International Terrorism: 
Problems of Definition', International Affairs 50:1 (January 
1974), pp.67-81.
Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p.16.3
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describe terrorism conducted with the support of a foreign 
government or organisation, directed against foreign nationals, 
institutions or governments, or which directly transcends 
national boundaries.^ All terrorist attacks on diplomats and 
diplomatic facilities thus by definition constitute examples 
of international terrorism.
A distinction also needs to be made between the terrorism
of governments and that used by political extremists and
revolutionary groups. This study does include a brief
examination of the Cusually clandestine) involvement of states
in international terrorism, but is not concerned with the
5'enforcement terror' used by totalitarian regimes to keep
power. It does not look at the calculated use of terror by
states in overt military conflicts such as the Second World
War or Vietnam War, nor considers the 'balance of terror'
which currently governs the nuclear confrontation between
7the superpowers. Rather, this thesis concentrates on
8'agitational terror' against states and international 
institutions. In the terms of Chomsky and Herman’s 
provocative analysis, it is a study not of 'wholesale violence'
4 This definition is drawn from Terrorist Incidents Involving 
Diplomats: A statistical overview of international terrorist
incidents involving diplomatic personnel and facilities from 
January 1968 through April 1983 (Department of State, 
Washington, 1983). It has been expanded, however, to include 
attacks by terrorists upon nationals or institutions of their 
own state where these occur in a third country, such as attacks 
by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (based in Northern Ireland) 
against British diplomats and diplomatic facilities abroad.
5 T.P. Thornton, 'Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation' in 
H. Eckstein (Ed), Internal War: Problems and Approaches(Collier-Macmillan, London, 1964), p.72.g
This is done well by Michael Stohl, 'National Interests and 
State Terrorism in International Affairs', Political Science 36 :1 (July 1984) .
7 This term was first coined by A.J. Wohlstetter, 'The Delicate 
Balance of Terror', Foreign Affairs 37:2 (January 1959).g Thornton, in Eckstein, p.72.
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to maintain order and security, but 'retail violence' to 
precipitate political change.9
There have also been numerous attempts to define 
diplomacy, though with far less controversy. For this thesis 
I have relied in the first instance on the definition coined 
by Hedley Bull in The Anarchical Society. To him, diplomacy 
is:
the conduct of relations between states 
and other entities with standing in world 
politics by official agents and by 
peaceful means.10
This definition subsumes the more traditional and now 
outdated explanations of diplomacy offered by Sir Ernest Satow 
and Sir Harold Nicolson.^ It does not, however, include 
certain forms of state policy described as 'diplomacy' by 
scholars like Raymond Aron, Thomas Schelling and Michael Stohl, 
and which are essential to a discussion of international12 i oterrorism. To them, 'diplomacy is bargaining' and the 
terms of the exchange are set by the power of the parties 
involved. This view of interstate relations is discussed in 
the thesis.
As Bull and others have pointed out, not everyone 
engaged in diplomacy can be described as a diplomat.^ For
Noam Chomsky and E.S. Herman, The Washington Connection and 
Third World Fascism (Vol.1 of The Political Economy of Human 
Rights) (Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1980), pp.85-95.
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in
World Politics (Macmillan, London, 1983), p.162.
Sir Ernest Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice (Longmans, 
Green and Co., London, 1957), p.l and Sir Harold Nicolson, 
Diplomacy (Oxford University Press, London, 1969), pp.4-5.
12 T.C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966), pp.lt34, and Stohl, 'National Interests'.
13 Schelling, p.l.
Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp.162-167. See also 
Alan James, 'Diplomacy and International Society', 
International Relations 6:6 (November 1980), pp.934-935. 
While the word 'diplomat' was long held to be a solecism, it 
is now the standard form in the United States and is 
sufficiently common elsewhere to be preferred over the older word 'diplomatist'.
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the purposes of this study the term is taken to include all 
members of diplomatic and consular missions who enjoy formal 
diplomatic status. It also includes government officials 
on special diplomatic missions or attached to recognised 
international organisations. This use of the term in some 
respects exceeds the scope of various international 
agreements governing such matters as diplomatic privileges 
and immunities and excludes certain other internationally 
protected persons, but realistically includes all members 
of the diplomatic Establishment who are likely to become 
targets for terrorist attack. It also recognises that since 
1945 diplomatic status has been accorded to a wide range of 
officials an(3 support staff attached to diplomatic missions 
and international organisations, whether or not they are 
professional diplomats. Honorary office holders, while 
occasionally the victims of terrorists, have been excluded 
from this category.
1INTRODUCTION
The proper study of terrorism should 
seek to explain a phenomenon, not 
justify it. And it must be realised 
by all that explanation does not 
entail justification.
Grant Wardlaw
Political Terrorism
(1982)
Over the past fifteen years, terrorism has become a 
subject for academic debate in much the same way that 
guerrilla warfare was popular with scholars in the 1950s and 
1960s. A great many books and articles have been written 
on terrorism since the problem assumed renewed importance 
around 1968. Some of these studies have approached the 
subject from an historical perspective.1 Others have 
concentrated on the challenges posed to liberal states2 3or 
have looked at the possible state sponsorship of terrorist 
groups. While most of these works mention the specific 
problem of terrorist attacks on diplomats and diplomatic 
facilities as part of their overall treatment of the subject, 
few examine it in any detail. Even those recent studies which
See for example Roland Gaucher, The Terrorists: From
Tsarist Russia to the O.A.S. (Seeker and Warburg, London, 
1968) and Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (Abacus, London, 1978).
2 _ ,Such as J.B. Bell, A Time of Terror: How Democratic
Socveties Respond to Revolutionary Violence (Basic Books, New 
York, 1978) , Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State 
(Macmillan, London, 1977) and Juliet Lodge (Ed), Terrorism:
A Challenge to the State (Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1981) .
3 In particular, see R.S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, 
Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (Crane Russak, New York,
1984) and Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret
War of International Terrorism (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 19 81) .
2concentrate on international terrorism tend to treat the 
terrorist threat to diplomats only in passing.^
The scant attention paid to this particular aspect of 
the terrorist problem is not due to an underestimation of 
its seriousness. Indeed, the danger has been one of over­
reaction. Rather, it is because terrorist attacks on 
diplomats and diplomatic facilities are usually viewed as 
part of a wider problem and rarely seen as a discrete subject 
worthy of analysis in its own right. No contemporary 
terrorist group has attacked only diplomatic personnel and 
no state has suffered only this kind of threat. Nor has 
this particular problem been confined to one geographical 
area or political system. In those relatively few cases 
where the terrorist threat to diplomats and their facilities 
has been subject to close analysis the studies have tended 
to concentrate on certain specialised facets of the problem, 
such as the implications of such attacks for international 
law. Carol Baumann's pioneering study of The Diplomatie 
Kidnappings usefully included an examination of the wider 
implications of this particular terrorist tactic but did 
not deal with other kinds of attacks on diplomats and 
diplomatic facilities.^
As might be expected, greater attention has been paid 
to this problem by governments the diplomatic services of 
which have been placed at risk. With its diplomats and
For example, Yonah Alexander (Ed), International Terrorism: 
National, Regional and Global Perspectives (Praeger, New York, 
1976), David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (Eds), International 
Terrorism and World Security (Croom Helm, London, 1975) andM. H. Livingston, International Terrorism.
5 As in M.C. Bassiouni (Ed), International Terrorism and 
Political Crimes (Charles Thomas, Springfield, 1975),
A.E. Evans and J.F. Murphy (Eds), Legal Aspects of 
International Terrorism (Heath and Co., Lexington, 1978) and
N. M. Poulantzas, 'Some Problems of International Law Connected
with Urban Guerrilla Warfare: The Kidnapping of Members of
ic Missions, Consular Officers and other Foreign 
Personnel', Annals of International Studies 3 (1972).
6 .E. Baumann, The Diplomatic Kidnappings: A Revolutionary
Tactic of Urban Terrorism (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1973).
3diplomatic facilities among the most popular targets for
terrorist attack the United States (US) government, primarily
through the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), has for some years now made efforts to study this
aspect of international terrorism and devise appropriate
counter-measures. During the last ten years, spending on
State Department security has increased more than 20-fold
from $22.6 million in 1975 to $497.3 million planned in 1985.7
As the number of states affected by terrorist attacks has
grown and as this particular problem has attracted greater
attention in international fora, so other governments have
begun to take this problem more seriously. Academic interest
is now growing but apart from Brian Jenkins of the Rand
Corporation few scholars appear to have published their
8thoughts on this aspect of international terrorism.
The lack of scholarly attention paid to this problem 
is surprising, for over the past fifteen years terrorist 
attacks on diplomats and diplomatic facilities have been 
steadily growing to the point that they now constitute qnearly 40 per cent of all international terrorist incidents. 
According to the US Department of State, the diplomats of 
at least 113 countries have been attacked since 1968, by 
more than 100 terrorist groups.^ One noted British scholar
'US Embassies Try to Maintain Open Society in Tight Security', 
International Herald Tribune, 2 April 1985, p.9. See also 
'Diplomats Forced to Adapt to New Era of Terrorism',
Washington Post 15 November 1984, p.21 and Frank Perez, 
'Terrorist Target: The Diplomat', Address by Frank Perez,
Deputy Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, before 
the conference on terrorism sponsored by the Instituto de 
Cuestiones Internationales, Madrid, 10 June 1982, Current 
Policy, 402 (10 June 1982).
See for example B.M. Jenkins, Diplomats on the Front Line, 
Rand Paper P-6749 (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1982).
9 B.M. Jenkins, Hew Modes of Conflict, Rand Report R-3009-DNA 
(Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1983), p.14.
Terrorist Incidents Involving Diplomats, p.3 and p.5.
4in this field has even suggested that 'the profession of 
diplomat must now rank as one of the most dangerous in the 
world1.'*''*" There is growing evidence too that a number of 
states like Libya and Iran support these practices and have 
even resorted to terrorism of this kind themselves as a form 
of ’coercive diplomacy1. Inevitably, terrorist attacks on 
diplomats and the increasing use of terrorism by some states 
as a tool of their foreign policies have had a profound effect 
on the conduct of diplomacy and, many would argue, international 
relations in general. As early as 1970 the Chairman of the 
US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Inter-American 
Affairs was warning that ’unless something is done to remedy 
this situation, international relations may come to be 
dictated by the whims and self-designated necessities of 12guerrillas, terrorists and other extreme radical elements'.
Consideration of this problem at an international level 
is greatly complicated by the fact that 'at base, terrorism 
is a moral problem' and, naturally enough, provokes such 
emotional reactions. What may be considered justifiable 
violence by one state can be seen as illegitimate by another, 
depending on its political viewpoint. Hence the ubiquity of 
the phrase 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom 
fighter'. Differences persist despite the fact, or perhaps 
even because of the fact, that at various times throughout 
history most states have been guilty of terrorism of one kind 
or another. It is one of the many ironies of international 
debate on the nature of terrorism that many states could 
still be included in their own proposed definitions of the 
problem. Because assessments of terrorism are usually so 
subjective, argument has tended to revolve around ideological
Paul Wilkinson, 'After Tehran', Conflict Quarterly (Spring 
1981), p.5.
12 'Safety of U.S. Diplomats', Hearings before the Sub­
committee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 
Second Session (27 April 1970).
13 Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p.4.
5positions rather than objective political analysis. Yet 
agreement has been reached regarding terrorist attacks on 
diplomats and diplomatic facilities, suggesting that in this 
area at least some further progress might be possible. In 
addition, the rare international consensus on this particular 
aspect of the terrorist problem lends weight to the claim 
that it is worth closer examination.
The following study is intended to help fill this need.
It presents a broad overview of terrorist attacks on diplomats 
and diplomatic facilities, looking at the problem first in 
historical perspective and then in terms of its current 
dimensions. It includes a brief survey of the way in which 
states have exercised their responsibilities to protect 
diplomats, as required under international law, and examines 
the growing problem of terrorism being used by states as a 
tool of their foreign relations. This study looks also at the 
various responses states have made to counter this threat to 
diplomatic practices and in particular considers the impact 
of the current terrorist problem on the conduct of diplomacy. 
It offers a number of comments on the likely course of 
international relations in this field, in the light of the 
US Administration's view that international terrorism is part 
of a Soviet inspired campaign to destroy the institution of 
diplomacy and undermine world stability.
It is argued that there has always been a need to provide 
protection for diplomats, but that the dangers they face are 
now greater than ever before. Since the 1960s, terrorism 
has placed considerable strains on the international system 
as a whole and diplomats in particular have been identified 
as legitimate targets for attack. Yet shorn of the political 
rhetoric and journalistic hyperbole that these attacks have 
engendered, the problem is not as grave as some states have 
claimed. Diplomats and diplomatic facilities remain under 
constant threat and the conduct of diplomacy is being 
adversely affected, but diplomacy itself is secure. Almost 
without exception terrorist attacks are aimed at particular 
states, groups of states or states in general, not the
6institution of diplomacy, on which the terrorists themselves 
also depend. They both seek to use international diplomacy 
to further their own causes and ultimately aspire to 
diplomatic status of their own - either as a terrorist 
organisation, like the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(PLO), or as a result of having successfully seized power 
and achieved formal statehood.
This is a fine distinction, and one that offers cold 
comfort to the diplomats and governments at risk, but it is 
important in terms of the responses to the terrorist threat 
now being considered by certain states. Despite some dire 
predictions, diplomacy itself will survive as it has always 
done, adapting to changes in the international environment 
and insured against collapse by the recognition of all states 
that diplomacy continues to perform an essential function in 
international affairs. Indeed, by provoking a conflict 
between the traditional values of international relations 
and those centred on national self-determination, terrorist 
attacks have encouraged cooperation between states against 
universally disruptive political violence of this kind and 
so reinforced traditional norms, among them the security of 
diplomatic intercourse.^ There is a danger from the blatant 
disregard of diplomatic conventions by a few maverick states 
but the institution of diplomacy would be more threatened by 
an over-reaction on the part of others. Ideologically 
coloured visions of international terrorism as a global plot 
and an emphasis on military responses to terrorist acts deny 
diplomatic options as much as terrorist attacks themselves, 
risk an escalation in the level of violence and undermine 
public confidence in the usefulness of international legal 
means to settle disputes of world concern.
Martha Crenshaw, 'The International Consequences of 
Terrorism', Paper prepared for delivery at the 1983 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
The Palmer House, 1-4 September 1983, p.l.
7All governments need to recognise that diplomacy has 
become a hazardous profession and to take more effective 
measures to protect diplomats and their families from 
terrorist attacks. Yet it must also be understood that 
terrorism will never disappear. In these circumstances perhaps 
the best that can be hoped for is that the problem can be 
managed in such a way that, like criminality, it is made to 
bring the least harm to the fewest people and is not permitted 
to disrupt the normal functioning of international society.
8Chapter I
THE BACKGROUND 
Diplomacy and Terrorism
Violence and war try to settle in a 
short time, and by a sudden dissipation 
of energy, difficulties that ought to 
be dealt with by the subtlest analysis 
and the most delicate tests - for the 
object is to reach a state of unforced 
equilibrium.
Paul Valery
History and Politics
(1931)
Diplomacy and terrorism share a number of parallels.
Both have their roots in the ancient past and both have
developed in response to changes in the international
environment. 'The purpose of each is to persuade and prevail,
and both rely heavily on s y m b o l i s m ' Yet here the
similarity ends. Diplomacy has developed as an organised
tool of states within a recognised international system, while
terrorism has traditionally been used by disparate non-state
actors against established authority. Diplomacy attempts to
manage political change through compromise and peaceful
negotiation, where terrorism seeks radical change by violent
means. Diplomacy has been directed towards adjustment and
conciliation, goals largely incompatible with ideology, yet
terrorism almost always springs from a strong ideological
2base rarely sympathetic to such an approach. Diplomatic
J.E. Karkashian, 'Too Many Things Not Working' in 
M.F. Herz (Ed), Diplomats and Terrorists: What Works3 What
Doesn't: A Symposium (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy
(Georgetown University), Washington, 1982), p.6 (emphasis 
retained)
2 Maurice Keens-Soper, 'The Liberal Disposition of Diplomacy', 
International Relations 5:2 (November 1975), p.909.
9negotiations have never been far from considerations of 
power but traditionally diplomacy and terrorism have been 
found at opposite ends of the political spectrum.
Throughout history, diplomats have been granted special 
protection from violence and despite a number of isolated 
incidents the worlds of terrorism and diplomacy have remained 
poles apart. This situation, however, is now changing. Since 
the late 1960s diplomats and diplomatic facilities the world 
over have become popular targets for terrorist attack and 
terrorism is now a major topic for discussion on the agenda 
of international negotiating groups. With the increasing 
involvement of some states in insurgent terrorism the 
traditional division between diplomacy and terrorism is 
becoming blurred and the conduct of international relations 
more uncertain. In order fully to appreciate the changes 
which have taken place and the impact of recent terrorist 
attacks on diplomatic targets it is necessary first to 
consider the problem in historical perspective.
As Carol Baumann has pointed out, terrorist attacks on 
diplomats and diplomatic facilities, while a relatively new 
phenomenon, base their effectiveness on a number of very old 
and simple realities. Relations of some kind have always 
been considered necessary between states and have always 
been conducted through some means of political intercourse. 
This has required official intermediaries whose status and 
behaviour have been subject to agreement between the parties 
involved. Indeed, diplomatic agents are probably the world's 
oldest international institution and the codes regarding 
their protection and conduct by custom antedate all other 
rules of international law.^ Examples of formal diplomatic
Baumann, p.32.
4 J.E.S. Fawcett, 'Kidnappings versus Government Protection', 
World Today 26:9 (September 1970), p.359. See also 
Ira Stechel, 'Terrorist Kidnapping of Diplomatic Personnel',
Cornell International Law Journal 5:189 (Spring 1972), p.190.
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exchanges can be found as long ago as 3000 BC and the concept5of resident envoys was discussed as early as 1380 BC.
There were several precedents in the days of the Greek city 
states but it was the second half of the fifteenth century 
before accredited resident envoys began to make their 
regular appearance in Renaissance Italy.
Pressures associated with the Italian Wars after 1494, 
the expansion of trade and the ferment of the Reformation 
all encouraged the spread of resident diplomacy, which by 
the sixteenth century could be found throughout Europe.
It was not until after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, 
however, and the evolution of a society of independent 
sovereign states, that the establishment of permanent 
diplomatic missions became common practice. With the 
resulting multiplication of contacts came a change in the 
methods and characteristics of diplomacy but in general it 
emerged as 'an organising institution, bearing its distinctive 
styles and manners, and its own networks and procedures, 
rules, treaties and other commitments'.^ Although the 
first records of diplomatic activity were to be found outside 
Europe, resident diplomacy seems never to have developed 
there. The evolving European system was in many ways alien 
to these other civilisations but as the Western states 
encroached ever more insistently on their interests these 
other powers found acceptance of European conventions of 
diplomatic intercourse increasingly difficult to resist. By 
1900 Western international law and customs, and as a corollary7resident diplomacy, extended throughout the world.
Peter Barber, Diplomacy (The British Library, London, 1979), 
p.14 and Adam Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States
(Eyre Methuen, London, 1982), p.84.
r Watson, p.17. The growth of diplomacy during this period 
is examined in greater detail by Sir Harold Nicolson in The
Evolution of the Diplomatic Method: Being the Chichele
Lectures delivered at the University of Oxford in November 
1953 (Constable, London, 1954).
7 Barber, p.51.
11
The demise of the colonial empires after 1945, the 
emergence of over eighty new states and the proliferation 
of international organisations all brought pressures for 
a reconsideration of some of these practices. Many new 
states in particular viewed with suspicion a system which 
stemmed primarily from European culture and traditions and 
in the development of which they had played no part. To 
the more radical states this was the same system which had 
permitted the spread of European colonialism and which still 
worked to prevent the Third World from sharing in the power
g
and resources to which they felt all states were entitled.
Yet, to a surprising extent, states of all geographical
regions, political colours, cultures and stages of development
have been willing to embrace what Hedley Bull has called
'the often strange and archaic diplomatic procedures that9arose in Europe in another age'. The new states have 
placed considerable reliance on the diplomatic system as 
an agency through which to achieve quite fundamental changes^ 
and calls for amendments to the system itself have almost 
without exception been made in its own idiom. These calls 
have not always been received sympathetically by the older 
states but despite this 'the contemporary global system is 
gradually evolving new rules and conventions to replace 
those of its more purely European predecessor'
One convention which has always had universal application 
and is unlikely markedly to change is that regarding the 
personal inviolability of diplomatic agents. As resident
Keens-Soper, p.913. See also P.J. Boyce, Foreign Affairs 
For New States: Some Questions of Credentials (University
of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1977), p.201.
9 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.183.
^  See for example C. Farrands, 'Perspectives on Negotiation: 
Diplomacy and Regime Change', in B. Buzan and R.J.B. Jones (Eds),
Change and the Study of International Relations: The Evaded
Dimension (Pinter, London, 1981), p.86.
11 Watson, p.19.
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diplomacy spread, so the principle of inviolability and
certain associated immunities also developed. Prompted
initially by the fact that the diplomat represented the
person of his sovereign, the justification for these
privileges soon came to be accepted as one of functional 1 2necessity. By 1625 Hugo Grotius could write that:
There are two maxims in the law of 
nations relating to ambassadors which 
are generally accepted as established 
rules: The first is that ambassadors
must be received and the second is that 
they must suffer no harm.13
These fundamental laws and the special duties of protection
owed by receiving states were expressed in the norms of
diplomatic reciprocity which emerged from the Peace of
Westphalia and were soon strengthened by municipal laws in
code and practice. Most of the privileges found today were
14in existence in some form by 1720. They were further 
refined at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when an attempt 
was made to resolve the prevailing confusion over precedence, 
consistent with the nominal equality of states. The codes 
of behaviour established then soon became universal and 
many remain in force today.
International developments did not prompt another major 
effort to codify the rights and privileges of diplomatic 
agents until 1921 when the Sixth International Conference 
of American States met in Havana to consider draft conventions 
on diplomatic and consular officers. The drafts also specified
There currently exist three theories to account for the 
development, and to justify the continuation, of diplomatic 
privileges. The first rests on the diplomat's representative 
function, the second is based on the theory of extra­
territoriality while the third, and now most favoured theory, 
is that of pure functional necessity. See for example 
B. Sen, A Diplomat's Handbook of International Law and Practice 
(Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1979), pp.80-83.
13 Quoted in Sen, p.6.
14 Barber, p.26.
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the position of personnel representing international 
organisations like the newly-formed League of Nations and 
reaffirmed the principle of non-interference by diplomats 
in the affairs of the receiving state. Although these 
two conventions were signed in 1928, consideration of the 
matters included in them was incomplete, prompting the 
International Law Commission (ILC), at its first meeting 
in 1949, to select diplomatic intercourse and immunities 
as a subject for early examination. Work began in 1954 and 
culminated in the United Nations Conference on Diplomatic 
Intercourse and Immunities held in Vienna in 1961. Attended 
by the representatives of 81 countries (including 24 created 
since 1945) , the Conference agreed upon a comprehensive 
multilateral convention which 'codified and restated the 
law with regard to the status of the diplomat and all members 
of his staff'.^
For the purposes of this study, two Articles of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations are particularly 
important. Article 22 states, in part:
1. The premises of the mission shall be 
inviolable. The agents of the receiving 
State may not enter them, except with the 
consent of the head of mission.
2. The receiving State is under a special 
duty to take all appropriate steps to 
protect the premises of the mission 
against any intrusion or damage and to 
prevent any disturbance of the peace of ^  
the mission or impairment of its dignity.
Article 29 of the Convention extends this fundamental principle 
to diplomatic agents themselves:
Sen, pp.78-79 and Baumann, p.37.
^  Stechel, pp.193-194.
17 The full text of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations is included in I. Brownlie (Ed), Basic Documents 
in International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983), 
pp.213-229 and is reproduced as Appendix E of this thesis.
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The person of the diplomatic agent shall 
be inviolable. He shall not be liable 
to any form of arrest or detention. The 
receiving State shall treat him with due 
respect and shall take all appropriate 
steps to prevent any attack on his person, 
freedom, or dignity.-*-®
Article 29 was cdnsidered to be completely in accordance with
the accepted principles of international law and practice
and was adopted without amendment from the draft Articles
prepared by the ILC. The Convention entered into force
on 24 April 1964 with 63 signatures and, with some 140 states
20now party to it, has become universal practice.
Although disagreement over the scope of the proposed 
convention had restricted the Vienna Conference to an 
examination of formal interstate relations, the 1961 21Convention and its companion on Consular Relations in 1963
were soon followed by a number of additional international
agreements which extended similar privileges and rights of
protection to members of special diplomatic missions and
22specified international organisations. The agreements 
were still open to different interpretations according to the
18 . .  . j
'IDVd.
19 Stechel, p.195 and J.F. Murphy, 'The Role of International 
Law in the Prevention of Terrorist Kidnapping of Diplomatic 
Personnel' in Bassiouni, p.288.
20 Michael Palliser, 'Diplomacy Today' in Hedley Bull and 
Adam Watson (Eds), The Expansion of International Society 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984), p.374.
21 The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations came into force 
on 19 March 1967. As Poulantzas has noted, there is a growing 
tendency today for states to entrust their diplomatic 
representatives with their consular services, with the result 
that the difference in treatment given to diplomatic envoys 
and consular officers, in some areas always very slight, is 
gradually diminishing. Poulantzas, p.144.
22 These additional agreements include the Convention on 
Special Missions, the Convention on the Representation of 
States in their Relations with International Organisations, the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations, and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 
of the Specialised Agencies. See J.F. Murphy, 'Protected 
Persons and Diplomatic Facilities' in Evans and Murphy, p.279.
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historical traditions and political outlook of states but
they 'raised the codification, if not the actual protection,
of the personal inviolability of diplomats to a new level of
2 3international validity'. It was widely recognised that 
in times of heightened international competition and growing 
functional interdependence diplomacy was likely 
to assume an increasingly important role. This role could 
only be fulfilled if there was universal agreement about 
the conditions under which state representatives could work.
It is thus ironic that, within only a few years of the most 
complete exposition of these time-honoured rules and practices 
there should be an unprecedented succession of attacks on 2diplomats and seizures and bombings of diplomatic facilities.
Although terrorism does not enjoy quite the same
historical credentials as diplomacy, it is still an ancient
practice. Scholars searching for early examples of organised
terror have identified antecedents to modern groups in the
sicarii, a religious sect active in the Zealot struggle in
Palestine from 66-73 AD and the Assassins, an Ismaili Muslim
sect which between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries
25sent agents on missions throughout the Islamic world.
Because of the nature of totalitarian governments since 
antiquity the origins of terror organised as a political 
system are difficult to determine but by common consent are 
attributed first to the French Revolution of 1789-1799, from 
whence the words 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' are derived. 
Examples of insurgent terrorism occur in the years that 
follow but the doctrine only found real expression in Russia 
in the second half of the nineteenth century when extremists
Baumann, pp.40-41.
24 Fawcett, p.359.
25 Laqueur, Terrorism, pp.18-20, Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism: 
International Dimensions - Answering the Challenge, Conflict 
Studies 113 (Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, 
1979), p.l and Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p.18.
16
inspired by the ancient concept of justifiable tyrannicide
carried out numerous attacks against representatives of the 
2 6Czarist state. The tactics of Narodnaya Volya and
other Russian terrorist movements were soon emulated by
groups elsewhere and by the twentieth century terror as an
organised political tactic was being used by anarchists in
2 7France, Spain, Italy and the United States. The ill-fated
Bakuninist International believed it was engaged in an
international campaign of terrorist violence. More
importantly, terror was adopted as a strategy by radical
nationalist groups in Ireland, Macedonia, Serbia, Armenia
and India. With the notable exception of the Irish campaign,
however, these early examples failed to achieve more than
2 8minor tactical successes.
From the turn of the century until the mid-1960s,
terrorism was mainly the preserve of nationalist separatist
2 9movements and extreme right wing groups. The successful 
campaigns against the British in Palestine between 1944-1948 
and in Cyprus between 1955-1959, for example, were 
characterised by terrorist strategies on the part of the
Laqueur, Terrorism, p.35 and Gaucher, pp.3-102.
27 Walter Laqueur is of the opinion that 'Psychologically 
interesting, the ere des attentats was of no great political 
significance' (Terrorism, p.27). In one sense this may be 
true, but given that over fifteen national figures in the 
United States and Europe, including three US Presidents, 
were assassinated in the fifty years between 1865-1918, 
there must have been some impact on the international scene. 
See John Williams, Heyday for Assassins (Heinemann, London, 1958), p.230.
2 8 The Irish terrorist campaign of 1918-1921 was not only 
uniquely successful, but it directly inspired the tactics of 
other terrorist groups like the Zionist Irgun Zvei Leumi 
and the Cypriot Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA). 
See Andrew Selth, 'Romantic Ireland's Dead and Gone', RUSI 
(Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies) 128:1 (March 1983), pp.44-47.
29 Walter Laqueur, 'Introduction' in Walter Laqueur (Ed),
The Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology (WildwoodHouse, London, 1979), p.119.
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insurgents.^  The revolutionary struggles of this period,
on the other hand, were dominated by three schools of
strategic thought none of which viewed terrorism as an
effective tool for political change. While fundamentally
opposed on certain key principles, both the Soviet and Chinese
communists agreed that terrorism should not be accorded an
important place in their political-military doctrines. The
Bolsheviks were ambivalent about the use of terrorism but
to Lenin and Trotsky (and orthodox Marxists still) it was
considered elitist adventurism which lowered the political
consciousness of the masses. Organisational and political
32work was felt to be more important. The Chinese too held
misgivings about terrorist tactics. After the failure of
the Canton and Shanghai uprisings in 1925-1927 Mao Tse-tung
had little faith in urban campaigns of any sort. He was
prepared to use terrorist tactics as occasion demanded but
placed emphasis on building mass support under the leadership
of the party. Unlike the Russians, however, the Chinese
saw victory arising from a 'protracted war' conducted by33guerrilla armies in the countryside. This strategy enjoyed 
some authority with insurgents in the developing countries 
of Asia and Africa, but after 1959 was displaced in Latin 
America by the Cuban model of revolution.
For first-hand accounts of these conflicts and the 
rationale behind the use of terrorist tactics by the insurgents, 
see Menachem Begin, The Revolt (W.H. Allen, London, 1951) and 
George Grivas, The Memoirs of George Grivas (Longmans, London, 
1964) .
31 While these three schools are surveyed in Baumann, pp.4-31, 
a more sophisticated examination of the development of 
revolutionary military doctrine is given by Bernard Semmel in 
his introduction to Bernard Semmel (Ed), Marxism and the 
Science of War (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981), 
pp.13-44.
32 See the extracts from works by Lenin and Trotsky reproduced 
in Laqueur, The Terrorism Reader, pp.198-223.
33 See in particular 'Problems of Strategy in China's 
Revolutionary War', 'Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War 
Against Japan' and 'On Protracted War' in Selected Military 
Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Foreign Languages Press, Peking,
1966) .
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Like that of the Chinese, the Cuban model emphasised
the primacy of the struggle in the rural areas. Fidel Castro
believed that 'the city is a cemetery of revolutionaries 
34and resources' and stressed the development of a rural35power base before the 'descent to the city'. Unlike
the Soviet and Chinese doctrines, however, little emphasis
was given to the initial mobilisation of the population,
whose support was expected to flow from the successful
establishment of a guerrilla 'foco', or focus. Political
considerations were made subordinate to military factors
and the armed forces placed at the centre of the revolutionary
struggle. According to Regis Debray, who is widely taken to
represent Fidel Castro's views, 'the vanguard of the party
can exist in the form of the guerrilla foco itself. The
3 6guerrilla force is the party in embryo'. In addition, a
significant role was given to violence as an act in itself
and in Debray's writings at least little concern was shown
to relate it to the overall direction of the political struggle.
Like the African theorist Frantz Fanon, Debray seemed to
feel that violent acts had a certain intrinsic value and37need not be rationed to specific circumstances. Ernesto 
(Che) Guevara, one of Castro's lieutenants, cautioned his 
fellow revolutionaries on the use of purely terrorist tactics 
which he felt were of 'negative value' and liable to cause
Quoted in Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?
Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America
(Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968), p.67.
35 Debray, p.65.
o r
op.cit., p.105.
37 While Fanon's belief in the psychologically 'purifying' 
effects of revolutionary violence sprang from basically anti­
colonial sentiments, he shared much in common with Menachem 
Begin who believed in the need for the Jews to reassert their 
identity through violent acts ('We fight, therefore we are'). 
See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Penguin, 
Harmonsworth, 1967), pp.27-84 and Begin, pp.26-46.
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disproportionate losses and alienate the population.
Yet the philosophy of action enunciated by Debray was to 
have the greatest impact on Latin American politics over the 
next decade and beyond.
The success of the Cuban revolution in 1957-1959
encouraged the adoption of the 'foco' theory throughout
Latin America. It also prompted a number of isolated attacks
on foreign citizens and targets, which during the preceding
39fifteen years had suffered few such threats. Following 
the defeat of rural guerrilla groups in Venezuela, Peru, 
Colombia, Brazil and Guatemala, however, the value of the 
Cuban model lay in doubt. The emphasis on violence and the 
primacy of the armed revolutionary over the party - the 
subjective will over the objective conditions - kept their 
force, but particularly after the failure of Guevara's 
own Bolivian expedition in 1967 the 'foco' theory was largely 
discredited. In the announcement launching his new movement, 
the Brazilian terrorist leader Carlos Marighela stated:
We are not interested in sending armed 
men to a certain spot in Brazil and 
in waiting for other groups to spring 
up in other parts of the country. This 
would be a fatal error.40
Several commentators have correlated the increase in political 
terrorism, and the ensuing attacks on diplomats, with this 
fall into disrepute of the Cuban model for revolution and 
the consequent shift in focus of the struggle to the major 
urban and industrial areas.
Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1969), p.105.
39 Wilkinson, Terrorism: International Dimensions, p.l.
^  Quoted in Sanche de Gramont, 'How One Pleasant, Scholarly 
Young Man From Brazil Became a Kidnapping, Gun-Toting, 
Bombing Revolutionary', New York Times Magazine 15 November 
1970, p.136.
^  See for example Jack Davis, Political Violence in Latin 
America, Adelphi Paper 85 (International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, London, 1972), p.20, Baumann, p.18 and 
Stechel, p.202.
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The crucial date for this transition is by wide agreement
1968, when 'fires spread across the world in much the same
style as 1848'.^ In a curious confluence of ideological,
nihilistic, romantic and sectional passions, there arose
almost at the same time in different parts of the world a
4 3number of diverse terrorist groups. In Latin America, for
44example, Marighela formed the Acao Libertadora Nacional
and began his campaign of 'violence, radicalism and 
45terrorism' in Brazil. The same year the Fuerzas Armadas 
4 6Rebeldes in Guatemala abandoned their struggle in the
countryside and began a series of terrorist attacks in the
cities. In Uruguay, the Tupamaros^ turned from occasional
shootings and bank robberies to widespread bombings and
kidnappings. In the Middle East, the Palestinians finally
despaired of conventional military methods after the defeat
of the Arab armies in the 1967 Six Day War and turned
4 8completely to guerrilla and terrorist strategies. 1968 was 
also a year of social and political turmoil in Europe.
Closely following the civil disturbances in Paris and the 
first manifestations of Baader-Meinhof terrorism in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Angry Brigade appeared
4 2 Francois Duchene, 'Introduction' in Civil Violence and the 
International System, Adelphi Papers 82 (Part 1) and 83 
(Part 2), (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
London, 1971), Part 1, p.2.
4 3 The best public guide to these terrorist and urban guerrilla 
groups is Peter Janke's excellent Guerrilla and Terrorist 
Organisations: A tiorld Directory and Bibliography (Harvester 
Press, Brighton, 1983).
44 National Liberating Action, or ALN.
4 5 Quoted in Baumann, p.19.
46 Rebel Armed Forces, or FAR.
4 7 Strictly speaking, the Tupamaros are members of the 
Movimiento de Liberacion Racional, the National Liberation 
Movement, or MLN. See Janke, p.508.
4 8 The Palestinians had carried out guerrilla operations prior 
to 1967, but were only convinced of the need to concentrate 
on guerrilla and terrorist strategies after 1967. See Helena 
Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People
Power and Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1984), pp.21-57.
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in Britain. The same ideological ferment produced the 
49
Brigate Rosse in Italy. At the same time the seeds were
sown in the Irish Republican Army and the Trotskyist League
of Revolutionary Communists for the ideological splits which
produced the Provisional IRA in Ireland and the Rengo Sekigun
50in Japan the following year.
The transition from popularly-supported, rural-based
guerrilla struggles to campaigns of violence by smaller,
secret terrorist cells not only represented disillusionment
with traditional theories of revolution, but also the
recognition by extremist groups of all political colours
everywhere that fundamental changes had taken place in
51society. Rapid and widespread urbanisation, technological
developments in transport, communications and weaponry,
together with changes in political and social attitudes,
all contributed to a new global environment. International
society was smaller, more sophisticated and more closely
interconnected. Because of their reliance on complex
technological systems modern states were also more vulnerable
to terrorist attack. The strategy chosen by extremist
groups was to use these developments to instil fear and apply
political pressure through exemplary action of a violent
and unexpected kind. The attacks were essentially symbolic
52acts against targets of equally symbolic value. As
Red Brigades, or BR.
50 The Rengo Sekigun, or sometimes just the S ekigun, is known 
variously in English as the United Red Army (URA), or.simply 
Red Army, but is often called the Japanese Red Army to 
distinguish it from the Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion, 
or RAF). The latter is more popularly known after its German 
founders as the Baader-Meinhof Group (or Gang). See Janke, 
pp.17-20 and pp.337-338.
51 Writing in 1973, Baumann cites the example of Brazil with 
five cities of over one million people and two more with over 
five million each. At the same time over 70 per cent of the 
Argentinian population lived in urban areas. Baumann, pp.20-22.
52 Thornton, in Eckstein, p.77.
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David Fromkin and others have noted, 'whereas military and
revolutionary actions aim at a physical result, terrorist53actions aim at a psychological result'. In this, the
terrorists were greatly assisted by the international news
media which avidly consumed the details of each fresh incident.
Terrorist groups of little or no political power were able
to reach beyond their immediate environment and achieve
effects on a target community out of all proportion to their
54numbers, popular appeal or capacity for violence. Indeed,
'a very plausible case can be made that the most important
difference between past and present terrorism may be traced
55to the modern, transnational flow of information'.
As some terrorists, notably those in Latin America,
achieved some initial tactical successes others were encouraged
and by the early 1970s the world had seen an extraordinary
proliferation of terrorist groups. While the political
stance of the most important tended to be radically left
wing, they were characterised overall by a wide diversity
56of roots, ideologies and goals. Their specificity was 
disguised, however, by a superficial similarity in the tactics
53 David Fromkin, 'The Strategy of Terrorism', Foreign Affairs 
53:4 (July 1975), p.693.
54 Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p.3. This is demonstrated 
convincingly by the impact of small and otherwise obscure 
groups such as the South Moluccans (who seized the Indonesian 
Consulate in Amsterdam in 1975), the 'Group of Alshaheed' which 
seized the Iranian Embassy in London in 1980 to publicise the 
claims of the Arab minority in Arabistan and the 'Black 
December' organisation which seized the Indian High Commission 
in London in 1973. The latter group appears to have consisted 
only of the three men involved in this particular incident.
55 Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p.31.
56 Over 670 groups have claimed responsibility for at least one 
international terrorist attack since 1968. While undoubtedly 
inflated by bogus and very small groups this figure nevertheless 
represents an extraordinary proliferation of organisations 
which have adopted terrorist tactics. See Patterns of 
International Terrorism: 1981 (State Department, Washington,
1982), p.12. Robert Katz claims that at the time of Aldo Moro's 
abduction in 1978 there were some 209 terrorist groups in 
Italy, with 181 on the left and 28 on the right of the political 
spectrum. Robert Katz, Days of Wrath: The Public Agony of
Aldo Moro (Granada, London, 1980), p.300.
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they adopted and by the fact that they were quick to copy
57each other's ideas. As terrorist groups realised the
opportunities which lay beyond their own national boundaries
the scope of their operations expanded and, as circumstances
demanded, many formed loose cooperative alliances with other
5 8terrorist organisations and sympathetic states. The
constraints on action observed by earlier terrorist groups
59were no longer considered necessary, or sound. Unconsciously 
echoing the nineteenth century French anarchist Emile Henry,
While undoubtedly important, this diffusion of ideas and 
tactics can be exaggerated. E.S. Heyman claims, for example, 
that the robbery of former Argentine President Pedro Aranburu's 
corpse from its crypt by Montoneros in October 1974 prompted 
'Burmese radicals' to seize the remains of former UN Secretary- 
General U Thant from their temporary resting place in Rangoon 
only weeks later, in order to secure their own demands from 
the Ne Win regime. (E.S. Heyman, 'The Diffusion of Trans­
national Terrorism', in R.H. Shultz and Stephen Sloan (Eds), 
Responding to the Terrorist Threat: S ecurity and Crisis
Management (Pergamon Press, New York, 1980), p.190.) The 
students and Buddhist monks who took U Thant's coffin were 
acting from purely indigenous motives, however, were by no 
means terrorists and were unlikely ever to have heard of the 
Montoneros' action, which was not reported in the Burmese 
press. See Andrew Selth, 'With the First Shot Fired'
(unpublished paper, Rangoon, 1974).
5 8 An oft-quoted example of this cross-fertilisation of 
terrorist ideas and international cooperation is the case of 
the Japanese Red Army's attack on the occupants of the Lod 
Airport terminal in Tel Aviv in 1972. The operation is 
alleged to have been planned in Germany by a Palestinian Arab 
and carried out by Japanese trained in the Democratic Peoples 
Republic of Korea (DPRK), Syria and Lebanon. The terrorists 
were provided with funds in Germany and given Russian arms 
in Italy by an Algerian diplomat financed with Libyan money, 
before the attack took place in Israel. See P.N. Grabosky,
'The Urban Context of Political Terrorism' in Michael Stohl (Ed), 
The Politics of Terrorism (Dekker, New York, 1979), p.56, and 
Geoffrey Fairbairn, 'International Terrorism', Pacific Defence 
Reporter 5:3 (September 1978), p.94.
59 The Russian terrorists of Narodnaya Volya, for example, would 
not carry out one operation as it would result in injury to 
children. The Brazilian terrorists who kidnapped the FRG 
Ambassador in June 1970 recognised in the communique left at the 
scene that 'kidnapping endangers the lives of people who have 
nothing to do with the revolutionary struggle'. (Quoted in 
Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas: The New Face of Political
Violence {Alister Taylor, Wellington, 1972), p.206.) This 
sensitivity to the innocence of their victims was not shared by 
later terrorists. Those who took part in the Lod Airport 
attack, for example, claimed that 'no-one in Israel is innocent'.
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the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) declared in 1970 that:
there can be no political or geographical 
boundaries or moral limits to the operations 
of the peoples' camp. In today's world, 
no one is 'innocent', no one is 'neutral'.60
Individuals, states and international organisations were all 
made 'legitimate' targets in a vision of world-wide terrorism.
While each of these developments do not in themselves 
set modern terrorists apart from their historical forebears, 
they contributed to a coherent strategy of terrorism that 
was unique. As Brian Jenkins has observed, international 
terrorism today is:
an offshoot, the newest branch in the 
evolution of modern revolutionary and 
guerrilla warfare theories. It elevates 
individual acts of violence to the level 
of strategy ... It denigrates conventional 
military power by substituting dramatic 
violence played for the people watching.
It violates the conventional rules of 
engagement: it reduces the category of
innocent bystanders. It makes the world its battlefield: it recognises no
boundaries to the conflict, no neutral nations.61
Such a philosophy of action cast aside all traditional 
restraints on international behaviour - both in peace and 
war - and exposed the vulnerability of those whose position 
and protection depended on the universal acceptance of certain 
conventions and principles of international law. Foremost 
among these were diplomats who, together with their facilities, 
were quickly recognised as holding a unique symbolic value, 
both to the terrorists as targets and to the states which they 
represented.
Quoted in John Hamer, 'Protection of Diplomats', Editorial 
Research Reports 11:3 (October 1973), p.766.
61 B.M. Jenkins, High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War: 
The Impact of New Technology on Low-Level Violence, Rand Paper 
P-5339 (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, January 1975), p.8.
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The increased physical dangers to diplomats that
accompanied the growth in international terrorism have come
at a time when the functions of diplomacy are more important
than ever. Technological developments have made the nuclear
balance very fragile, power relationships are more fluid than
they have been for centuries, and both state and non-state
actors have grown in number and become more interdependent.
While in some respects there has been a decline in the role
played by traditional diplomacy since it reached its apogee
in nineteenth century Europe, and a decline in observance
of the rules which govern its workings, professional diplomats
continue to have an important place in the conduct of world 
6 2affairs. As Martin Wight has stated so succinctly:
Diplomacy is the system and the art of 
communication between powers. The 
diplomatic system is the master 
institution of international relations.
Thus any threat to the institution of diplomacy must have 
serious implications for the international order of which 
it is such an integral part.
Wilkinson, 'After Tehran1, p.5.
6 3 Martin Wight, Power Polities (Leicester University Press, 
Leicester, 1978), p.113.
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Chapter II 
THE PROBLEM
Diplomats and Diplomatic Facilities 
as Terrorist Targets
Almost every page of history offers 
some remark on the inviolable rights 
of ambassadors, and the security of 
their persons, a security sanctioned 
by every clause and precept of human 
and revealed law.
Hugo Grotius
De J u r e  B e l l i  ac  P a d s
(1625)
Despite the universal acceptance by states of the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability, the profession of 
diplomacy has always held its dangers. Throughout history 
diplomats have been exposed to insults, harassment and 
violent attack, sometimes at the hands of state authorities 
but more often from mobs and individuals with a grievance. 
Diplomats have been strangers in foreign lands, symbolising 
different political and economic systems, different standards 
of living, religions, and often different races. As 
interstate contacts grew and their official representative 
status came to be accepted as an integral part of 
international society, so diplomats were increasingly 
identified as vehicles through which popular grievances 
might be registered against the sending states. Only this 
century, however, have diplomats been viewed as worthwhile 
targets for terrorist attack.
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Once again, it was the Russians who led the way.
After the Bolshevik coup in October 1917 the Social
Revolutionary Party assassinated the German Ambassador to
the Soviet Republic in an attempt to disrupt relations
2between Moscow and Berlin. In 1923 a Soviet diplomat at 
the Lausanne Peace Conference was shot by White Russians 
and four years later another monarchist killed the Soviet 
Minister to Poland. In the 1930s the Counsellor of the 
German Embassy in Paris was murdered by an anti-Nazi emigre 
and not long afterwards the German Counsellor in Moscow 
suffered the same fate. The period immediately before the 
Second World War and the years that followed its end saw an 
increasing number of attacks on diplomats and diplomatic 
facilities. Clifton Wilson, who has carried out perhaps 
the most detailed study of this subject, could count the 
deaths of at least thirteen people attached to diplomatic 
missions between 1945-1967. 'Many more' were injured during4the same period. Most of those diplomats killed, however,
Some sources cite the murders of the Chancellor of the 
Japanese Legation and the German Minister in Peking in 1900 
as the first examples of terrorist attacks on diplomats this 
century. Both were killed by rebellious Chinese troops, 
however, not Boxers as often supposed, and the circumstances 
surrounding the two incidents are still unclear. See for 
example Lancelot Giles, The Siege of the Peking Legations:
A Diary, Edited with an Introduction, 'Chinese Anti-Foreignism 
and the Boxer Uprising' by L.R. Marchant (University of 
Western Australia Press, Nedlands, 1970), pp.71-72 and 82-84.
2 See C.W. Thayer, Diplomat (Michael Joseph, London, 1960),
p. 202 .
3 Diplomatic ranks have changed little over the years. After 
the Head of Mission (usually the Ambassador or, in the case 
of Commonwealth representatives, High Commissioner) follow 
the Minister, Counsellor, First Secretary, Second Secretary 
and Third Secretary. Non-diplomatic staff (who may, however, 
be accorded diplomatic rank and privileges) usually take the 
title of Attache, as in the case of the Defence Attache.
Most specialised officers, like the Trade Commissioner, are 
to all intents and purposes part of the diplomatic staff of 
the mission. See Sen, pp.30-35.
4 C.E. Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities (University 
of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1967) , p.52. See also Boyce, p.201.
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appear to have died as a result not of any particular
terrorist intent but from events related to the general5social turmoil and political unrest of the time.
There was a small number of isolated terrorist attacks, 
such as the abduction of the US Ambassador to Brazil in 1949 
and an attempt on the life of the US Ambassador to Japan ing1961, but with few exceptions none of the anti-colonial or 
revolutionary groups of the time seem to have had any policy7to attack diplomatic targets. No doubt because the 
mobilisation of international support was an integral part 
of their strategies they appear deliberately to have eschewed 
attacks which risked the alienation of the international 
diplomatic community. For example, General George Grivas, 
the leader of the Cypriot EOKA terrorists, declared in his 
1953 Preparatory General Plan:
The British must be continuously harried 
and beset until they are obliged by 
international diplomacy exercised 
through the United Nations to examine the 
Cyprus problem and settle it in accordance 
with the desires of the Cypriot people and the whole Greek nation.^
When a US Vice-Consul was accidentally killed by an EOKA bomb 
in 1956 the terrorists expressed their 'deep regret' to the 
US government and explained that the bomb was meant for a9Briton. It was not until the late 1960s that attacks on 
diplomats and their facilities were made a part of terrorist 
campaigns.
Between 1918 and 1968, for example, some 68 heads of state 
were assassinated. Bell, A Time of Terror, p.63.g James Eayrs, Diplomacy and its Discontents (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1971), p.10.
7 The Viet Cong attack on the US Embassy in Saigon during the 
1968 Tet offensive hardly qualifies as a terrorist attack on a 
diplomatic facility, but is worthy of note as a deliberate 
attack by insurgents on a diplomatic mission for its symbolic 
value in a propaganda war.g Reproduced as Appendix 1 in Grivas, pp.204-205.
Wilson, p.54.9
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While it is not possible to divide such complex 
phenomena into neatly defined periods, three very broad 
trends can be discerned in these sorts of terrorist attacks 
over the next fifteen years - kidnappings, embassy seizures 
and assassination attempts. Indiscriminate violence against 
diplomatic targets (usually in the form of bomb attacks) 
remained a feature throughout the period. The initial spate 
of kidnappings seems to have been a direct product of the 
collapse of rural-based insurgencies in Latin America. A 
member of the US Military Mission in Caracas was kidnapped 
by Venezuelan terrorists in 1963, and another in 1964, but 
no demands were made in either case and both captives were 
released unharmed after only a few days. Four years later 
two US Military Attaches in Guatemala were killed in what 
appears to have been an abortive kidnapping attempt. This 
was followed later in 1968 by the death of the US Ambassador 
to Guatemala, who was shot while attempting to escape his 
would-be terrorist kidnappers. It was in Brazil, however, 
that the tactic of abducting diplomats - 'diplonapping' - 
was first used successfully by terrorists to win concessions 
from the receiving government. In September 1969 the US 
Ambassador, Charles Elbrick, was kidnapped in Rio de Janeiro 
by members of the Movimento Revolucionario do Outubre 8, 
a group associated with the ALN. For the Ambassador's 
safe return the terrorists demanded the release of fifteen 
political prisoners from Brazilian gaols and the publication 
of their political manifesto. ALN leader Carlos Marighela 
declared that:
By kidnapping the American Ambassador we 
wish to demonstrate that it is possible to 
triumph over the dictatorship and 
exploitation if we are properly armed and organised.H
The actual relationship between the Revolutionary Movement 
8 October (MR-8) and the ALN is not clear. Peter Janke states 
that the Elbrick kidnapping was carried out by ALN militants 
'in conjunction with' members of MR-8. Janke, p.438. See also note 11.
11 Carlos Marighela, 'Declaration by the ALN October 
Revolutionary Group' in For the Liberation of Brazil (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1971), p.25.
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The Brazilian government responded with massive searches 
and increased military controls over the population but 
soon agreed to the A L N 's demands and the Ambassador was 
released without harm.
The success of this operation encouraged the Brazilian
terrorists to try again. In March 1970 the Japanese Consul-
General in Sao Paulo was abducted and later released in
return for five political prisoners. The following month
an attempt to seize the US Consul in Porto Allegre failed,
but in June the same year terrorists successfully kidnapped
the FRG Ambassador to Brazil, Ehrenfried von Holleben. A
communique left at the scene stated that 'the terrorists
would no longer confine themselves to kidnapping representatives
of the major powers: all foreign diplomats would be considered
12fair game'. Von Holleben was later set free in return for
the release of forty political prisoners. Only six months
later, when the Swiss Ambassador to Brazil was kidnapped,
the price of a diplomat's safe return had risen to seventy
political prisoners, yet it was paid. As Robert Moss has
13correctly observed, it was 'runaway inflation'. It was 
also the successful manipulation of forces both within the 
Brazilian government and outside it, as explained by the 
leader of MR-8 in 1970:
We orient our armed actions in such a 
way as to make them politically profitable.
For instance, the kidnapping of a foreign 
diplomat creates political problems for 
the regime. Either the regime agrees with 
the Minister of Interior not to give in and 
allows the diplomat to be killed - which 
creates difficulties with the foreign power 
the diplomat represents, and with which 
the regime has economic ties - or the regime
12 Moss, p . 206 .
13
op.cit. , p.245.
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meets the demands of the kidnappers 
and the diplomat is set free, then 
the army and police criticise the 
leniency of the Government and that 
creates dissension within the regime.
In our case, we only carried out 
kidnappings when we were fairly sure 
our demands would be met. We chose 
diplomats from countries on which 
Brazil is dependent and we knew the 
Minister of the Interior was not in 
a position to adopt a tough stance.14
The success of the diplomatic kidnappings in Brazil
ensured that the tactic would be quickly taken up by
terrorist groups elsewhere. Between August 1968 and May 1971
there were no less than 21 kidnappings or attempted
kidnappings of diplomatic personnel, in ten countries. All
15but four occurred in Latin America. Most of the hostages
were released unharmed but three, the FRG Ambassador to
Guatemala and a US AID Advisor in Uruguay in 1970, and the
Israeli Consul-General in Turkey a year later, were killed
by their captors after ransom demands were refused. After
the death of the US AID Advisor, a terrorist is reported to
have told a Cuban newspaper that the murder was necessary
for the kidnappers to retain their credibility and 'because
the success or failure of one urban guerrilla group in
using diplomatic kidnapping as a form of political blackmail
would influence other extremist movements that might be
16tempted to use the same weapon'. The kidnapping and death 
of Count Karl von Spreti, the FRG Ambassador to Guatemala, 
was significant for other reasons. It was the first time that
Quoted by Gramont, p.140.
15 The four incidents which took place outside Latin America 
were the kidnappings of the US Political Secretary in Jordan 
in June 1970, the UK Consul in Canada in October 1970, the 
German Honorary Consul in Spain in December and the Israeli 
Consul-General to Turkey in May 1970. See the table in Baumann, 
p.167.
16 Moss, p.228.
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money had been demanded as part of the ransom, the first
time that a diplomat had been killed by his captors and,
perhaps most importantly, the first time that a sending
government had publicly criticised the receiving government
for its inability both to protect the diplomatic personnel
for which it was responsible and to recover them safely in
the event that they were abducted. The West German government
sent a special envoy to Guatemala to press for accession
to the terrorists' demands and after von Spreti's murder
reduced its diplomatic relations with the Guatemalan government
to a bare minimum. FRG Chancellor Willy Brandt went as far
as suggesting that concerted international action be taken
to investigate this latest threat to diplomats, thus for
the first time removing the entire problem 'from the realm
of newspaper headlines to the realm of international law 
17and politics'.
Diplomatic kidnappings reached a peak in 1970, when there
were seventeen separate incidents. They then dropped away
quickly until 1972 when the number began to rise again.
According to the US State Department, diplomats from some
47 countries were kidnapped in the fifteen years between 
181968-1983. Personnel of all ranks were involved, including
a number of Honorary Consuls, although a study conducted by
the Rand Corporation in 1977 revealed that, of the 43
successful kidnappings carried out in the period August 1968-
June 1975, terrorists managed to abduct an Ambassador or at
19least a Consul-General 11 times. From 1972, however, this 
tactic was overshadowed by an increased number of bomb attacks 
and seizures of diplomatic facilities.
Baumann, p.101.
18 Terrorist Incidents Involving Diplomats. p.4.
19 Brian Jenkins, Janera Johnson and David Ronfeldt, Numbered 
Lives: Some Statistical Observations From 77 International
Hostage Episodes , Rand Paper P-5905 (Rand Corporation, Santa 
Monica, 1977), p.12.
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In 1955 six gunmen stormed the Romanian Legation in
Berne and demanded the release of anti-communists from
Romanian prisons, but this incident, like the seizure of
the Yugoslav Consulate in Gothenburg by Croatian emigres in
1970, apparently failed to capture the imagination of the
2 0world's terrorists. In December 1972, however, a significant 
new threat to diplomats emerged when the Israeli Embassy in 
Bangkok was seized by four members of the Black September 
Organisation (BSO), and its six occupants held hostage. The 
terrorists demanded the release of 36 Palestinian compatriots 
held in Israel but after 19 hours were persuaded by Thai 
authorities to free their captives in return for safe passage 
to Egypt. Less than three months later, eight members of 
the same terrorist group took control of the Saudi Arabian 
Embassy in Khartoum. They demanded the release of other 
Palestinians held in Israel and Jordan, and of members 
of the Red Army Faction imprisoned in the FRG. These demands 
were refused, but before surrendering to the Sudanese 
authorities the terrorists killed two US diplomats and a 
Belgian diplomat who had been in the Saudi Embassy at the 
time it was seized. In their tactics, the nature and scope 
of their demands, their ruthlessness and their use of one 
state's diplomatic assets to apply pressure on other states, 
these two terrorist attacks set a pattern for further seizures 
of diplomatic facilities in the years that followed.
Between 1972-1982 armed extremists took over embassies 
and consulates more than 50 times, 'generally to demand the 
release of prisoners or other political concessions, 
sometimes just to register disapproval of a particular policy'. 
There was a dramatic increase in such incidents after 1979, 
due in part no doubt to the example provided by the hostage
B.M. Jenkins, Embassies Under Siege: A Review of 48
Embassy Takeovers3 1971-1980, Rand Report R-2651-RC (Rand 
Corporation, Santa Monica, 1981), pp.1-6.
21 Jenkins, Diplomats on the Front Line, p.3.
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crisis in Iran but also because of political struggles like
that between Iraq and Iran, or that continuing in El Salvador.
By the end of 1982 the diplomatic facilities of 38 countries
had been seized by terrorists in at least 27 countries, with
the missions of the United States and Egypt the most popular
22targets for this form of terrorist attack. After 1981,
however, the number of seizures each year declined as
diplomatic facilities became more secure and as terrorists
came to accept the limited results that such operations usually 23achieved. Seizures of diplomatic facilities were not
eliminated from the terrorists' tactical inventory, but were 
replaced as the most prevalent threat to diplomats by a 
greater frequency of personal attacks.
As both sending and receiving states began taking measures 
to guard against kidnappings and the seizure of diplomatic 
facilities, so terrorist groups turned increasingly to 
bombings and assassination attempts against specific targets.
In 1970 about half the total number of international terrorist 
incidents were directed against people, half against property. 
By 1981 some 80 per cent of attacks were against people, 
and the proportion against diplomatic personnel seems to 
have risen accordingly.^ Many attacks were made with handguns 
but bombs, always a favourite terrorist weapon, were 
responsible for many more casualties. Between 1968 and 1983 
there were some 503 casualties in terrorist incidents involving
Jenkins, Embassies Under Siege, p.v and Perez, 'Terrorist Target: The Diplomat', p.2.
23 According to Brian Jenkins, embassy seizures were generally 
'a losing proposition' for terrorists. Their demands were 
met less than 17 per cent of the time and one third of all 
terrorists involved in such operations were killed or captured. 
Jenkins, Diplomats on the Front Line, p.3. Of course, it 
could be argued that in terms of the publicity gained by the 
terrorists all such attacks were successful to a greater or lesser degree.
24
Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981, p.4.
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diplomats, and 1,315 wounded. Over the past few years 
attacks have become more destructive and less discriminating 
in their victims, with a greater number of people killed 
and wounded. 1983 saw a new development with the use by 
some terrorist groups of large car bombs driven to their 
targets by fanatics willing to martyr themselves in order 
to cause the greatest damage and highest number of casualties. 
The bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut in April 1983, for 
example, resulted in the death of 63 people, including
y r17 Americans, with 120 people injured.
As several noted scholars have shown, there are a number
of serious obstacles to quantifying and evaluating trends of 
2 7this kind. The major difficulty, as always, lies in
determining precisely what constitutes a terrorist attack.
Another relates to the inevitable reliance of researchers
on incomplete data bases and untested sources. While
considerable efforts have been made by some collection
agencies there will always be gaps in information about any
clandestine activity. No figures can ever show the terrorist
operations planned but never carried out, begun but aborted
before they came to official notice and which may have taken
place in closed societies and never publicly revealed. Even
compilations in the same country with access to many of the
same sources, like those of the US State Department and the
2 8Rand Corporation, differ markedly in some crucial areas. 
Figures can in any case provide only part of the picture, as 
terrorist attacks also need to be judged in terms of their
25
Terrorist Incidents Involving Diplomats , p.3.
2 6 'Victims of Terrorism', Department of S täte Newsletter 
(May 1983) , p.2. See also Terrorist Bombings: A S tatistical
Overview of International Terrorist Bombing Incidents from 
January 1977 through May 1983 (State Department, Washington, 
1983), p.l.
27 Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, pp.50-53, Bell, 'Terror:
An Overview' in Livingston, pp.41-42 and Jenkins, Diplomats 
on the Front Line, pp.1-2.
2 8 This is demonstrated best by Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, 
pp.50-53.
36
effects. With all these problems in mind, it is nevertheless
still possible to survey the levels of terrorist attacks
on diplomats and diplomatic facilities over the past fifteen
29years and make some general observations.
Between 1968-1982 the Rand Corporation recorded 574
attacks against diplomats and diplomatic facilities, in
total more than 25 per cent of all international terrorist
30attacks for the period. By 1983, the level of attacks
against diplomatic targets had risen to nearly 40 per cent of 
31the total. The US State Department, which includes threats,
hoaxes, arms smuggling incidents and other kinds of terrorist-
related data in its statistics, has reckoned that the level
of attacks against diplomatic targets between 1968-1983
32stood at 52 per cent of the total. Both collection agencies
agree that the number of attacks against diplomats and
diplomatic facilities grew steadily almost every year,
jumping dramatically to reach a peak in 1980. On present
indications, 1984 seems likely to have recorded a level of
incidents at least as high and probably higher than at any
3 3time since these records were begun in 1968.
Both the Rand Corporation and State Department have compiled 
their statistics from 1 January 1968. Both being American 
agencies, it would be surprising if they did not show some 
bias in their figures, if not from ideological or other 
political reasons, then from the sources at their disposal.
30 Jenkins, Diplomats on the Front Line, p.l.
B.M. Jenkins, New Modes of Conflict, Rand Report R-3009-DNA 
(Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1983), p.14.
32 Terrorist Incidents Involving Diplomats , p.l and R.M. Sayre, 
'International Terrorism: A Long Twilight Struggle', Address
by Robert M. Sayre, Director of the Office for Counterterrorism 
and Emergency Planning, before the Foreign Policy Association, 
New York, 15 August 1984, Current Policy 608 (15 August 1984), 
p.l.
33 Jenkins, New Modes of Conflict, p.16. See also Brian 
Jenkins' predictions quoted in 'Embassies Under Seige',
Newsweek (11 December 1984), p.146 and Sayre, p.l.
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Not only are terrorists attacking diplomatic targets
more often but they are attacking the diplomats of more states.
To date terrorists have carried out operations against the34personnel and premises of at least 66 states with ten
nationalities the targets in more than half the incidents.
Those states most threatened with this kind of violence have
been the United States, Turkey and Yugoslavia, followed by35France, Cuba, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.
Attacks are taking place in more countries, although 42 per
cent of all incidents have occurred in North America and
Western Europe, with most of the remainder in Central America
and the Middle East. The most favoured location for
terrorist attacks against diplomats is the United States
3 6(particularly New York) followed by France, Lebanon,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Colombia, Italy and the 
37FRG. According to the State Department, 460 attacks on
diplomats or against diplomatic facilities between January3 81968-April 1983 resulted in deaths or personal injuries.
Jenkins, Diplomats on the Front Line, p.4. With its wider data base, the US State Department lists incidents involving 
the diplomats of 113 countries. See Terrorist Incidents 
Involving Diplomats , p.3.
35 In 1982 it was estimated that US diplomats were the intended 
victims in 29 per cent of all international terrorist attacks 
since 1968. See Jenkins, Diplomats on the Front Line, pp.4-5 
and Terrorist Incidents Involving Diplomats , p.3.
3 6 Half the terrorist attacks on diplomats in the United States 
have taken place in New York and have involved diplomatic 
missions to the United Nations. Only 20 per cent of the 
attacks in the US took place in Washington, with the remainder 
scattered throughout the country, reflecting the distribution 
of various ethnic communities and minor diplomatic posts. 
Jenkins, Diplomats on the Front Line, p.6. See also the 
report prepared by the State Department's Threat Analysis 
Group dated 2 April 1984 and entitled 'Terrorist Attacks 
Against Diplomatic Installations and Personnel in the US'.
This report was reproduced in the Hearings of the US House of 
Representatives Appropriation Committee: Budget Explanation:
State Department FY 1984: Request for Protection of Foreign
Missions and Officials in the US (1984).
37 Jenkins, Diplomats on the Front Line, p.6 and Terrorist 
Incidents Involving Diplomats, p.3.
3 8 Terrorist Incidents Involving Diplomats, pp.3-4.
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The State Department has listed some 102 groups claiming 
responsibility for attacks on diplomatic targets over the 
last fifteen years. The number is increasing each year 
and many of the new terrorist groups appear to be singling 
out diplomats as one of their primary targets. The motives 
for these attacks are almost as diverse as the groups 
responsible. While several attempts have been made to devise 
typologies for such incidents the most useful is perhaps 
that suggested by Brian Jenkins in Diplomats on the Front Line, 
published in 1982. In that study he identified five major40types of terrorist attack involving diplomats, as follows: 
terrorist attacks on diplomats that are associated with 
current insurgencies, such as those in Central America.
This is one of the largest categories: attacks by ethnic,
emigre or exile groups against the representatives of 
the state they oppose, such as those carried out by Croatian 
separatist groups against Yugoslav diplomats and diplomatic 
missions: worldwide attacks on foreign diplomats by
terrorists operating as part of a wider campaign against a 
government, such as those conducted by various Palestinian 
and Irish groups: isolated terrorist attacks against
diplomats by indigenous groups to protest the actions of a 
foreign government, one example of which would be the bombing 
of the French Embassy in Lima to protest against French 
nuclear tests in the Pacific: and finally, the government use
Terrorist Incidents Involving Diplomats , p.5. Once again, 
the State Department warns that some claims may be false and 
that some groups may have been invented to disguise the 
involvement of states or organisations in particular incidents. 
The State Department's list is reproduced as Appendix D of 
this thesis.
40 The following paragraph draws heavily on the typology 
expounded by Brian Jenkins in his study of Diplomats on the 
Front Line, pp.8-10. This manner of categorising terrorist 
attacks against diplomatic targets has also been followed by 
at least one international conference on the subject. See 
J.F. Murphy, 'Report on Conference on International Terrorism: 
Protection of Diplomatic Premises and Personnel, Bellagio, 
Italy, 8-12 March 1982' in Terrorism: An International
Journal 6:3 (1983), pp.483-484.
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of terrorist tactics, or employment of terrorist groups to 
attack foreign diplomats abroad as the continuation of a 
local armed conflict, or as a form of surrogate warfare.
The rash of attacks by Iran and Iraq against each other's 
diplomats since the war between the two countries began in 
1980 would fall into this category.
No terrorist group concentrates exclusively on attacks
against diplomats or diplomatic facilities, but a number
have given a high priority to these targets. Since their
latest terrorist campaign began in 1975 Armenian separatists,
for example, have carried out more than 70 attacks on Turkish
diplomats, resulting in the death of some 43, including
41members of their families. Various Croatian groups too
have singled out diplomatic targets for special attention,
although in their case their attacks have been directed
against Yugoslav officials and facilities. In 1973
Australian police seized a confidential booklet, probably42produced by the H rvatsko Revoluoionarno Bratsvo and
entitled 'Instructions for Croats Outside Their Homeland', 
which exhorted Croatian extremists to:
Destroy all Yugoslav embassies and 
consulates, kill Yugoslav diplomatic 
representatives because they are common criminals and Fascists.^3
'The New Terror Network', Newsweek (12 February 1985), p.112. 
This figure is considerably higher than other estimates (The 
Australian of 13 December 1984, for example, cites 26), but 
includes the victims of attacks in 1973 and 1974, and counts 
family members. See also Andrew Corsun, Armenian Terrorism: 
1975-1980, Research Papers on Terrorism, Office of Security 
Threat Analysis Group, US Department of State (State Department, 
Washington, n.d.) and 'Terrorism: The Turkish Experience', 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, 97th Congress,
First Session, 25 June 1981.
42 Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, or HRB. This group was 
apparently 'neutralised' for a time but re-emerged in 
Australia as the H rvatska Ilegalna Revolueionarna Organizaoija 
or Croat Illegal Revolutionary Organisation (HIRO), before 
reverting to its original name. See Stephen Clissold, Croat 
Separatism: Nationalism> Dissidence and Terrorism, Conflict
Studies 103 (Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, 1979), 
p. 15.
43 Quoted in Clissold, p.16.
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A number of anti-Castro Cuban groups and various Palestinian
groups have also singled out diplomatic targets for attack,
as have Jewish extremist organisations active in the United
States and Western Europe. In 1974 a number of Latin American
terrorist groups established a Junta de Coovdinacion
Revolucionaria in Paris, one of the main purposes of which
was to facilitate the assassination of Latin American . . 44diplomats in Europe. Diplomatic targets are still popular 
with extremists in Latin America itself.
Despite some superficial similarities, these terrorist
attacks are in many ways unique, arising from and taking
place in circumstances that can never be repeated. Yet
here again some general observations can be made. Diplomats
and diplomatic facilities might be chosen as primary or
instrumental targets,4“* attacked either because of their
immediate value to the terrorists (such as the assassination
of the British Ambassador to Ireland in July 1976 by the
IRA) or because they may be used as a means to induce certain
responses in other governments, as was the case when members
of Colombia's Movimiento 19 Abril occupied the Dominican
Embassy in Bogota in February 1980 and used the 18 high
ranking diplomats captured there at the time to bargain with
the Colombian government.47 Often, elements of both are 48present. In these ways, terrorists have been able to
Junta of Revolutionary Coordination. Laqueur, Terrorismp. 228 .
Murphy, in Evans and Murphy, p.280.
46 April 19 Movement, or M-19.
47 When M-19 attacked the Dominican Embassy a reception was 
being held, attended by the Ambassadors of the United States, 
Mexico, Austria and seven other countries, including the 
Papal Nuncio. The terrorists demanded the release of 311 
political prisoners, a US$50 million ransom and safe conduct 
out of the country. See F.J. Hacker, 'A Case Study of Hostage Negotiation' in Herz, pp.1-5.
48 B.M. Jenkins, 'International Terrorism: A New Mode ofConflict' in Carlton and Schaerf, pp.16-18.
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register protests against particular states and win various 
concessions, such as the release of political prisoners, the 
publication of political statements or simply additional 
operating funds. In some cases terrorist actions against 
diplomats have prompted responses by states that have either 
been repressive, and thus counter-productive, or else of
such a nature as to threaten the very liberties which the
49 . .states claim to defend. Attacks have embarrassed receiving
governments by exposing their inability to protect diplomats
and their facilities and in other ways caused friction with
the sending states. The latter in their turn have been
obliged to divert resources to protect their missions abroad
and have suffered additional uncertainties in the conduct of
their international relations. These victories for the
terrorists, however, have been largely tactical. The real
value of diplomatic targets for terrorist groups lie in
their ability to promote wider strategic objectives.
Diplomats and diplomatic facilities are uniquely
valuable targets for any terrorist group. After centuries,
the diplomat is now 'the most purely representative figure
of his time. Behind him stands his whole country and its
aims ... He is the point of contact between policy and the
50world outside'. By attacking one official or one office 
a terrorist group which is not structurally or logistically 
equipped for a larger scale war can in effect assault an 
entire state, group of states or world system in miniature.
Obvious examples of the first include the massive repression 
that followed terrorist actions in Brazil and Uruguay. The 
second category could arguably include the overwhelming 
military responses to incidents in Canada in 1970 and Australia 
in 1978. Grant Wardlaw has recently argued for greater 
caution in state responses, with particular attention to 
the British effort against the IRA, in 'Terrorism, Counter- 
Terrorism and the Democratic Society', draft chapter prepared 
for inclusion in Michael Stohl and G.A. Lopez (Eds), State 
Terrorism: New Perspectives for Research (forthcoming).
50 J.D.B. Miller, The World of States (Croom Helm, London,
1981), p.35.
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Terrorists can attack a policy, an alliance or a world view.
Thus the American Ambassador kidnapped in Brazil in 196951represented the 'big North American capitalists' and
the British Ambassador kidnapped by Tupamaros in Montevideo52in 1971 was seen as a symbol of 'British imperialism'.
Soviet missions have been attacked because they represent 
the communist system and US missions because they represent 
the capitalist system. Egyptian missions have been seized 
because Egypt supported the Camp David Accords and Saudi 
Arabian missions have been bombed because that country 
supported Western peace initiatives in Lebanon. Yugoslav 
diplomats have been assassinated because their government 
denies Croatians a separate state of their own and Turkish 
officials are threatened because of what a Turkish government 
did to the Armenian population over 70 years ago. Because 
of their uniquely representative function diplomats and 
diplomatic facilities are seen as potent symbols through the 
manipulation of which terrorists can seize the initiative in 
a psychological war.
Such attacks also ensure the terrorists of an immediate 
and wide response. By openly flouting the time-honoured 
principle of diplomatic inviolability terrorists 
'automatically engage the attention and concern of the entire 
diplomatic community as well as the states directly involved'. 
Just as importantly, the blatant contravention of such well- 
established legal and ethical norms gives the terrorists' 
actions additional shock value, which in turn guarantees them
53
51 Carlos Marighela, 'On the Organisational Function of 
Revolutionary Violence' in For The Liberation of Brazil, 
p. 38.
52 Bell, A Time of Terror, p.55. Sir Geoffrey Jackson's 
account of his capture and eight-month imprisonment is given 
in People’s Prison (Faber, London, 1973).
53 Baumann, p.110.
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greater publicity. For, as one observer has noted, 'terrorism
is theatre' and targets are chosen in large part because
of the attention they are likely to attract in the
international news media. Even after fifteen years of such
incidents the murder of a diplomat is still considered
newsworthy, as was demonstrated in November last year when
world attention was focussed on the assassination of a middle-
ranking British official in a minor diplomatic post in 
55India. Should public interest begin to wane more spectacular 
operations, such as the car bomb attacks on diplomatic 
missions in Beirut in 1983 and 1984 can quickly regain the 
world's attention.
All these factors have combined to make diplomatic 
targets peculiarly attractive to terrorist groups and seem 
assured to keep diplomats and their facilities in the 'front 
line'. Yet in recent years another reason has been suggested 
for the increased number of attacks on diplomatic targets.
This is the use of terrorist tactics, and the employment of 
terrorist groups, by established states to attack the diplomats 
of other states abroad, either as an extension of a 
particular foreign policy or as a form of surrogate warfare.
Brian Jenkins, quoted in Philip Schlesinger, Graham Murdock 
and Philip Elliott, Televising Terrorism: Political Violence
in Popular Culture (Comedia, London, 1983), p.12.
55 On 27 November 1984 Percy Norris, the British Deputy High 
Commissioner in Bombay, was being driven to the UK Consulate 
when two men shot him as his car stopped at a traffic light.
The following day a man calling from Bucharest, Romania, 
informed European news agencies that theunurder had been carried 
out by the 'Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims', 
a group believed responsible for the shooting of the Israeli 
Ambassador to Britain in June 1982 and the death of another 
British diplomat in Athens in March 1984. See 'Embassies 
Under Siege', Newsweek, p.149.
5 6 A number of studies have examined the relationship between 
the media and terrorist violence. See for example Richard 
Clutterbuck, The Media and Political Violence (Macmillan, 
London, 1981) and 'Terrorism and the Media: A Special Issue',
Terrorism: An International Journal 2:1 and 2 (1979).
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Chapter III 
THE COMPLICATION 
State-Sponsored Terrorism
How should you govern any kingdom 
That know not how to use ambassadors?
William Shakespeare 
King Henry VI3 Part 3 
(16th Century)
The growing scope and complexity of international 
terrorism, particularly the threat to diplomats and 
diplomatic facilities, has caused widespread concern among 
members of the international community and prompted a lively 
debate on the measures appropriate for their protection. 
Consideration of this matter, however, has been greatly 
complicated not only by differing interpretations of the 
nature of terrorism but by the involvement of states themselves 
in terrorist activities.
Once again, this problem is not new but since the 1960s, 
when terrorism emerged as a coherent doctrine of revolutionary 
warfare and a myriad groups sprang up around the world 
to capitalise on the increased vulnerability of modern 
society, the involvement of governments in terrorism has 
been given considerable attention. The debate over this 
matter has been heightened by the open admission of some states 
that they were prepared to sponsor terrorist groups as a 
means of extending their foreign policy options and by the 
Reagan Administration's insistence that terrorism has become 
a global issue with the potential to destroy diplomacy,
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undermine world stability and threaten civilisation itself.
In taking these extreme positions, both sides have drawn 
attention to the breakdown of the international system which 
has prevailed since 1945, in which the two great powers and 
their allies could indulge in terrorist activities of all 
kinds without upsetting the basic framework of world order 
which they established as a victorious alliance at the end 
of the Second World War. With the emergence of other states 
less prepared to acquiesce in this system and independent 
groups active outside it the ability of the great powers 
to control events has greatly diminished, thus adding to 
the general uncertainty of international relations and in 
particular to the insecurity of the United States in the 
face of growing Soviet power. In such a situation diplomacy 
can play a crucial role yet paradoxically the sponorship 
of terrorist groups by some states has also challenged the 
principles on which that institution is based.
The problem of state involvement in terrorist activities, 
in particular those relating to diplomacy, can be approached 
at three levels. The first level is that at which 
encouragement - either active or passive - is given by 
governments to groups or mobs which threaten diplomats and 
diplomatic facilities within their own national boundaries.
The second level is that of support - either direct or indirect 
by a government for terrorists operating in other states, while 
the third is that at which states actually conduct terrorist 
operations themselves, either using their own operatives 
or by enlisting terrorist groups directly to act on their 
behalf.
This is a recurring theme in statements made by members of 
the Reagan Administration. See in particular G.P. Shultz, 
'Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies', Address by
the Secretary of State before the Jonathan Institute's Second 
Conference on International Terrorism, Washington, 24 June 1984 
Reprinted in Current Policy 589 (24 June 1984), pp.2-3.
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There have been innumerable cases in the past where 
governments have knowingly failed to show respect, or provide 
protection for diplomats and diplomatic facilities for which 
they were responsible under international law. It is not 
the place here to investigate the record of harassment, 
insult or minor injury suffered by diplomats at the hands 
of state officials, nor is it appropriate to survey the long 
history of violations of diplomatic premises and 
communications. Yet it is useful briefly to consider some 
instances of government complicity in attacks on diplomats 
and their facilities by violent mobs. Perhaps the first 
and most celebrated instance this century occurred in 1900 
when the Chinese Empress Dowager formed a loose alliance 
with a rebellious coalition of soldiers and millenarian 
elements to besiege the Peking Legation Quarter for 55 days.
A comparable wave of anti-foreign sentiment arose in China 
during the Cultural Revolution in 1966-1967, when Red Guards 
assaulted the diplomats of several states and attacked a 
number of missions. The British Embassy was burnt down by 
a violent mob and over 20 serious violations of diplomatic 
immunity recorded. These attacks were made with the 
knowledge of the Chinese authorities who did nothing to 
prevent or stop them. In reply to formal protests from 
the diplomatic community the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
reportedly refused assistance and declared that 'diplomatic 
immunity is a product of bourgeois norms1.^
It is worthy of note that the receiving state retains its 
formal responsibilities for the protection of diplomatic 
missions, and they their inviolability, even in the case of an 
irreparable breach in relations between the sending and 
receiving states, even war. Thus diplomats and diplomatic 
facilities are entitled to protection from violent mobs 
regardless of any differences that might be at issue between 
the two states at the time. See Article 44 of the Vienna 
Convention in Appendix E.
 ^ Giles, passim.
Quoted in Boyce, p.207. Ironically, while the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry was rejecting requests for protection from the 
diplomatic community in Peking, the Burmese government called 
out armed troops to protect the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon 
from a violent mob which had attacked it, killing one Chinese 
diplomat. See Ralph Pettman, China in Burma's Foreign Policy ,
Contemporary China Papers 7 (Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1973), pp.31-34.
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There were also a number of violent attacks on 
diplomatic missions in Indonesia during the 1960s, most 
of which were clearly carried out with the approval of the 
local authorities. In 1963, for example, the British and 
Malaysian Embassies in Jakarta were sacked and a number of 
diplomatic staff injured by mobs protesting against the5formation of the Malaysian Federation. The Suharto regime 
inspired or at least condoned a number of attacks on Chinese 
diplomatic personnel and facilities between 1965-1970 and 
probably had a part in attacks on two US consulates in 
Indonesia during the same period. On all these occasions 
requests for protection from the diplomatic community were 
refused. The tactic of exploiting violent mobs to register 
grievances against another governemnt has also been 
demonstrated by the Cambodians. In 1965 a large crowd 
attacked the US Embassy in Phnom Penh with the obvious 
knowledge of Prince Sihanouk's Administration. In 1970, 
shortly after the Prince was deposed by Lon Nol in a military 
coup, a similar attack was made against the Embassy of the 
North Vietnamese. The same year, the Chinese and DPRK 
Ambassadors to Cambodia were held hostage by the Lon Nol 
Government pending the safe evacuation of Cambodian diplomatic 
staff from Pyongyang and Peking. In 1979 the US Embassies 
in Tripoli and Islamabad were both stormed by mobs instigated
oby the local governments. Other examples abound.
In return, the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur was sacked 
by a Malaysian mob and three Indonesian diplomats seized as 
hostages. These incidents are described in detail in 
J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute
1962-1966 (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1974), 
pp.181-193.
 ^Boyce, p.203.
 ^ ibid.
Q
Between 1970 and 1980 'there were some 70 forcible incursions 
into diplomatic facilities'. Fifty per cent occurred after 
the Iranian hostage seizures. Perez, 'Terrorist Target: The
Diplomat', p.2.
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Because of the international repercussions of obvious 
state complicity in such attacks the fiction is usually 
maintained that they occurred either without the knowledge 
of the local authorities or that the security forces of 9the receiving government had been unable to prevent them.
In many cases where mob violence was serious official 
apologies were later offered and in some cases, like that 
of the British Embassy burnt down in Peking, reparations 
were made to the sending state. Thus the seizure of the 
US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, and the holding of 
its American occupants for over a year,10 shocked the 
international community not so much because Iran had signally 
failed to protect them - that had happened often enough 
before - but because the regime of the Ayotollah Khomeini 
openly 'adopted1 the attack as its own.'*’"*' As US President 
Jimmy Carter later wrote of the seizure:
9 Receiving states are bound by the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations to protect diplomatic personnel, 
according to Sen even against the expression of 'hostile 
views, contempt or even disapprobation of a foreign state'. 
Sen, pp.97-98. States are also obliged by international 
law to exercise 'due diligence' to prevent the commission 
on their territory of certain acts by private persons to 
other states, or their representatives. J.L. Brierly,
The Law of Nations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984), 
p.289.
10 There were 100 people in the US Embassy compound when 
it was seized on 4 November 1979. The 34 locally-engaged 
staff members were immediately allowed to go and after two 
weeks the 13 black and female Americans held hostage were 
also permitted to leave. One other member of the Embassy 
staff was released because of illness in July 1980, leaving 
52 hostages held for the 444 days of the 'crisis'. They 
were finally released on 21 January 1981. A detailed 
chronology of these events is given in Pierre Salinger,
America Held Hostage: The 5 ecret Negotiations (Andre Deutsch,
London, 1981), pp.311-319.
11 There had been one earlier example of a state openly 
embracing terrorists on its own soil (though not for a 
terrorist act committed within its own borders). Ugandan 
President Idi Amin clearly supported the Palestinian 
terrorists who hijacked an Air France Airbus and flew it to 
Entebbe Airport in June 1976. See William Stevenson,
90 Minutes at Entebbe (Corgi, London, 1976), p.ix.
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We were deeply disturbed, but reasonably 
confident that the Iranians would soon 
remove the attackers from the embassy 
compound and release our people. We and 
other nations had faced this kind of 
attack many times in the past, but never, 
so far as we knew, had a host government 
failed to attempt to protect threatened 
diplomats.12
Both the Iranian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had 
given the US a firm pledge that US staff and property would 
be protected, but in blatant disregard of these undertakings, 
traditional custom, international law and world opinion 
the militants who had stormed the US compound were 
subsequently given official blessing.
While strictly speaking assaults on diplomats and
diplomatic facilities of this kind do not constitute state-
sponsored terrorism as defined earlier, they are nevertheless
a form of symbolic attack by one state upon another through
the agency of non-state actors. In demonstrating the
receiving state's displeasure and applying pressure for
policy changes they act as an extension of that state's
foreign policies and as such have been included in Herman
Kahn's controversial analysis of the progressive
13intensification of political conflict. These attacks 
also highlight the fragility of diplomatic conventions and 
are illustrative of the failure of some states to observe 
the customary rules regarding the protection of diplomats 
and their facilities. By extension, they suggest too that 
such international instruments can never be sufficient in 
themselves to commit states to the peaceful settlement of 
disputes and restrain them from other forms of attack on 
diplomatic targets.
12 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President(Bantam Books, Toronto, 1982), p.457.
13 Herman Kahn, On Es eolation: Metaphors and 5 eenarios
(Penguin, Baltimore, 1968), p.73.
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I "7covert or indirect foreign intervention. Few of the
states sponsoring participants in these struggles appear
to have been particularly concerned about the tactics used
and in a number of cases were themselves directly involved
18in terrorist operations. By the late 1960s, however, 
many insurgent groups were turning to tactics of a different 
kind. At the same time there arose a number of groups 
without any specific national or political constituency 
and whose ideologies contained a significant nihilistic 
element. International diplomatic support was no longer 
prized and such restraints on action as had existed before 
well nigh disappeared. The sponsorship of such groups 
involved states in the hijacking of. aircraft, kidnappings, 
assassinations and indiscriminate violence against civilian 
targets. It also deeply implicated them in attacks on 
diplomats and diplomatic facilities. The international 
scope of these attacks, their apparent lack of rationale 
and popular support, and in particular their targets, 
separated modern terrorists from other insurgent groups and 
made government support a more sensitive issue.
It is easy to find lists of countries accused of 
sponsoring international terrorism, but with few exceptions 
these tend to be compiled by Western observers concerned 
exclusively with agitational terror which is felt to serve 
the interests of the Eastern bloc. Thus Brian Crozier of 
the London-based Institute for the Study of Conflict told a
17 Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p.177.
Wilkinson claims that less than 10 per cent of the 
internationally significant outbreaks of violence since 1945 
were direct military conflicts.
18 One of the more publicised recent examples of this 
involvement is the participation of Americans in the selective 
assassination of Vietnamese civilians under the Phoenix 
Program in South Vietnam after 1968. While the subject of 
considerable controversy, this participation has been 
confirmed by CIA operatives working in Vietnam at the time.
See Michael Maclear, Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War
(Thames Methuen, London, 1981), p.255.
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subcommittee of the US Senate in 1975 that the Soviet Union
and its Eastern European satellites, the Peoples Republic of
China, the DPRK, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Tanzania, Zambia,
Congo (Brazzaville) and Zaire, the Peoples Democratic
Republic of Yemen (PDRY), Iraq, Syria and Libya were all19'subversive centres'. Other Western commentators and
government spokesmen have since added Lebanon, Iran, Uganda,
20Somalia and Egypt. The US State Department has also
compiled a list of 24 countries, including Mexico and Chile,
which it claims has offered political asylum to known 
21terrorists. Yet such lists must be treated with caution.
They can be greatly lengthened or drastically reduced,
depending on the definition of terrorism used and the
ideological persuasion of the person or agency compiling
them. There is immense room for the application of double
standards. No Western list, for example, includes the names
of those countries which provide aid to regimes which depend
on enforcement terror to maintain power and can thus be
2 2accused of 'surrogate terrorism'. Rarely are countries
like Saudi Arabia, Greece or even Australia mentioned despite
their past tolerance of and even support for certain terrorist 
23groups. Too often countries like China, Egypt and Jordan
'Terrorist Activity: International Terrorism', Hearings
before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration 
of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws 
of the Committee of the Judiciary, US Senate, 94th Congress, First Session, Part 4, 14 May 1975.
20 See for example D.M. Trent, A National Policy to Combat 
Terrorism, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 
Reprint Series 22 (Stanford University, Stanford, 1979), p.2.
21 Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981, p.2.
22 Stohl, 'National Interests', p.51.
Yugoslavia has exerted considerable pressure on the 
Australian government in the past for its tolerance of, and 
alleged financial support for, Croatian extremist organisations. Clissold, pp.12-13. It is suspected that 
since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Greece has given 
assistance to Armenian terrorist groups.
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are left off the West's lists because of current political 
sensitivities - a consideration that has now apparently 
been extended to Iraq.24 Support for groups like the 
Contras in Nicaragua or the mujahideen in Afghanistan is 
ignored while comparable Eastern bloc support for insurgent 
groups in Central America is included. Clandestine operations 
by Western intelligence services are overlooked while those 
of the West's adversaries are not.
Even if consideration of this problem was confined
to those states which have given support to insurgent
terrorists over recent years, it would be difficult to be
specific. Because of its largely clandestine nature, the
extent of this assistance is hard to determine. It covers
a wide range of activities and is constantly changing. It
would appear, however, that the Soviet Union, its Eastern
European satellites and a number of radical Arab states in
particular have provided considerable amounts of arms, funds,
training and logistical support, both directly and through
intermediaries. A conference on 'International Terrorism:
Protection of Diplomatic Premises and Personnel' held in 1982
was told that the Palestine Liberation Organisation had an
annual budget of US$250 million, some of which was distributed
25to other terrorist groups. Colonel Qaddafi's support 
for a wide range of terrorist organisations since the mid-
The omission of Iraq from such lists is apparently 
'diplomatic bait' to encourage more moderate behaviour.
Murphy, 'Report on Conference', p.496.
25 Murphy, 'Report on Conference', p.484. Such figures can be 
very misleading if used without care, as has been done, for 
example, in Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Weapons 
of Terror: International Terrorism at Work (Macmillan, London, 
1979), pp.82-83. Even after the PLO has used a large 
proportion of these funds for its own operating expenses, 
including the cost of running its own 'diplomatic' service, 
it has substantial amounts to pass on to other groups such as 
the IRA, the African National Congress (ANC), and the Fuerzas 
Armadas de Liheraoion Naoional (the Puerto Rican separatist 
group responsible for a number of incidents in the US) . These 
funds pale into insignificance, however, compared with some 
of the ransoms paid to some Latin American groups. It has been 
estimated that between 1968-1980 over US$250 million was paid 
as ransom to terrorists by multinational companies alone. See 
'International Terrorism', Address by the Head, Protective 
Services Coordination Centre, to the Joint Services Staff 
College, Canberra, 22 February 1983, p.10.
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1970s is now well established and often proudly admitted.
The Libyan Secretary of Information, for example, was 
reported to have stated in 1980 that:
We are proud to be used ... We assert 
to the whole world that we provide 
material, moral and political support 
to every liberation revolution in the world.26
Such boasts need to be treated carefully. As William
Gutteridge has reminded observers, 'the tireless fanaticism27attributed to the Libyan leader can easily be overdrawn',
yet Libya has certainly been extraordinarily generous in
the provision of funds, facilities and material support
2 8to international terrorists. Iran has usually been less
open about its aid to terrorist groups but probably wider
in its reach, giving support to groups in Europe, the Middle
East and Asia. The PDRY and DPRK appear to have concentrated
their efforts on the provision of training facilities and
since 1964 are reputed to have trained thousands of terrorists29from around the world. Cuba too is reported to have been
lavish in its support for terrorist groups in Latin America,
both in its own right between 1960-1968 and on behalf of
30the Soviet Union after that time.
Quoted in Cline and Alexander, p.69.
27 William Gutteridge (Ed), Libya: Still a Threat to Western
Interests? Conflict Studies 160 (Institute for the Study of 
Conflict, London, 1984), p.3.
2 8 Gutteridge, pp.3-6. See also 'Libyans Arm and Train 
World Terrorists', New York Times 16 July 1976, pp.Al-A6. 
Colonel Qaddafi is reputed to have paid the international 
terrorist known as 'Carlos' US$2 million for his attack on 
the OPEC Ministers' meeting in Vienna in December 1975.
29 David Rees, North Korea's Growth as a S ubversive Centre, 
Conflict Studies 28 (Institute for the Study of Conflict, 
London, 1972) , Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981, p.21, and Shultz and Sloan, p.204.
30 'The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion' 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, 97th Congress,
26 February-12 March 1982. See also Sterling, p.247. 1968
is the year the Soviet KGB is reputed to have taken control 
of its Cuban counterpart, the Direocion General de 
Int eiligen eia (DGI) .
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Not only are states providing increasing support for
international terrorist groups, but they are becoming
directly involved in terrorist operations. Often groups are
enlisted to conduct attacks on behalf of a state and there
is apparently a growing trend in the use of official personnel
directly to carry out terrorist attacks. Most states have
carried out covert intelligence operations before, a category31which has included kidnappings and assassinations, but
rarely have they participated in a concerted campaign of
international terrorist violence. Once again, Libya has
been most open about its activities, with public threats
against its critics abroad and, particularly after the Gulf32of Sirte incident in August 1981, against United States
officials and offices abroad. A number of Libyan 'hit
teams' have been sent to assassinate American diplomats in
Europe and efforts to assassinate the US Ambassador to Egypt
are well documented. Other 'hit teams' have successfully
murdered a number of Libyan exiles in several different
countries. Despite widespread condemnation of these practices
and the deportation of some of the Libyans involved there is
no sign that Libya's support for these 'suicide commandos'
34will ease in the near future. Iran too has been directly
There has been a recent spate of books dealing with this 
subject, among them John Barron's KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet 
Secret Agents (Transworld, London, 1975), The CIA and the Cult 
of Intelligence (Dell, New York, 1975) by Victor Machettti 
and J.D. Marks, and Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary 
(Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975). While there is considerable 
controversy over the apparent revelations in such works, there 
seems little doubt that the covert operations of these (and 
other) intelligence services have included assassinations and 
kidnappings, and other activities now associated with terrorist 
groups.
32 In 1973 Libya insisted that the Gulf of Sirte was entirely 
Libyan territory. Almost as soon as he was inaugurated,
President Reagan announced that the Sixth Fleet's summer 
manoeuvres would be held in the Gulf, within the area claimed 
by Colonel Qaddafi. When they took place in August 1981,
Libyan jets converged on the US Fleet and two were shot down. 
Gutteridge, p.18.
33 Murphy, 'Report on Conference', p.495.
Grant Wardlaw, 'Terrorism: State involvement adds new 
dimension', Pacific Defence Reporter, Annual Reference Edition 
(December 1984/January 1985), p.59.
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involved in such incidents and can be linked to attacks on
Americans and Israelis in Lebanon, as well as terrorist
bombings in Kuwait. Although its support has diminished since
1980, Iraq has consistently sponsored 'Black June1, a
Palestinian group formed in 1976 and responsible for a
number of attacks on Israeli and Arab diplomats in Western
Europe. Perhaps one of the most spectacular examples of
state-sponsored terrorism of this kind occurred in Rangoon
in October 1983 when members of a DPRK Army team were
responsible for a bomb attack on the party of the visiting
35South Korean President.
The frequency of state-sponsored terrorist attacks
seems to be growing rapidly. In 1982 the US State Department
cliaimed that it had evidence of 129 attacks conducted
directly by national governments, 80 per cent of which had
3 6taken place in 1980 and 1981. These accounted for some
25 per cent of all international terrorist attacks for the 37period. Two years later, the US Secretary of State
identified over 70 attacks in 1983 alone in which significant3 8state support or participation was felt to have occurred.
Such attacks resulted in a large number of casualties. 
Obviously, these figures too must be used with caution.
Accurate information on such incidents is difficult to obtain 
and the figures are most likely distorted by the large 
number of attacks that Iran and Iraq have been making on 
each other's diplomats as part of the current war between 
them. Yet the US statistics are probably correct in reflecting 
a greater willingness on the part of terrorist groups to
See The Bomb Attack at the Martyrs’ Mausoleum in Rangoon: 
Report on the findings by the Enquiry Committee and the 
measures taken by the Burmese Government (Rangoon, 1984).
3 6 'International Terrorism', Gist (September 1984), pp.1-2. 
37 Paul Wilkinson, 'State-sponsored international terrorism: 
the problem of response', The World Today (July 1984), p.292.
3 8 G.P. Shultz, 'Terrorism: The Problem and the Challenges',
Statement by the Secretary of State before the US House of 
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington,
13 June 1984, Current Policy 586 (13 June 1984), p.2. See 
also Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981, p.4.
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serve state interests and a growing tendency on the part 
of some states to use terrorism to pursue their foreign 
policy goals. These trends are important for a number of 
reasons, one of which is the impact such practices are 
making on the conduct of diplomacy.
The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
(Article 41) specifically enjoins the representatives of 
sending states to respect the laws and regulations of 
the receiving state and not to interfere in the internal 
affairs of that state. The same Article reads in part:
The premises of the mission must not 
be used in any manner incompatible with 
the functions of the mission as laid 
down in the present Convention or by 
other rules of general international 
law or by any special agreements in force 
between the sending State and the 
receiving State.39
Yet there have always been cases where the provisions of
this Article have been ignored. Diplomats have often
40strayed close to the edges of propriety and diplomatic 
missions have long been used to shelter intelligence agents. 
This has entailed support for covert operations, including 
some against the host government. Such operations have 
ranged from contact with opposition groups and simple 
intelligence gathering to kidnappings, assassinations and
See Appendix E.
40 Thayer cites the case of Franz von Papen, the German 
Military Attache in Washington during the First World War, 
who was declared persona non grata for being implicated in 
plots to destroy US ammunition dumps. As early as 1584 the 
Spanish Ambassador in London was expelled for plotting against 
Queen Elizabeth I. Thayer, pp.211-212. As Martin Wight 
has observed, 'Diplomacy and espionage were always distinct 
in principle. But they have enough in common to be long 
confused with each other'. Sometimes this confusion has 
extended to diplomats themselves. Wight, p.116.
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plots against the receiving government. There appears
no precedent, however, to the current widespread use of
diplomatic facilities by some states for the purpose of
conducting terrorist operations abroad against expatriates
and foreign governments. Over the past fifteen years
diplomatic bags have been extensively used to smuggle arms
and ammunition, and diplomatic premises have often become
centres for the storage and distribution of terrorist42literature and materials. Diplomatic communications have 
been used to coordinate operations between terrorists and 
their state sponsors and diplomatic credentials have been 
provided both for state assassins and 'free lance' terrorists.
In addition to this use of diplomatic facilities, 
diplomats themselves, or at least officials given that title, 
have been responsible for liaison with terrorist groups, 
providing them with arms, intelligence about their targets, 
accommodation and guidance. Calls in April 1982 for a 
'purge of the embassies' in Paris followed the discovery 
that the diplomats of a number of states were implicated in 
a series of terrorist incidents in France and on numerous 
other occasions 'diplomats' have been declared persona non
A celebrated early example of this was the abduction of 
Chinese nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen by the Manchu Secret 
Service in London in 1896. Sun was imprisoned in the Chinese 
Legation for 12 days before pressure from the Foreign Office 
secured his release. Richard Deacon, A History of the Chinese 
Secret Service (Muller, London, 1974), pp.139-158. In 1966 
the Chinese Embassy in the Hague was accused of a similar 
operation. The ROK and DPRK have often accused each other of 
abducting one another's nationals in this way.
42 For example, the Palestinian terrorists responsible for 
the abduction and deaths of the Israeli athletes in Munich in 
1972 received their arms from Libyan diplomats who had used 
diplomatic privilege to smuggle them into Germany. The 
Canberra Times of 12 February 1973 reported that a cache of 
arms found hidden in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad by the 
Pakistan government consisted of some 300 automatic weapons, 
60,000 rounds of ammunition and grenades, all sealed in 
diplomatic bags. According to Seymour Hersh, the CIA smuggled 
weapons into Chile in diplomatic bags before the overthrow 
of Salvador Allende in 1973. S.M. Hersh, The Price of Power: 
Kissinger in the Nixon hhite House (Summit Books, New York, 1983), p.289.
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grata because of similar behaviour in other states. Once 
again, the assassination attempt against ROK President Chun 
Doo Hwan in October 1983 provides a recent example of this 
development, with the discovery by Burmese authorities that the 
DPRK 'hit team' received close assistance from members of 
the North Korean Embassy in Rangoon.44 While the murder 
of an English policewoman by a member of the (Libyan Peoples' 
Bureau in London in April 1984 was the immediate cause, 
it was this continued use of diplomatic facilities for 
terrorist operations that prompted the seven major economic 
powers meeting in the UK last year to state that they:
viewed with serious concern the increasing 
involvement of States and Governments in acts 
of terrorism including the abuse of diplomatic 
immunity.45
Not only have the diplomats of some states been party
to state-sponsored terrorism, but they have also been among
its victims. A high proportion of terrorist attacks
instigated by states have been directed against the diplomats
4 f)and diplomatic facilities of other states. According to 
the US State Department, Syria and Iran were directly 
involved in the bomb attacks against the American Embassies
Edward Moxon-Browne, Terrorism in France, Conflict Studies 
144 (Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, 1983), p.3. 
Over the past fifteen years, Soviet 'diplomats' have been 
expelled from Mexico, Bolivia and Colombia; Cubans, Syrians 
and Iranians from France, Libyans from the UK, US and Italy, 
and DPRK diplomats from Burma and Sri Lanka, all for their 
involvement in terrorist activities.
44 The Bomb Attack on the Martyrs' Mausoleum, pp.19-20.
45 Quoted in Frank Brenchley, Diplomatic Immunities and State- 
sponsored Terrorism, Conflict Studies 164 (Institute for the 
Study of Conflict, London, 1984), p.2.
46 An early example of this was seen in 1960 when the US State 
Department claimed that Fidel Castro had assigned agents to 
assassinate the US Ambassador to Mexico, who had apparently 
suggested that Mexico's sugar quota to the United States be 
increased (presumably at Cuba's expense). Mexican police 
were assigned to protect the Ambassador for over a year. 
Wilson, p.60.
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in Beirut and Kuwait in 1983 and were most probably 
responsible for the attack on the US Embassy Annexe in 
Beirut last year. The diplomatic services of both Iran 
and Iraq have become prime targets for terrorist attack 
since the war began between those two states in 1980. The 
Iranian-supported Islamic Jihad openly threatened US, UK 
and French diplomatic missions after those countries agreed 
to participate in the multinational force in Beirut in 1983. 
Libya has openly announced its intention of attacking US 
diplomatic personnel and facilities and since the Camp David 
Accords has joined with other 'confrontation states' in 
sponsoring terrorist attacks against Egyptian missions.
State aid to groups like the Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the HRB directly increases 
the risks to all Turkish and Yugoslav diplomats and their 
families. Indeed, it could be argued that as diplomats 
and their facilities are now viewed as 'legitimate' targets 
by most terrorist groups then any support given to them, 
whether it be direct or indirect, contributes to the dangers 
faced by all members of the diplomatic profession. Similarly, 
any abuse of the diplomatic system by states assisting 
terrorists raises doubts in peoples' minds about the 
legitimacy of all diplomatic activity and helps erode the 
fragile consensus on which the principle of inviolability 
is based.
States appear to support terrorist operations for a 
number of reasons. Ideological considerations play a 
significant role and often involvement includes the export 
of enforcement terror found in the sponsoring state. Attacks 
might be prompted by simple vengeance, as in the cases of 
the Letelier assassination in Washington in 1976, or the
4 8assassination of former General Oveissi in Paris last year,
47
Sayre, p.l.
48 Former Chilean Ambassador and Defence Minister Orlando 
Letelier was killed in Washington by agents of DINA, the 
secret police force of the Pinochet Government. Former 
Iranian General Gholam Ali Oveissi (the so-called 'Butcher 
of Tehran') was assassinated by Iranian agents in Paris in 1984.
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or might be simply to silence critics of the regime. Other
cases, like those sponsored by Iran, seem to be inspired
by a mixture of political and religious motives. It is
possible too that support for terrorist groups is felt by
some of the smaller and weaker states to give them an
influence in world affairs that would otherwise be denied
them. Whatever the reason, the sponsorship of international
terrorism represents a rejection of conventional diplomacy
and to a degree at least a preference for coercion over
peaceful negotiation. However slight, this is a movement
along the political continuum towards open conflict. Indeed,
such is the scope of state-sponsored terrorism and so
significant are the differences between it and earlier
social and political struggles by terrorist groups that
some observers have come to see the current phenomenon,
for all practical purposes, as a form of 'surrogate war',
the latest manifestation of the 'camouflaged wars' predicted
by Sir Basil Liddell-Hart and Andre Beaufre in the 1950s 
49and 1960s.
In a thesis first proposed in 1975 and elaborated 
50further in 1983, Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation 
has argued that because of the nuclear stalemate between 
the two superpowers opposing states have been obliged to 
choose between conventional wars and protracted unconventional 
wars. As a general rule, however, the former are becoming 
increasingly impractical. They are too costly, too 
destructive and too unpopular in domestic and world opinion. 
Short 'lightning' wars like the 1967 Six Day War or the
49 Basil Liddell-Hart, S trategy : The Indirect Approach (Faber,
London, 1967), p.373 et.seq. and Andre Beaufre, Introduction 
to S trategy - With particular reference to problems of defence, 
politics, economics and diplomacy in the nuclear age (Faber, 
London, 1965), pp.107 et.seq.
50 High Technology Terrorism and S urrogate War: The Impact
of Hew Technology on Low-Level Violence (1975) and New Modes 
of Conflict (1983) .
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Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 are still an option
but are often inconclusive. Protracted wars have other
drawbacks, as demonstrated by the Vietnam War. An alternative
mode of warfare, Jenkins has argued, is a campaign of low
level terrorist violence. By taking advantage of developments
in modern society, in particular arms technology and the
legal ambiguities of international terrorist operations,
states can wear down the capacities and resolve of their
enemies through a series of clandestine attacks. These can
be made on targets within the state or, as in the case of
attacks on diplomats and diplomatic facilities, against the
assets of a state beyond its national borders. Jenkins
apparently believes not only that such a conflict is likely
but that it would jeopardise the present system of
international order based on a community of sovereign states,
even the concept of nationhood. 'War will cease to be
finite, the distinction between peace and war will dissolve'
leaving states in an environment not unlike the anarchy of51Renaissance Italy.
While this argument is persuasive, it contains a number
of serious flaws. It is true that the current nuclear
balance which constrains the major powers from total war
has produced a kind of stability in which lower level conflicts
can flourish, but however costly and unpopular conventional
wars are still seen as a real option, as evidenced by the 52Iran-Iraq war. Nor is it likely that protracted guerrilla 
campaigns will ever disappear for, quite apart from indigenous 
considerations, they continue to serve the wider strategic 
purposes of the superpowers themselves, as seen in Afghanistan 
and Central America. 'International terrorist attack is a 
different mode of war, not an alternative to war as such'.^^
51 High Technology Terrorism and S urrogate War, p.3 and 
pp.24-25, and New Modes of Conflict, p.16.
52 This point is emphasised in 'New weapons don't always win
wars', The Weekend Australian Magazine 8-9 December 1984, p.8.
53 Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p.179.
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There is a trend towards the development of terrorist 
violence as part of the world's strategic composition but 
not all such campaigns can be included within the pattern 
outlined by Brian Jenkins. As Grant Wardlaw pointed out 
last year, for example:
Resort to the tactics of terrorism, or 
the formation of alliances with terrorist 
groups, provides an option which allows 
such [small] nations, which would otherwise 
be unable to mount challenges using 
conventional force, to carry out surrogate 
warfare against their opponents.54
In such cases, terrorism is seen simply as a cheap weapons 
system and while it may be used in conjunction with wider 
conflicts it should not automatically be viewed as part of 
one. Jenkins does not distinguish between terrorist 
activities in this way, however, nor does he seem to allow 
for terrorist acts unrelated to significant political 
contests. His vision of surrogate warfare between states 
is really only applicable to conflicts between major powers 
and even then fails to accord sufficient weight to the 
readiness of the international community to take steps 
against universally disruptive political violence.
Despite its shortcomings, or perhaps as a result of
them, this thesis seems to have been readily adopted by
the US government. As early as 1975 the Special Assistant
to the Secretary of State and State Department Coordinator
for Combatting Terrorism testified to a US Senate Subcommittee
in terms very similar to those used by Jenkins in his first
55paper on this subject. The idea of a global power shunning 
outright war but still pursuing its strategic objectives
Grant Wardlaw, 'Strategic Aspects of Political Terrorism', 
Address to the Joint Services Staff College, Canberra,
29 February 1984 (unpublished paper, p.20).
55 'Terrorist Activity: International Terrorism', Hearings.
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through terrorist surrogates has also found a receptive 
audience among senior members of the Reagan Administration, 
which has cited with approval Claire Sterling's claims 
that the Soviet Union is operating a 'terror network' 56through its Eastern European satellites, the PLO and Cuba.
Congress too has given credence to suggestions that there is
'a large Communist terrorist force, a Communist army which ...
5 7is not yet fully deployed'. This 'low intensity warfare' 
by the Eastern bloc is seen as part of a concerted effort 
to expand its influence around the world and is purportedly 
aimed at everything from the West's strategic interests in 
Western Europe, the Middle East and the Caribbean to 5 8weakening liberal democracy and undermining world stability.
As Grant Wardlaw and others have pointed out, 'the
evidence of Soviet support for destabilising influences in
the Western-aligned world is overwhelming, but it indicates
a capacity for opportunistic exploitation of situations
59rather than their specific creation and direction'. To 
view the Soviet Union as the 'puppet master' of world 
terrorism is to ignore the many, often subtle differences 
between terrorist groups, their aims and ideologies. In 
many countries the radical right poses as great a threat as 
the revolutionary left and the political commitment of many 
terrorist groups is shallow and changeable. Despite 
rhetorical flourishes and short-term alliances, terrorists 
(like states) have tended to remain stubbornly independent 
and have refused to submerge their differences in 'a sea of
Sterling, passim.
57 'Historical Antecedents of Soviet Terrorism', Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, 97th Congress, First 
Session, 11-12 June 1981.
5 8 See in particular Shultz, 'Terrorism: The Challenge to
the Democracies', pp.2-3 and Sayre, p.2.
Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p.56.59
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6 0world revolution'. Obviously, any weakening in political 
stability and social cohesion in the West can affect the 
overall 'correlation of forces' between the two major 
blocs, but the simplistic and misleading picture of 
world terrorism painted by Sterling and others serves only 
to reinforce the prejudices of the Reagan Administration, 
which has already displayed a tendency to view complex 
global problems in simple East-West terms. Such an approach 
also ignores America's own involvement in terrorism of 
different kinds.
Over the years the US too has 'hired gunmen, mobs and
private armies with which to protect her foreign policy 
6 2interests'. American efforts have included offensive 
operations but in recent years have been largely reactive. 
They have included in particular support for regimes which 
have relied on enforcement terror to remain in power and 
have been justified publicly by a double standard that has 
made anti-communist terror acceptable while terror used by 
the US's opponents has been deemed worthy of universal 
condemnation. This approach is exemplified best by the 
speech made in 1979 by the US's Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations on 'Dictatorship and Double Standards', 
in which a distinction was made between 'totalitarian'
J.B. Bell, 'Contemporary Revolutionary Organisations' 
in R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye (Eds), Transnational Relations 
and World Politics (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
1981), p.167.
61 W.S. Thompson, 'Political Violence and the "Correlation 
of Forces"', Orbis 19:4 (Winter 1976), pp.1270-1287.
6 2 Thompson, p.1282. There have been a number of recent 
suggestions of US complicity in assassination plots and 
similar terrorist operations. Seymour Hersh's study of former 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for example, suggests 
that the US was responsible for, or at least implicated in, 
the assassinations or attempted assassinations of Fidel 
Castro, Salvador Allende, Patrice Lumumba, Rafael Trujillo 
and Nguyen Van Thieu. Hersh, pp.274-277.
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regimes such as the Soviet Union and 'authoritarian' regimes
such as those military dictatorships supported by the US.
This same distinction was drawn when Mrs Kirkpatrick spoke
about terrorism to the Jonathan Institute in Washington in
June 1984. On that occasion her argument was essentially
the same, that motives were crucial and that while terror
used in defence of society was acceptable, terror used to
6 8destroy it was not. The difficulty with this argument, 
however, lies in the fact that such distinctions rely on 
subjective moral judgements as much as those made by the 
US's opponents when describing terrorists as 'freedom 
fighters'. Inevitably, ideological factors enter into 
consideration of the problem and diplomatic solutions become 
more elusive.
Terror has always been seen as an option by states 
whenever their national interests seem to have required it, 
so much so that in some respects terror has almost become 
'acceptable'. Such is the history of repressive state 
policies, support for dictatorships, clandestine interventions 
and covert operations against individuals that, as Michael 
Stohl has shown, 'policies of terrorism in the international 
system have grown to the status of legitimate (i.e. considered 
to be legitimate) behaviour'. Nowhere is this demonstrated 
better than in the diplomatic field. Raymond Aron made the 
point over twenty years ago that the distinction between 
diplomacy and strategy was purely relative.^ Drawing on 
Thomas Schelling's analysis of the nuclear 'balance of 
terror', Stohl has gone further and suggested that terrorism
6 3 This speech was expanded and printed as J.J. Kirkpatrick, 
'Defining Terrorism', Catholicism in Crisis (September 1984), 
pp.41-44.
64 Stohl, 'National Interests', p.40.
65 Aron states that 'The distinction between diplomacy and 
strategy is an entirely relative one. These two terms are 
complementary aspects of the single art of politics - the 
art of conducting relations with other states so as to further 
the "national interest"'. Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A
Theory of International Relations (Praeger, New York, 1970), 
p. 24 .
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has now become part of the 'coercive diplomacy' which states 
have always used to produce changes in their opponents' 
political positions through symbolic violence and the fear 
that non-compliance will bring punishment 'terrible beyond
r rendurance'. Thus a campaign of international terrorism
can become a tool of states, an extension of foreign policy
by other means, placed on a scale between absolute peace and
outright war. In suoh a situation, diplomacy can be regarded
as being more or less effective depending on the ability
of states to manipulate the threat of terrorist violence
as a means of exerting pressure and winning desired policy
changes. As Michael Stohl has written, 'the threat is quite
6 7explicit, even if it is non-verbal'. If seen in such a
6 8light, such 'tacit negotiation' challenges the assumptions
in the traditional definition of diplomacy as 'the conduct
69of business between states by peaceful means' and gives
greater weight to the assumptions of the Realist school
whose 'diplomacy of violence' is discussed by Schelling and
Stohl. To the Realists, diplomacy has never been a matter
of 'pure persuasion', but has always contained an element
of symbolic or clandestine violence. 'The power to hurt is
bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy - vicious
70diplomacy, but diplomacy'. Long understood and accepted in 
terms of conventional power ('gunboat diplomacy') and nuclear 
exchanges, this relationship between terrorism and diplomacy 
is only now becoming plain.
^  Schelling, p.15.
Stohl, 'National Interests', pp.41-42.
6 8 The term is Dean Acheson's, quoted in Eayrs, pp.71-72.
69 Satow, p.l.
70 Schelling, p.2 and Aron, p.61. , Horatio Nelson is reputed 
to have claimed that a man-o'-war was 'the best negotiator 
in Europe'.
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Such a development has caused considerable concern, 
not only because of the threat to lives and property, but 
also because of fears that the international system itself 
cannot survive such a challenge. The United States in 
particular has warned of the threat to the institution of 
diplomacy, to world stability and even to civilisation 
itself. With its perception of international terrorism 
as being essentially Soviet-inspired, the US has blamed this 
impending catastrophe on the USSR, but once again the 
situation is a great deal more complex than that portrayed 
by members of the Reagan Administration. Whereas in the 
past the international system could be controlled to a 
significant degree by the superpowers and their allies, this 
is no longer the case. The system is much more fluid, with 
a greater number of states and non-state actors, many of 
which act independently of the major blocs. Some have chosen 
to indulge in activities that are inimical to the interests 
of the major powers regardless of their political persuasion. 
Terrorist activities that have been 'legitimate' in the 
past are no longer taking place in a system controlled by 
these powers and are thus considered more threatening. New 
forms of terrorist attack, such as those against diplomats 
and diplomatic facilities, challenge norms of international 
behaviour that affect all states.
The Soviet Union has been more successful than the 
United States in manipulating these new forces but is itself 
also threatened by them. One does not have to be an apologist 
for the Soviet Union, as Cline and Alexander have suggested, 
to feel that 'the dynamics of modern terrorism is so 
uncontrollable as to make Soviet leaders ambivalent about
See in particular Shultz, 'Terrorism: The Challenge to
the Democracies' and K.W. Dam, 'Terrorism in the Middle East', 
Address by Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary of State, to the 
leaders of the National United Jewish Appeal, Washington,
1 October 1984, Current Policy 618 (1 October 1984), pp.1-2.
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7 2this form of warfare'. The threat from international 
terrorism is also faced by the Eastern bloc which now 
has global interests and vulnerabilities of its own. The 
latter include diplomats and diplomatic facilities and far 
from attempting to destroy the institution of diplomacy, 
as claimed by the US, the Soviet Union has shown a concern 
to join with other states in protecting and strengthening it.
72 Cline and Alexander, p.5.
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Chapter IV 
THE RESPONSE 
Anti-Terrorist Measures
The state of peace among men who live 
together is not a natural state; for 
the natural state is one of war, ie if 
not a state of open hostilities, still 
a continuous threat of such. The state 
of peace must be established.
Immanuel Kant
Perpetual Peace: A 
Philosophical Proposal
(1795)
Before the 1960s, diplomats could usually rely on 
the host country's laws, international custom and other 
traditional restraints to protect them from violence.
The increasing frequency of attacks on diplomats and 
diplomatic facilities by terrorists after that time, however, 
made it necessary for both sending and receiving states to 
reassess the measures normally taken for the protection of 
the personnel and property for which they were responsible. 
Matters which had formerly been examined only occasionally 
and on a piecemeal basis required much deeper and broader 
consideration. As a consequence, a number of complex 
political and legal issues were raised over the measures 
required and the states responsible for their implementation. 
In addition, there were differences in perceptions and 
capabilities between the older, established and often 
wealthier states and the newly-constituted non-European 
states with fewer resources and a shorter history of
1 Baumann, pp.43-53 and p.110.
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participation in the formal diplomatic process. The 
fragility of diplomatic relations was exposed and the 
tactical advantages held by the terrorists made clear.
Above all, the international scope of terrorist activities 
emphasised the interdependence of modern states and the 
need for cooperation if the terrorist threat to diplomats 
and diplomatic facilities was to be countered effectively.
As might have been expected, the first efforts to 
protect diplomats and their facilities were made by the 
sending and receiving states themselves. Arguably, they 
have included the most successful and the most controversial 
measures. Over the past twenty years most states have 
taken steps to upgrade the physical security of their missions 
abroad, the level varying with the threat perceived and 
the resources available. Perimeter defences have been 
strengthened and protective screens added to approach roads 
and buildings. Surveillance and alarm systems have been 
installed and various other measures taken both to prevent 
unauthorised access to diplomatic facilities and to protect 
those working inside them. Since the 1979 Iranian hostage 
crisis additional precautions have been taken by many states 
to guard against attacks by violent crowds. More recently, 
there have been reports that states are giving greater 
consideration to the relocation and even the redesign of 
diplomatic facilities in order to make them more secure.^
Many missions are now guarded by armed police or military 
personnel from the sending state and it is likely that the
F.K. Perez, 'The Impact of International Terrorism',
Address by the Acting Director, Office for Combatting 
Terrorism, US State Department, Byliner 5 (January 1982) ,p. 4.
3
Newsweek reported in December 1984 that the National 
Research Council of the US National Academy of Sciences was 
trying to develop a new kind of architecture for diplomatic 
buildings that was safe yet blast resistant, visually 
appealing yet secure. 'Embassies Under Siege', Newsweek, 
P.146. See also 'Terrorism vs. glamour in life of diplomat', 
USA Today, 10 October 1984, p.l.
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attachment of security officers to such facilities will 
become more common.^
A number of steps have also been taken to protect 
diplomatic staff and their families outside the security of 
mission buildings or compounds. The senior diplomats of 
many states now travel in specially armoured vehicles and 
are often accompanied by personal bodyguards. In 1970, 
after the rash of kidnappings and murders of diplomatic 
personnel in Latin America, the US State Department sent 
all its embassies and consulates in the region a directive 
calling for a drastic reduction in travel and greater secrecy 
in the planning of any essential trip. Diplomatic staff 
were urged to travel to and from work either in convoys or 
in inconspicuous vehicles. They were also advised to vary 
their daily routines in order to reduce the risk of seizure.“* 
Other measures implemented by the US, and by many other 
states threatened by terrorist action, include the introduction 
of staggered working hours and the preparation of contingency 
plans to be followed in the event of an attack. Brief 
training courses have been given to diplomats and their 
families on how to respond to a terrorist threat and secure 
'safe havens' have been built into many diplomats' homes. 
Clifton Wilson cites a State Department report that American 
diplomats in Southeast Asia in the 1950s were instructed to 
carry firearms but this provocative and risky practice does 
not appear to be widespread now. In some high risk areas 
the size of diplomatic staffing establishments (including 
officers' families) have been reduced to provide terrorists 
with fewer potential targets and from time to time there 
have been reports of missions being withdrawn because the 
receiving government could not provide adequate protection
'Diplomats Forced to Adapt to New Era of Terrorism', p.21.
5 Stechel, p.213. See also 'The New Terror Network', Newsweek. p.lll.
6 Wilson, p.61.
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against attack. These were the grounds, for example, on 
which the FRG Embassy in Guatemala was closed after Count 
von Spreti's kidnapping and murder in 1970 and similar 
reasons have been put forward to account for the departure 
of a number of missions from El Salvador and Lebanon in 
recent years.7
The closure of a mission, however, is rare outside of 
a complete breakdown in civil order and even then might not 
be an option for a large power or one with vital interestsgat stake. In most cases sufficient protection can be 
provided by the receiving state to warrant keeping missions 
open. Since the terrorist threat to diplomats reached 
serious proportions in the late 1960s and early 1970s a 
number of states have amended their legislation to permit 
them greater freedom in trying to prevent a terrorist 
incident and in responding should one occur. Improved 
immigration procedures have reduced the ease with which 
international terrorists can travel and tighter customs 
controls have made it more difficult for them to transport 
their arms and explosives. Postal services have been alerted 
to watch for bombs in the mail and devices for their detection 
have been installed in many post offices. In a number 
of countries specialised government agencies have been 
created to coordinate any action required against terrorists. 
Such agencies usually have access to special skills, such 
as intelligence analysts, communications officers, trained
Baumann, pp.98-101 and Palliser, in Bull and Watson, p. 353 .g For example in 1984, during an upsurge of fighting between 
militant factions in Beirut, Australia withdrew its diplomatic 
mission. The United States, although it reduced the numbers 
of Embassy staff members and their families in the country, 
kept its mission open. US staff numbers were further reduced 
in March 1985 but there was obviously no question of the 
US mission closing, regardless of the danger, given its 
interests in the region and the need to maintain a presence 
for symbolic reasons.
9 Murphy, in Evans and Murphy, pp.281-28 5 , and Murphy, in Bassiouni, p.306.
10 See for example Trent, pp.4-7 and the Postscript to this thesis.
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negotiators and tactical response experts. In addition, 
many states have developed specialised police and military 
capabilities for use in an anti-terrorist role.
More than 15 states are known to have developed specially
trained units capable of mounting armed assaults on terrorist-
held premises and it can be assumed that most, if not all,
have prepared for missions to rescue diplomats held hostage
12in their own facilities. The assault on the Iranian 
Embassy in London in May 1980 by a team from Britain's 
Special Air Service Regiment was a spectacular example of 
the kind of response that is available to governments with 
such units at their disposal. The success of this operation, 
however, and similar assaults against hijacked aircraft in 
Entebbe, Mogadishu and Bangkok, must be weighed against the 
equally spectacular failure of the US mission in April 1980 
to rescue the American diplomats held hostage in Tehran 
and the debacle at Lanarca Airport in 1978. The risks 
involved in such operations are extremely high. As the 
assault on the Iranian Embassy in London and the operation in 
Iran demonstrated in their own ways, even the
best laid plans can go wrong, jeopardising not only the lives
While in some respects an example of the more journalistic 
recent studies of the terrorist phenomenon, Christopher Dobson 
and Ronald Payne's study Terror! The West Fights Back 
(Macmillan, London, 1982) usefully surveys these counter­
terrorist forces. See also R.H. Shultz, 'The State of the 
Operational Art: A Critical Review of Anti-Terrorist Programs'
in Shultz and Sloan, p.34.
12 This is apparent, for example, from the'Sunday Times'
Insight Team, Siege! Frinces Gate, London, April 30-May 5 1980 
(Hamlyn, London, 1980) and 'Inside the SAS: risking all for
the sandy beret', The Weekend Australian Magazine 3-4 November 
1984, pp.1-2. In his account of the development of the US's 
own anti-terrorist unit, Colonel Charles Beckwith described 
how members of Delta Force travelled around the world, carrying 
diplomatic bags and inspecting US embassies. C.A. Beckwith 
and D. Knox, Delta Force (Arms and Armour Press, London, 1984), 
pp.170-171.
13 Siege!, passim.
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of the attacking counter-terrorist force but also those
of the hostages. In addition, there can be no guarantee
that circumstances will permit such units to be used,
particularly if the operation needs to take place in another 
14country. Practical and international legal constraints 
are particularly high where diplomats or diplomatic facilities 
are involved. More importantly, the stakes involved in such 
operations in terms of national prestige and international 
influence are huge and it is unlikely that units of this 
kind will ever be used except in the last resort, and with 
very great reluctance.
Another major problem arises over the resources required 
to protect diplomats and diplomatic facilities from terrorist 
attack. While vague about the actual level of protection 
required, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular 
Relations both clearly place the primary responsibility for 
the safety of diplomats and their facilities on the receiving 
states. Yet the rapid expansion in the size and number of 
missions since 1945 has placed a considerable burden on 
such states, particularly in areas of high risk such as 
Central and North America. At the height of the kidnapping 
problem in the early 1970s, for example, more than ten per 
cent of the entire Guatemalan armed forces was assigned 
to act as bodyguards for foreign diplomatic personnel at an 
annual cost of US$l-2 million for each m i s s i o n . A t  the 
other end of the scale, the United States is currently 
responsible for over 16,000 accredited diplomatic personnel, 
their families and some 1,500 consuls and honorary consuls. 
Most are based in New York and Washington but many live in
The limitations of such units are brought out by Brian 
Jenkins in The Lessons of Beirut: Testimony Before the Long
Commission, Rand Note N-2114-RC (Rand Corporation, Santa 
Monica, February 1984). See also Crenshaw, pp.17-23 and 
C.C. Aston, Political Hostage Taking in Western Europe, 
Conflict Studies 157 (Institute for the Study of Conflict, 
London, 1984), pp.10-11.
15 Jenkins, diplomats on the Front Line, p.7 and Murphy, 
'Report on Conference', p.483.
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cities scattered across the country. Even with an
allocation from Congress of US$9.5 million in 1985 the US
government agencies responsible cannot provide adequate
17protection for them all. The extent of this problem is
such that some of the smaller states have suggested that
a distinction be made in international law between those
states able to offer adequate security for diplomatic missions
18and those which cannot. Similar burdens, however, are 
also carried by some sending states, particularly those most 
often subject to terrorist attack. The US, for example, as 
the most favoured target, currently spends around 15 per cent 
of its State Department budget on security for its missions 
abroad but according to Paul Wilkinson even this annual 
expenditure of US$200 million is not enough to provide 
adequate protection for them all, the cost of which would 
be prohibitive.^
In the final analysis, it must be accepted that while 
security measures may help deter terrorists there can never 
be complete security from an imaginative and determined 
attack, particularly if the terrorists are prepared to martyr
16 Hearings: State Department FY 1984, and Hearings of the
US House of Representatives Appropriation Committee: Budget
Explanation: State Department FY 1982 (1982). In 1982 New
York had the largest diplomatic community in the world, with 
slightly fewer than 10,000 accredited diplomatic personnel 
and some 25,000 dependents. The same year there were some 
6,000 diplomats in Washington, with around 13,600 dependents.
If the 1,500 consuls and honorary consuls in the country are 
added, the US government is left with a diplomatic community 
of approximately 56,000 people for whose protection it is 
legally responsible.
17 Hearings: State Department FY 1984.
18 This problem was in fact foreseen by -some of the newer 
states present at the 1961 Vienna Conference. They were loath 
to see the extension of diplomatic immunities to non-diplomatic 
personnel attached to Western embassies and sought to restrict 
the extension of privileges to professional diplomats. See 
Boyce, p.198 and p.213.
19 Wilkinson is quoted in 'Violent Tactics', Wall Street 
Journal 21 April 1983, p.23. See also Jenkins, The Lessons of 
Beirut, p.5. Jenkins states that over 2,000 man-years are 
devoted annually to the protection of US diplomats abroad.
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themselves in the attempt or if they are supported by the
host state. As Brian Jenkins explained to the Long Commission
in February 1984, terrorist operations are very hard to
predict. Also, there is an inescapable asymmetry between
the two sides. 'Terrorists can attack anything, anywhere,
anytime. Governments cannot protect everything, everywhere,
20all the time.' There will always be areas that remain
vulnerable to attack. As protection is increased in one area,
so the attention of terrorists will turn to others. Brian
Jenkins believes, for example, that embassy seizures grew
out of the increasing difficulty of seizing aircraft because
of tighter security at airports. The increased level of
bombings and assassination attempts in recent years appears
to be a response in turn to tighter security measures to
21protect diplomats and their facilities from seizure.
Another option for the terrorists is simply to increase
the scale and violence of the attack, with a greater likelihood
of casualties. The attack on the US Embassy in Beirut,
22described in 1978 as 'a fortress', was a major psychological 
victory for the terrorists not only because of its importance 
as the US's headquarters in Lebanon, and therefore the symbol 
of the Reagan Administration's Middle Eastern policies, but 
also because of the elaborate measures taken to protect it.
A delicate balance needs to be struck between those measures 
which will help deter attacks and those which, by the nature 
of the commitment made and the prestige invested, may invite 
them.
The greatest problem faced by states in this area, 
however, lies in the nature of diplomacy itself. For diplomacy 
must be conducted openly, with ready access to other diplomats,
Jenkins, The Lessons of Beirut, p.4. 
Jenkins, Embassies Under Siege, p.20.
Murphy, in Evans and Murphy, p.290.
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a wide range of officials and members of the local population.
To some areas of a diplomatic mission, such as the consular 
and commercial sections, free access by the public is crucial. 
Yet such freedom of movement provides opportunities for 
the terrorists which they have been quick to exploit. To 
restrict the access of the public to the mission and for 
diplomats to have fewer contacts with people outside it might 
add to the security of the mission but would also greatly 
reduce its effectiveness. It would also have a detrimental
2 3effect on the morale of the mission staff and their families. 
Paradoxically, it is often in precisely those countries 
where the terrorist threat is highest that diplomacy has 
the greatest role to play, demanding a larger staff, freer 
movement and wider contacts outside the mission. Once again, 
a balance needs to be struck between the interests of security 
and the requirements of diplomacy, but such a balance will 
always provide opportunities for terrorists. The best that 
can be done in such circumstances, perhaps, is to prepare 
for the inevitable.
As John Murphy has stated, 'the proper strategy and 
tactics for governments to employ in response to kidnappings 
and other attacks on diplomats are key elements in any policy 
designed to enhance diplomatic protection'.^  Many states 
have devised contingency plans for use in the event of terrorist 
attacks on diplomatic targets within their spheres of 
responsibility, but there is considerable controversy over the 
approaches adopted. The 'hard line' states, led by the United 
States and Israel, have held the receiving states primarily 
responsible for the safety of their diplomatic missions and
A number of experts have even argued that increased security 
measures should be taken purely to maintain staff morale and 
to attract diplomatic officers and their families to high risk 
posts. See 'Violent Tactics', Wall Street Journal, p.23 and 
D.D. Newson, 'The Diplomat's Task versus Security' in Herz, p.ll.
24 Murphy,in Evans and Murphy, p.297.
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argued that only by firmly resisting their demands can
terrorists be shown that their actions will not pay. Prompted
by past experiences, in which accession to terrorist demands
seemed to encourage further attacks, they have refused even
to negotiate with the terrorists. Diplomacy is seen, at best,
as a technique which can help defuse some dangerous situations
and which is useful in broad conceptual areas of policy
formulation, but which is not particularly relevant to the
25resolution of specific terrorist incidents. The British
Ambassador to Uruguay may have felt in 1971 that the Tupamaros
'had moved by kidnapping him into "the diplomatic world of 
2 6negotiations"', but the advocates of a hard line would 
claim that:
To the degree that diplomacy becomes a 
more prominent factor in the management 
of an incident, it tends to add stature 
to the terrorist group and thereby helps 
promote their cause.
The governments of some hard line states have been prepared
to see their own diplomatic officers murdered by terrorists
2 8rather than change their approach.
The 'soft line' states on the other hand see considerable 
value in 'diplomatic solutions'. Not only is diplomacy 
considered useful in the coordination of responses from the 
various governments and security forces that might be involved, 
but traditional diplomatic skills have also been used to
Karkashian, in Herz, p.8.
2 6 Quoted from a press conference given in September 1971, in 
Baumann, p.109.
Karkashian, in Herz, p.6 (emphasis retained).
2 8 The members of the Black September Organisation who seized 
the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum in 1973 are reputed 
to have killed their American and Belgian diplomatic hostages 
after hearing over the radio that President Nixon was resolved 
to hold to the US's policy never to treat with terrorists.
Just as the US was determined to show its resolve, so too 
were the terrorists who were anxious to counteract any 
impression of weakness that may have been given by the collapse 
of the Israeli Embassy seizure in Bangkok three months before.
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explore options with the terrorists themselves, particularly
when the lives of hostages have been at stake. The soft
liners argue that there is no evidence that a strong stand
against negotiations helps significantly to reduce the
frequency of terrorist attacks, which are often made for
reasons additional to those included in any stated demands.
Often, the publicity given to an incident is justification
enough, something that would be achieved regardless of the
2 9policies of the governments involved. By holding the 
receiving states solely responsible for the resolution of 
terrorist incidents the hard line states in effect contribute 
to the success of the operation by adding to the pressure 
and embarrassment felt by them. Moreover, by discarding 
their options before an incident has even occurred, hard line 
states effectively nullify their own capacities to react 
when one does. Should such a state eventually feel obliged 
to negotiate it loses more prestige and international 
bargaining power than if it had initially taken a more 
conciliatory approach.^
Such considerations play an important part in the 
formulation of state policies. The high symbolic content 
of any terrorist attack usually means that questions of 
'face' or national prestige quickly become of paramount
29 This is the conclusion for example, in Jenkins, Embassies 
Under Siege, and Jenkins et.al., Numbered Lives, p.32. A 
study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace also 
found that a primary motive in international hostage incidents 
was publicity. See Murphy, in Evans and Murphy, p.297 and 
F.J. Hacker, 'A Case Study of Hostage Negotiation' in Herz,
P-4 .
30 There will also be occasions when the imperatives to 
negotiate will outweigh even the most rigid state policies 
against doing so. There is evidence to suggest, for example, 
that the Israelis were prepared to negotiate with the 
hijackers of the Air France Airbus at Entebbe in 1976, just 
as they had been forced to do twice before. Yehuda Ofer, 
Operation Thunder: The Entebbe Raid (Penguin, Harmondsworth,
1976), pp.55-58. See also Katz, p.314.
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concern. The terrorists see themselves as representatives
of their cause before the world, while their adversaries
are symbols of systems or policies which they oppose. To
the states, however, the terrorists represent a public
challenge to their ability to manage their own affairs,
fulfil their legal responsibilities and protect their
citizens. Terrorism tests their resolve and their reputation
for action in the pursuit of their own interests. Thus
neither side wishes to appear weak or vaccillating, nor
to accord the other side a status to which it is not felt
entitled. By their actions, each side attempts to establish
its own legitimacy and the illegitimacy of its opponent.
These symbolic duels are invariably conducted in the full
glare of world-wide publicity, making both sides highly
sensitive to the effect their actions might have on their
public image. As Robert Jervis, Martha Crenshaw and others
have noted, such perceptions of strength and resolve are
crucial factors in international relations on which depend
issues much wider than the resolution of a particular31terrorist incident. Thus the stakes are quickly raised 
and responses by states to international terrorism become 
part of global politics, with all the added complications 
and dangers which that brings.
The need for victim states to appear resolute in the 
face of terrorist provocation and able still to command 
the initiative in a situation where the terrorists can always 
choose the time, place and method of attack, has encouraged 
a number of states to form counter-terrorist units capable 
of offensive operations. Israel and South Africa, for example, 
have long carried Out reprisal raids for terrorist attacks 
and since 1972 Israel's Central Institute for Intelligence and 
Security (Mossad) has sent 'hit teams' throughout Western 
Europe and the Middle East to assassinate Arab terrorists
Robert Jervis, 'Deterrence and Perception', International 
Security 7:3 (Winter 1982/1983), and Crenshaw, passim.
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believed responsible for attacks on Israeli targets.
Similar operations have been carried out by the Spanish
government against Basque ETA terrorists in France and the
FRG has reportedly sent small zeilfahndung (target squads)
to abduct terrorists living abroad and return them to Germany
for trial. The Yugoslav Security Service (UDBA) has
apparently sent assassins to locate and kill Croatian
terrorists and a number of Latin American governments are
thought to have sent agents abroad to kill terrorists who
34had escaped capture in their own countries. There is also
evidence to suggest that, like their terrorist opponents,
the governments of Israel, Spain and Portugal have resorted
35to car and letter bombs.
In April 1984 President Reagan signed a secret National 
Security Directive (Number 138) authorising the establishment 
of US counter-terrorist forces 'capable of mounting pre­
emptive or retaliatory raids against terrorist groups'. The
formation of officially sanctioned assassination squads was
3 6also seriously debated but apparently will not proceed.
32 Israel denied its clandestine operations against Arab 
terrorists until July 1973 when two Israeli agents were 
captured. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was publicly 
justified by Prime Minister Begin on the grounds that the 
Iraqi-backed Black June Movement had attacked the Israeli 
Ambassador in London.
Dobson and Payne, Terror!, p.169, and Dobson and Payne,
The Weapons of Terror, pp.140-141. The Basque terrorists 
belonged to Euskadi ta Askatasuna, or Freedom for the Basque 
Homeland. France gave ETA terrorists refugee status until 
January 1979.
^  Stephen Clissold has claimed that Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti 
(UDBA), the Yugoslav Security Service, has selectively 
murdered Yugoslav dissidents abroad, sometimes acting through 
diplomatic agents. (Clissold, p.14). Argentine and 
Venezuelan operatives have reportedly carried out operations 
against terrorists who fled in the 1970s (Jenkins, New Modes 
of Conflict, p.13).
Dobson and Payne, The Weapons of Terror,-p. 12 3 and Alexander, 
p .xix.
3 6 Grant Wardlaw, 'Terrorism: How big a threat to peace?'
The Age 18 April 1984, p.13.
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The same day that NSD 138 was signed, the Secretary of State
gave a major foreign policy address in which he made clear
the Reagan Administration's conviction that the only way
effectively to combat terrorism was to use force. Mr Shultz
criticised the Long Commission for their belief that
'diplomatic alternatives' could be separated from 'military
options' and pointed out that 'diplomatic success often
37rests upon perceptions of military power'. The United
States in effect declared war against an unspecified
terrorist foe, 'to be fought at an unknown place and time
3 8with weapons yet to be chosen'. In a speech made in October 
1984 the Secretary of State again referred to the need to:
reach a consensus in this country that 
our response should go beyond passive 
defense to consider means of active 
prevention, pre-emption, and 
retaliation ... We should take steps 
toward carrying out such measures.
There should be no moral confusionon this issue.39
The kind of measures being contemplated by the Reagan 
Administration as part of its new policy of 'active defence' 
apparently include the bombing of terrorist bases and 
training centres, even the forcible removal of regimes 
sponsoring terrorist groups.
It is difficult to see how military responses of this
kind can ever be effective, either in punishing terrorists or
in preventing future attacks. While at first sight it might
appear that there are a number of ways military force can be
used, in fact 'military options in response to terrorism are 40few' . Israeli reprisals against the Arab states and the
B.M. Jenkins, Combatting Terrorism Fecomes A War, Rand Paper P-6988 (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1984), p.3.
38 ibid.
39 G.P. Shultz, 'Terrorism and the Modern World', Address 
by the Secretary of State before the Park Avenue Synagogue, 
New York, 25 October 1984 (State Department Press Release 242), p.19.
40 Jenkins, The Lessons of Beirut, p.12.
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Palestinians, for example, have not only failed to prevent 
further attacks but have bred a new generation of terrorists 
anxious to claim their own retribution. In addition, a 
strong case can be made that Israeli actions have contributed 
significantly to the growing popular and diplomatic support 
now being shown for the Palestinian cause. Policies such 
as those approved last year by President Reagan are born 
largely from frustration and the need to preserve public 
face rather than from any objective assessment of the 
international terrorist threat and how it might be overcome 
in the long term. If implemented, these new American 
policies are instead likely to exacerbate the problem, and 
leave the US looking weaker and less in command of the 
situation than before. These policies are also counter­
productive in that they, and the measures already taken by some 
of the US's allies, narrow the gap between the states and 
the terrorists and raise a number of serious moral, legal 
and political questions.
As the scope and seriousness of the international 
terrorist problem grew, it quickly became apparent that no 
national government would be able to combat it alone. Steps 
were soon taken by a number of states to share intelligence 
on terrorist groups and activities, counter-terrorist 
techniques and equipment and to cooperate at various levels 
of law enforcement. Yet effective action against international 
terrorists was constantly blocked by the ability of terrorists 
to claim political asylum from sympathetic states, or in 
other ways to evade prosecution by crossing national boundaries. 
International law recognised the right of all states to 
grant territorial asylum, with provisions for the extradition 
of common criminals but that extradition need not be granted 
in the case of people accused of political offences. The 
definition of the latter being left to the states themselves, 
there has always been: scope for abuses of the system and 
for states sympathetic to the terrorists' motives to grant 
them refuge of this kind. Such discretion could not be 
removed without impinging on the sovereignty of the states in 
question, but terrorist actions could by international agreement
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be deemed common crimes and thus denied political status. 
Significantly, the development which first prompted states 
to consider this action was the growing number of attacks 
on diplomats and diplomatic facilities in Latin America.
On 2 February 1971 the Organisation of American States 
(OAS) approved a Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of 
Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and
41Related Extortion that are of International Significance.
It 'both condemned and classified certain acts of terrorism
42against foreign officials as international crimes' rather 
than poltical acts, thus theoretically denying those 
responsible asylum in any state party to the Convention.
These states were bound either to prosecute the perpetrators 
of such crimes themselves, or extradite them for trial 
elsewhere. It was, however, a rather loosely worded document 
which in some respects offered diplomatic personnel less 
protection than that already promised by the 1961 Vienna 
Convention. Many Articles were deliberately left imprecise 
in order to encompass the differing views of the OAS members, 
who were unable to reach agreement on a number of important 
issues. The greatest difficulty was encountered in attempts 
to reconcile the wish of some states (such as Brazil, 
Argentina and Guatemala) for a strong definition and 
denunciation of terrorism with the equally strong traditional 
beliefs of some Latin American states (such as Bolivia and 
Mexico) in the concept of political asylum. In the event, 
six states refused to sign the Convention, feeling that it 
did not go far enough towards combatting terrorism, but with 
thirteen signatures the Convention was approved.
Only six states eventually became full party to the 
Convention and Cuba, the country in the region most often 
accused of being sympathetic towards terrorism, did not even
41
42
Appendix F.
Murphy, in Bassiouni, p.297 .
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participate in the negotiations. The OAS Convention was
thus in some respects a rather ineffectual instrument, but
it was significant for a number of reasons. It demonstrated
above all that, whatever other differences they may have had,
all members of the OAS shared a concern for the continuing
integrity of the diplomatic process. The Convention was
also 'the first international legal instrument to deal
directly with the protection of diplomats and ... served
4 3as a primary model for the United Nations Convention' 
which followed three years later. Even before that, it 
prompted other multilateral fora to consider the question 
of the safety of diplomats threatened by international 
terrorism.
In December 1970, shortly after the OAS first began
consideration of the issue, the Council of Europe meeting
in Strasbourg examined 'The Protection of Members of
Diplomatic Missions and Consular Posts'. The Council's
Committee of Ministers considered terrorist attacks against
diplomats and diplomatic facilities 'grave violations' of
'the most sacred international traditions' and unanimously
condemned all attacks on diplomatic and consular personnel,
4 4the recent spate of kidnappings in particular.' A 
resolution passed by the Committee recommended member states 
to survey the security measures then in force for the 
protection of diplomats and, if necessary, to strengthen them. 
Members of the Council were also enjoined to examine their 
national laws to ensure that they adequately provided for 
the punishment of anyone guilty of such attacks and states 
were urged to cooperate in the protection of diplomats and 
their facilities from terrorist action.^ In January 1974
Murphy, in Evans and Murphy, p.300.
44 Quoted in Baumann, p.152.
4 5.ibid. See also Juliet Lodge, 'The European Community and 
Terrorism: Establishing the Principle of Extradite or Try'
in Lodge, pp.164-194.
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the Committee of Ministers passed another resolution on
international terrorism which inter alia identified offences
46against diplomats as being of particular note. Three years
later, the Council of Europe formally agreed to a Convention
on the Suppression of Terrorism, which listed attacks on the
'life, physical integrity or liberty' of diplomats as one
of those crimes for which political asylum could not normally 
47be claimed.* Both at the Economic Summit in Venice in 1980
and in London in 1984 attacks on diplomats were strongly
condemned by the world's seven leading industrial nations,
48and measures proposed to help prevent them. These sentiments 
were echoed in turn by the Council of Europe meeting in 
Madrid in 1984. With the example before them of the Libyan 
Peoples Bureau shooting in London in April, the Council 
approved:
a concerted campaign against terrorism and 
abuse of diplomatic privileges, and agreed 
to set up, under the aegis of the Council 
of Europe, an ad hoc Ministerial body to 
consider ways of improving the exchange 
of information on terrorism, including 
abuses of diplomatic privilege as well as 
violence against diplomats.4^
In Europe at least there appeared to be agreement about the 
need for strong united action against the terrorist threat to 
diplomats and diplomatic facilities. Yet here again 
appearances belied the reality.
While all of these resolutions, conventions and communiques 
were made with significant majorities, and most of them
Reproduced in R.A. Friedlander (Ed), Terrorism: Documents
of International and Local Control, 3 Vols. (Oceania 
Publications, Dobbs Ferry, 1979), Vol.3, p.563.
 ^op.cit . , p.565.
48 Wilkinson, 'State-sponsored international terrorism: the
problems of response', pp.297-298.
49 Brenchley, p.2.
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unanimously,50 they shared a number of shortcomings with
the OAS Convention. Because they were all based on consensus
they tended to be statements of widely held political
principles rather than practical measures for the suppression
of terrorism. All were worded sufficiently loosely to permit
the states responsible for their implementation considerable
latitude in deciding what action should be taken in the event
of a terrorist incident in their territories. None were
completely binding and none included measures to enforce
their application. As with the American states there was
still a notable reluctance on the part of European states
to abrogate their sovereign right to handle a terrorist
attack as they saw fit at the time. In addition, many still
placed fear of reprisals and the loss of commercial
opportunities above the need to take concerted action against
the terrorist threat. The escape clause in Article 13 of
the European Convention, for example, has been invoked by
five states to date and France, Italy and Belgium have yet
51to ratify the Convention. French fears that a binding
and more effective commitment against international terrorism
would cost them economic opportunities in the Middle East
resulted in a significant weakening of the communique issued
after the London economic summit last year. It was hardly
the 'heartening consensus' described by the US Secretary of 
52State. Nor has France been alone in these concerns.
Britain, the FRG and Japan were all quick to join France in 
its attempts to fill the economic vacuum left in Iran by the 
US withdrawal in 1980, despite calls by President Jimmy Carter 
for trade sanctions against the Khomeini regime while it held
Malta and Eire did not become signatories to the European 
Convention, the former because it was at that time enjoying 
a short-lived flirtation with Libya, the latter because of a 
disagreement over the wording of parts of the Convention.
See Wilkinson, Terrorism: International dimensions , p.16.
51 Amos Yoder, 'United Nations Resolutions Against 
International Terrorism', Terrorism: An International Journal
6:4 (1983), p.509.
52 Shultz, 'Terrorism: The Problem and the Challenges', p.2.
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5 3US diplomats hostage. Well might Amos Yoder ask, 'if
countries with the close political relationships of the
European Community can not agree on a strong anti-terrorist
agreement, how can there be much hope for a worldwide 
54agreement'.
Yet despite such obvious manifestations of national 
self-interest, the record of European (and Japanese) 
commitments against terrorist attacks on diplomatic targets 
should not be seen in a purely negative light. The 
overwhelming support given to the principle that diplomatic 
institutions deserved special protection is itself significant. 
Whatever hesitations they may have felt about opposing 
terrorism itself, the European states (and Japan), like those 
of the Organisation of American States, agreed that attacks 
on diplomats and diplomatic facilities were a cause for 
particular concern. This aspect of the terrorist problem 
at least attracted a real consensus, not just at a regional 
level, or among political allies, but at the global level 
as well.
The growing number of attacks on diplomats and their
facilities, and the albeit qualified success of the 1971
OAS Convention led a number of states to press for its
55universal application. In its 1971 annual Report, the 
International Law Commission expressed its willingness to 
prepare draft Articles on the subject. The ILC's proposal 
came shortly before a request from the Secretary-General of 
the UN, Kurt Waldheim, for the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to
5 3 Wilkinson, 'After Tehran', p.8.
54 Yoder, 'United Nations Resolutions', p.509.
55 The Netherlands government in particular was anxious to 
see the OAS Convention (or a similar instrument) extended to 
worldwide application, following the seizure by South Moluccan 
extremists of the Indonesian Ambassador's residence in 
The Hague in April 1970. The murder of the Yugoslav Ambassador 
in Stockholm by Croatian extremists in April 1971 also helped 
concentrate the minds of the UN delegates during debates on 
this matter.
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consider 'measures to prevent international terrorism and
other forms of violence which endanger innocent human lives
or jeopardise fundamental freedoms'. A draft convention
prepared by the United States, however, quickly foundered
on the perennial problem of the politically ambiguous nature
of terrorist activities. By concentrating on the export of
agitational terror and ignoring enforcement terror by states
the draft provoked the opposition of the Eastern bloc and
Third World. Many of these UN members had achieved their
independence through revolution and liberation movements of
various kinds and were reluctant for various reasons to agree
to measures that might, in theory at least, deny others the
same option. A number of states, like South Africa, used
the rubric of 'anti-terrorism' to justify repressive policies
towards their own populations. It was also pointed out that
a number of terrorist leaders and sympathisers like Menachem
Begin and Regis Debray now enjoyed international respectability,
thus demonstrating the transience of political values in the 5 7West. Indicative of the problems faced by those seeking a 
global convention against terrorism was the title of the 
agenda item, which was amended to read:
Measures to Prevent International Terrorism 
Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human 
Lives or Jeopardises Fundamental Freedoms 
and Study of the Underlying Causes of Those 
Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence 
Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance 
and Despair, and Which Cause Some People to 
Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes. 8^
Quoted in A.J. Pierre,'Coping With International Terrorism', 
Survival 18:2 (March/April 1976), p.62.
57 Menachem Begin, former leader of the Zionist terrorist 
organisation Irgun Zvei Leumi, became Prime Minister of Israel 
in 1977 and was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Regis 
Debray, confidant of Fidel Castro and Ernesto Guevara, and 
author of Revolution in the Revolution?, later became a 
Special Advisor and Representative of President Mitterand of France.
5 8 Quoted in Edward Mickolus, 'Transnational Terrorism', in 
Stohl, The Politics of Terrorism, p.148.
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Consideration of the matter soon became bogged down in an
Ad Hoc Committee. It seems likely that the UN, like the
League of Nations before it, will be unable to agree on a
broadly based convention on terrorism that will serve any
59practical purpose.
Significantly, no such problems were encountered with 
regard to the proposed UN Convention on the protection of 
diplomats. In a resolution passed in December 1971 the 
UNGA requested the ILC to study the question of the protection 
of diplomatic personnel, with a view to submitting draft 
Articles on the subject to the General Assembly. These were 
prepared and passed to the UNGA in July 1972 with a request 
for comments. The matter was sent in turn to the Sixth 
Committee of the UN, where the Canadian delegate, David Miller, 
expressed the views of many:
Failure to conclude a convention might 
have adverse effects on the whole fabric 
of the diplomatic system and on international 
relations as a whole. If diplomats had to 
be lodged in fortresses or were exposed to increasing danger, then freedom of opinion 
and their value to both the receiving and 
sending state would be so depreciated that 
in some cases they might be withdrawn.60
It was an appeal both to principle and to self interest,
and one which found considerable sympathy among other states.
The following year the UNGA adopted by consensus the
Convention on the Protection and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic 
61Agents. Given the sensitive subject matter and the usually 
deliberate nature of the UN, the Convention was drawn up and
The League of Nations adopted a Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Terrorism on 16 November 1937, but it was 
only ratified by India (in 1941) . The Convention never entered into force.
6 0 Quoted in Hamer, p.772.
^  Appendix G.
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opened for signature in a remarkably short time.62 It 
entered into force on 20 February 1977 after being ratified 
by 22 countries and only four years and three months from 
its initial inclusion as an agenda item.
The UN Convention, known also as the New York Convention, 
’establishes a legal mechanism to ensure compliance with 
international norms to protect persons who under international 
law are regarded as being entitled to special protection 
because of their current activities'.63 As such, it introduced 
the concept of the 'internationally protected person' into 
international legal jurisprudence. It also specified the duty 
of contracting states to establish certain acts against such 
persons as common crimes, drawing on both the 'extradite or 
prosecute’ formula adopted in the OAS Convention and the 
provisions of previous legal instruments such as the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The UN Convention also 
contained a number of provisions requiring states party to it 
to join in cooperative efforts towards the prevention and 
suppression of attacks on diplomats and punishment of any 
person guilty of the offence. Paradoxically, the New York 
Convention parallels the draft convention proposed by the 
United States to deal with the wider subject of terrorism, but 
makes no specific reference to terrorism as such, only crimes 
against internationally protected persons. Thus the Convention 
resolved the usual problems of definition by avoiding them 
completely, in the manner of earlier conventions against 
the hijacking of aircraft, and instead 'focuses on functions 
of prime concern to all member states regardless of ideology'.64
H.F. Shamwell, 'Implementing the Convention on the Prevention
Persons1SI n c AgainSt ^ n a t i o n a l l y  Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents', Terrorism: An
Internatzonal Journal 6:4 (1983), p.531.
Amos Yoder, 'The Effectiveness of UN Action Against 
Internationa! Terrorism: Conclusions and Comments’, Terrorism- 
An Internatzonal Journal 6:4 (1983), p.589.
Murphy, in Evans and Murphy, p.317.64
Like earlier agreements on this subject, however, the 
New York Convention was not without certain shortcomings.
As John Murphy has shown:
there is nothing whatsoever in the terms 
of the convention that precludes 
prosecuting authorities from deciding not 
to prosecute an alleged offender because 
of sympathy with his motives.6 5
The Convention fails too to deal with such issues as possible
sanctions against states party to terrorist attacks, different
strategies which might be adopted in cases where ransom is
demanded and the question of state liability for injuries
received in attacks. In addition, a major ambiguity was
introduced into the application of the convention by the UNGA
resolution to which it was annexed. Paragraph four of the
resolution explicitly provided that nothing in the Convention
could 'prejudice the exercise of the legitimate right to self-
determination and independence .. . by peoples struggling
against colonialism, alien domination, foreign occupation,
6 6racial discrimination and apartheid'. Observers like
L.C. Green have seen this qualification as, in effect,
legalising terrorist attacks against diplomats and other
protected persons whenever such attacks are made in the 
 ^ , 67name of these causes. Yet perhaps the key weakness of the
Convention lies simply in the failure of all states to ratify
it. To date only 52 states are party to it, yet without
universal acceptance the Convention can only have limited
value. Then again, when it is remembered that Iran was already
party to it when it 'adopted' the seizure of the US Embassy in
6 8Tehran in 1979, doubts must be thrown even on this assumption.
op.cit • / p.309.
6 6 Quoted in L.C. Green, 'The Legalisation of Terrorism' in 
Y. Alexander, D. Carlton and P. Wilkinson (Eds), Terrorism: 
Theory and Practice (Westview Press, Boulder, 1979), p.186.
67
ibid.
6 8 The New York Convention was in fact cited in the 
International Court of Justice's ruling on the seizure of the 
US hostages in Iran. It might be remembered too that when Idi 
Amin welcomed the Palestinian hijackers of Air France's Flight 
139 to Entebbe Uganda had already ratified the 1970 Hague 
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. Stevenson, p.168.
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Despite all these shortcomings, the UN Convention on 
the Protection and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents was a crucial 
test of the international community's attitude towards the 
institution of diplomacy. Whatever caveats might indirectly 
be applied for doctrinal reasons and despite any failures 
of observance which have been noted since, the Convention 
underscored the real concern felt on the part of the entire 
international community over the survival of diplomacy. At 
no stage was even token dissent registered by a state on this 
sensitive and controversial issue.  ^ Its rapid progress 
through the councils of the UN showed that 'the perception 
of officialdom of itself and its prerogatives is shared by 
both developed and developing countries' and demonstrated 
the willingness of all states to condemn universally 
disruptive violence of this kind.
All the international conventions and resolutions on 
this subject which have appeared over the past fifteen years 
drew on a reservoir of earlier legal instruments and in that 
sense might be seen as superfluous. There was after all a 
substantial and growing body of international law which 
already recognised the special position of diplomatic 
representatives and which inter alia condemned attacks on 
them, whether they be perpetrated by states or by independent 
terrorist groups. Instruments such as the Charter of the 
United Nations (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948), the two International Covenants on Human Rights 
(1966) , the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States 
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970) ,
This unanimity is all the more remarkable when it is 
remembered that, while the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights did not draw any opposing votes when introduced in 
December 1948, it prompted eight states to abstain. See 
Brownlie, p.250.
70 F. Saddy, 'International Terrorism, Human Rights and World 
Order', Terrorism: An International Journal 5:4 (1982).
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and not least the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and
Consular Relations (19G1 and 1963) could all be cited against
71terrorist attacks on diplomatic targets. Yet in themselves
these instruments were insufficient to cope with the growing
problem. They were ambiguous about the range of persons
entitled to special protection and the nature of measures
that should be taken to ensure inviolability. They were also
unclear about the question of sanctions against people who
attacked diplomats and failed completely to address the
problem inherent in cases where the attack is made in one
country by terrorists who seek sanctuary in another. Finally,
traditional international legal measures lacked established
procedures for international cooperation in preventing and
72punishing violations of diplomatic immunity.
Not all these weaknesses have yet been rectified, but 
that there has been such an effort to do so is indicative 
of the strength of commitment by all states to the continued 
survival of the diplomatic institution. Whether from positions 
of principle or, as seems more likely, purely self interest, 
it is seen still as important and worth preserving. This 
was demonstrated yet again in 1980, when the UNGA adopted by 
consensus a resolution which deplored all violations of 
international law governing diplomatic and consular relations, 
strongly condemned acts of violence against diplomats and 
diplomatic facilities and strongly urged all states:
to take all necessary measures with a 
view to ensuring, in conformity with 
their international obligations, the 
protection, security and safety of 
diplomatic and consular missions and
All these documents can be found in Brownlie's excellent 
collection of Basic Documents in International Law. It might 
be noted that some of these documents contain the same 
ambiguities as the New York Convention itself. The UN 
Declaration of Principles of International Law, for example, 
decries support for terrorism but enjoins states to support 
movements against racism and other forms of oppression. See 
Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p.232.
72 This paragraph is drawn largely from Murphy, in Evans and 
Murphy, pp.295-296.
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representatives in territory under 
their jurisdiction, including 
practicable measures to prohibit in 
their territories illegal activities 
of persons, groups and organisations 
that encourage, instigate, organise 
or engage in the perpetration of acts 
against the security and safety of 
such missions and representatives.^
This resolution was reaffirmed by the entire membership 
of the UNGA in 1981. Diplomats and diplomatic facilities 
may be under increasing attack, and states may be party to 
some of those attacks, but paradoxically the institution of 
diplomacy quite clearly is not. A greater danger would 
appear to arise from the over-reaction of some states to 
these attacks.
'United Nations General Assembly: Resolution on the
Consideration of Effective Measures to Enhance the Protection, 
Security and Safety of Diplomatic and Consular Missions and 
Representatives' (December 1980), in Friedlander, Vol.3, p.259.
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Chapter V 
THE RESULT
The Challenge to Diplomacy
All government, indeed every human 
benefit and enjoyment, every virtue, 
and every prudent act, is founded on 
compromise and barter.
Edmund Burke
Speech on conciliation
with America
(1775)
Since terrorist attacks on diplomats and diplomatic 
facilities first reached serious proportions some fifteen 
years ago, diplomacy has been described as one of the world's
most dangerous professions, with diplomats the 'front line
2 3fighters' in 'a new kind of warfare' that has placed the
entire system of diplomatic representation and peaceful
negotiation 'under siege'.^ The concept of diplomatic
immunity is said to have become 'an anachronism'' and United
Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim described the
occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979 as 'the most
serious threat to world peace since the Cuban missile crisis'.
More recently, the Reagan Administration has claimed that
 ^Wilkinson, 'After Tehran', p.5.
2 Richard Clutterbuck, Living With Terrorism (Faber, London, 
1975) , p.33 .
3 'Embassies Under Siege', Newsweek, p.146.
4 Palliser, in Bull and Watson, p.372.
5 Bell, A Time of Terror, p.64.
 ^ Quoted in Aston, p.l.
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terrorists and their state sponsors have consciously set 
out to destroy diplomacy itself:
For it is not the content of our - or 
any - particular diplomacy that is 
their target but the process - a process 
which seeks through negotiation to 
address the legitimate grievances of all 
parties; a process that, above all, 
seeks to prevent one party from imposing 
its will on another.7
The 'instruments of diplomacy' are cited as 'the prime
otargets of terror'. Official US statements have cast the
fight against terrorism in apocalyptic terms with the US,
on behalf of the world's democracies, defending a system
that promotes the peaceful settlement of disputes against9these 'depraved opponents of civilisation itself'.
It is certainly true that diplomats now probably face 
a greater danger than has been faced by members of their 
profession since the sixteenth century. From the late 1960s, 
when attacks on diplomatic targets were found to be a 
powerful weapon of publicity and public extortion, the 
number of terrorist incidents involving diplomats has steadily 
grown, increasing dramatically with the arrival of the 1980s. 
Diplomats and diplomatic facilities now constitute the most 
favoured targets for terrorist a t t a c k . T h i s  threat and the 
measures taken to guard against it have constrained diplomatic 
personnel in the performance of their duties and presented 
governments with a complex and delicate problem for the 
continued conduct of world diplomacy. In addition:
Dam, 'Terrorism in the Middle East', p.2.
g
ibid. See also Sayre, 'International Terrorism: A Long
Twilight Struggle', p.2. It should be noted, perhaps, that 
the 'instruments of diplomacy' to which the US government 
refers include US, French, and even Israeli troops in Lebanon.
9 Shultz, 'Terrorism and the Modern World', p.2.
Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981, p.10.
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campaigns of terrorism or specific 
incidents of terrorism directed 
against targets in the foreign 
diplomatic or business community 
have no doubt embarassed several 
governments, weakened some of them, 
and perhaps contributed to the 
downfall of a few. 11-
Attacks on diplomatic targets have caused friction between
states, disrupted their economic relations and in some cases
threatened their national sovereignty and territorial
integrity. The emergence of such violent independent actors
on the world scene has also presented a challenge to
international order by striking at 'one of the most basic
presuppositions of the states system, which is that only
states may legitimately employ violence against each other,
and then only in accordance with prescribed rules and 
12procedures'. The nature of modern society, the motivations 
of terrorists and their new capabilities give them the 
potential to become a real peace-keeping problem.
To assess the full impact of terrorism on diplomacy, 
however, these developments must be considered in the broadest 
perspective. Since 1945 the number of states has more than 
trebled, with the main increase being from four to over fifty 
in Africa and from nine to over forty in Asia. While the 
newly-constituted states represent a wide range of political 
and socio-economic systems, they share an acceptance of the 
concepts, developed under the European states system, of 
external sovereignty, territorial integrity and the legal 
equality of states. Yet if the concept of the sovereign state 
has not been challenged, European approaches to other matters 
have. Established attitudes to questions of legitimacy and 
self-determination, social, economic and political rights have
Jenkins, in Carlton and Schaerf, p.25.
12 Hedley Bull, 'Civil Violence and International Order' in
Civil Violence and the International System, Part 2, p.31.
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increasingly come to be questioned by states and independent
groups alike. To this mixture has been added the yeast of
powerful religious and ideological movements. No longer do
a relative handful of states make the rules and no longer
13do states necessarily feel bound by them. As pressures 
for change have mounted, so solutions have been sought outside 
customary fora. With the loosening of controls has also come 
the appearance of non-state actors with increased capacities 
to affect the international system. Many traditional restraints 
have been set aside and institutions which were formerly 
inviolate have become legitimate targets. Increases in 
terrorist attacks on diplomatic targets and abuses of diplomatic 
conventions have many causes but must be considered first 
in the light of these developments and the low consensus 
which currently prevails in many areas of world affairs.
It can be argued that such developments are as much the 
symptoms of current international uncertainties as they are 
the causes of them.
It also needs to be remembered that, despite some dire
predictions, no international terrorist group has yet managed
to proceed beyond minor tactical successes and achieve its
strategic objectives. The PLO has come closest but although
it has secured a broad international commitment to a separate
Palestinian state it does not seem very much closer to
achieving one. With the possible exception of Uruguay between
1969-1972, the only governments which have fallen through
terrorist action have been colonial regimes in circumstances
14where special conditions prevailed. Indeed, as Andrew Mack
has argued, terrorist action has tended to strengthen the state
15vis-a-vis civil society. ' No government with a genuinely
B.M. Jenkins, 'When the Yellow Ribbons Fade', Newsweek,
9 February 1981, p.19.
14 Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, pp.50-51 and 
Andrew Mack, 'The Utility of Terrorism', Australia and New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology (December 1981), pp.211-216.
15 Mack, p .199.
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popular support base has tolerated terrorism for long. With 
one or two exceptions no major political changes have occurred 
as a result of pressure from international terrorism. Paul 
Wilkinson put the problem into perspective when he wrote that:
it is manifestly improbable that tiny 
bands of francs-tireurs, however 
desperate, could seriously threaten 
an international order dominated by 
super powers with their vast military 
strength and global capabilities ...
The most they can hope to achieve is 
the sowing of disruption and alarm, 
or the temporary interruption or 
exacerbation of diplomatic relations 
between states.I7
As Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, Guevara and others foresaw, terrorism 
has been able to attract a good deal of attention, obtain a 
number of minor concessions from states and force a number 
of changes to the day-to-day operations of international 
society, but has been unable to affect its vital functions. 
These functions include interstate exchanges through diplomatic 
intermediaries.
It is salutary too to look at the casualties that have
resulted from attacks on diplomats and diplomatic facilities.
Between 1968 and 1982, there were 381 diplomats killed and
18824 wounded in terrorist incidents involving diplomats.
19Twenty three of those killed were ambassadors. Even when 
the numbers killed and injured in attacks over the past two 
years are included the total is unlikely to exceed 500 killed 
and 1,000 injured for the whole fifteen year period. Tragic
In September 1973 the Austrian government, under pressure 
from Palestinian terrorists, agreed to stop allowing Jewish 
refugees from the Soviet Union to transit through Austria on 
their way to Israel. Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p.40.
17 Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p.196.
18 Perez, 'Terrorist Target: The Diplomat', pp.1-2.
Terrorist Incidents Involving Diplomats, pp.3-4.19
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though these figures are, they must be balanced against the
total number of diplomats serving throughout the world during
the same period who suffered no attack, making the number
of casualties appear much smaller. The fact that two
ambassadors at least were killed in civil wars is a reminder
that diplomacy has always had its risks, even before
2 0terrorists posed a danger. Surveys conducted by the Rand
Corporation, of embassy seizures and international hostage
'situations', suggest that in fact the number of deaths at
the hands of terrorists (in the incidents surveyed at least)
have been relatively small. Most people killed or injured
were hurt either resisting the initial seizure or as a result
21of rescue operations by security forces. Since these
studies were made, terrorist attacks have become more violent,
resulting in a higher rate of casualties, but terrorism is
primarily symbolic violence - violence for effect - with
political consequences that invariably exceed the actual
amount of death and destruction caused. Fewer than 20 per
cent of all attacks on diplomats before 1982 resulted in
casualties. Most terrorist groups 'want a lot of people
watching and a lot of people listening, and not a lot of 
22people dead'. The exalted status of the diplomat in the 
eyes of the public, the dramatic nature of the attacks, 
political rhetoric, unreliable statistics and the news media 
coverage inevitably given to such events have all combined 
to give a misleading impression of the scale of terrorist 
attacks on diplomats and their facilities. This is not to 
underestimate the threat, which is real, simply to put it 
into a proper context.
Paradoxically, while the number of attacks on diplomatic 
targets is increasing, the institution of diplomacy is becoming
Laqueur, Terrorism, p.273.
21 Jenkins, Numbered. Lives, p.2.
2 2 Jenkins, in Carlton and Schaerf, p.15. See also Jenkins,
Diplomats on the Front Line, p.7.
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more secure. Terrorist attacks upon diplomats and diplomatic 
facilities, whether carried out by independent groups or as 
an extension of state policies, have almost without exception 
been aimed in the first instance at states - most often the 
sending state, but also the receiving state, or both. At times, 
attacks have been indirectly aimed at other states but 
diplomatic targets have invariably been chosen by terrorists 
because they are state symbols, representing the governments, 
policies or political systems of states. Only very rarely, 
if at all, have they been attacked because they represented 
the diplomatic system as such. Indeed, the only terrorist 
groups which have claimed to oppose world systems of this kind 
have been anarchist-nihilistic groups like the Angry Brigade 
in Britain, the Baader-Meinhof Group in Germany - to which 
all politics was 'shit'^ - and the Japanese United Red Army, 
which seems inspired by some vague notion of world revolution 
through indiscriminate violence. These groups have not often 
attacked diplomatic targets, though, and when they have their 
demands have been (like other groups) for the release of 
prisoners and monetary ransom, as in the case of the attack 
on the FRG Embassy in Stockholm by the 'Holger Meins Kommando' 
in April 1975 and the URA seizures of the French Embassy in 
The Hague in September 1974 and the Consular Section of the 
US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in August 1975. At no stage have 
such groups claimed they were striking a symbolic blow at 
diplomacy, or even the diplomatic services of particular 
states. Diplomatic targets have always served as a means to 
a variety of tactical ends, never as ends in themselves.
Another reason why the institution of diplomacy is secure, 
even if its practitioners and premises are not, is that
23 Brian Jenkins has surveyed the nature of terrorists' demands 
in his studies Embassies Under Siege (pp.13-15) and Numbered 
Lives (p.2 >.
24 Jillian Becker, Hitler's Children (Granada, London, 1978), 
p. 90 .
25 Details of these incidents are given in B.M. Jenkins and 
J. Johnson, International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974,
Rand Report R-1597-DOS/ARPA (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 
1975) .
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terrorists are usually alive to the role that diplomacy
can play in the realisation of both their tactical and
strategic goals. The kidnapping of diplomats and the seizure
of diplomatic facilities in one sense represents a flat
rejection of the diplomatic option of peaceful negotiations
and compromise, yet such attacks are not quite the 'zero sum'
2 6game that Paul Wilkinson has suggested. They give the
terrorists a bargaining position in which they achieve
diplomatic leverage infinitely greater than would otherwise
be obtainable. Like states wielding power in a more
conventional negotiation the terrorists become party to a
2 7'coercive value exchange' ' in which the diplomatic
representatives of other countries are inevitably involved.
States sponsoring terrorist groups utilise the same principles
at a national level, in conducting their own 'coercive
diplomacy'. On at least two occasions terrorist demands have
been for certain states to break diplomatic relations.
Terrorist groups no longer seem anxious to woo international
opinion in the manner of guerrilla forces in the past, but
they have been quick to realise that even a negative impact
can mobilise opinion and win them certain concessions. 'While
terrorists attack the basic rules of international order,
they depend on international pressure to achieve their
2 8political goals'. This has been most apparent in the case 
of various Middle Eastern terrorist organisations, such as the 
PLO.
The example of the PLO points to yet another paradox, 
which is that many terrorist groups, including those which 
attack diplomatic targets, seek the legitimacy that diplomatic 
status represents. This can be achieved either as a terrorist
2 6 Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p.179. 
27 Aston, p.5.
2 8 Jenkins, in Carlton and Schaerf, p.24.
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organisation, or as a state. The PLO has managed the former
and enjoys formal Observer status at the UN, membership of
several important international organisations and full
representation at a number of major conferences. In addition,
the PLO maintains its own 'diplomatic service' with offices
in over 100 countries, where they are accorded full, or near
29full, diplomatic privileges. Since 1973 the world has been
treated to the irony of the moderate, and now 'respectable',
factions of the PLO seeking 'diplomatic' solutions and
denouncing the 'reckless and irresponsible' acts of international
30terrorism carried out by other Palestinian groups, all of
which strongly suggests that the main Palestinian factions
at least wish to gain more power within the international
system without undermining its foundations. The other avenue
to diplomatic status is through having successfully achieved
statehood. In some cases this aim is held largely because
the easiest way to instigate desired changes in a state or
world of states is to seize control of such a unit. In
other cases a state of their own is the ultimate aim of many
terrorist groups, particularly those with ethnic, religious
or other separatist ideologies. It is perhaps not stretching
this argument too far to see in the 'anti-diplomatic corps'
which existed in Algeria in the early 1970s a recognition by
terrorist groups that some kind of diplomatic intercourse will
32always be necessary.
The greatest danger terrorism poses for diplomacy lies 
in the blatant disregard for diplomatic norms shown by some 
states and their use of agitational terror as extensions of
Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Weapons of Terror, p. 8 3 .
30 S.J. Rosen and R. Frank, 'Measures Against International 
Terrorism', in Carlton and Schaerf, p.63. Yasser Arafat made 
considerable efforts to persuade the BR to release Aldo Moro 
in 1978. (Moro was considered sympathetic to the Palestinian 
cause.) See Katz, pp.295-296.
31 Bell, in Keohane and Nye, p.167.
32 Geoffrey McDermott, The New Diplomacy and its Apparatus 
(Plume Press, London, 1973), p.67.
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their foreign policies. Such behaviour has the potential
seriously to undermine not only the established conventions
through which states regulate their contacts with each other,
but the whole rule of law on which such contacts are based.
Once again, however, these developments in themselves are not
new and while a few mavericks like Iran and Libya have shocked
the world with their rejection of customary standards even
they have not rejected diplomacy outright. Iran's
unprecedented abrogation of its responsibilities towards the
US mission in Tehran was universally condemned, including by
all members of the Security Council and by a number of states
which might have been expected to sympathise with the33revolutionaries. Yet the Iranians themselves continued to
operate their diplomatic missions abroad and to accept all
the usual courtesies from receiving governments. They also
'carefully respected the immunities of other embassies and
of the diplomatic emissaries who negotiated the eventual
release of the h o s t a g e s I n  1979 Libya loudly rejected
conventional diplomatic forms, much as the Soviet Union had 35done in 1918, and has since demonstrated its contempt for 
all standards of civilised behaviour by the shooting of a 
policewoman in St. James' Square. Despite its behaviour in 
some states, however, Libya seems prepared to abide by
Watson, p.140. According to William Gutteridge, the US 
National Security Advisor summoned the Libyan Ambassador to 
Washington in December 1979 and asked his government to 
intercede on behalf of the US hostages in Iran. Colonel 
Qaddafi promised he would try and sent a delegation to Tehran. 
Apparently, the Libyan approach was rebuffed by the Khomeini regime. Gutteridge, p.18.
34 Watson, p.140.
35 By a decree on 4 June 1918 the new Soviet government 
recognised the 'complete equality of great and small nations', 
abolished the titles and ranks of ambassador and minister 
and substituted 'plenipotentiary representative', or polpred, 
for short. E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923,
3 Vols. (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1983), Vol.3, p.78.
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customary rules in others and there are signs that its
3 6experiment with Peoples' Bureaux is fast crumbling away.
As states which supported terrorism in one form or
another have themselves come under terrorist attack, they
have been quick to reaffirm the value of traditional norms
of international conduct. The seizure of the Saudi Arabian
Embassies in Khartoum and Paris in 1973, for example, prompted
a rapid reassessment of Saudi (and Somali) attitudes towards
terrorism and the financial aid Saudi Arabia was giving to
the Palestinians. European states like France which, while
not actually condoning terrorism had at least taken a permissive
view of terrorist activities against other states, have
responded quickly and firmly when their own sovereignty has 
37been impugned. As the scope of terrorism has become wider 
even some of the more radical states have begun to take a 
less sympathetic view of certain types of terrorist operation.
In particular, since the massive increase in attacks against 
diplomats and diplomatic facilities in the early 1980s:
a growing number of States have seriously 
questioned whether the pursuit of anti­
colonialism and self-determination really 
necessitates the abandoning of traditional 
standards of State behaviour. The consensus 
among States seems to have moved towards
In a personal interview with the Information Officer of 
the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in Canberra in June 1984, the 
author was told that Libya was most unhappy with the fact 
that the Secretaries of their overseas missions are only 
accorded a rank equivalent to that of Charge d'Affaires. 
Although Libya rejects the formal title of Ambassaddr it is 
apparently felt that this would be a more appropriate rank 
to accord their senior representatives abroad and Libya is 
currently pursuing the matter in the context of the Vienna 
Conventions.
3 7 Moxon-Browne passim and Wardlaw, 'Terrorism: How big a
threat to peace'. See also Political Violence and Civil 
Disobedience in Western Europe} 1982, Conflict Studies 145 
(Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, 1983), p.2.
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rejection of those forms of political 
expression which violate such basic trust.38
This consensus is demonstrated most clearly by the unanimous 
support given in the United Nations and other international 
organisations to measures aimed at safeguarding internationally 
protected persons.
While discussions on terrorism in international fora
have revealed deep and apparently irreconcilable divisions
over the nature of the phenomenon and the responses that states
should make to it, they have also revealed a remarkable
community of shared values and interests regarding the need
to protect diplomats and diplomatic facilities from terrorist
attack. Not even token dissent has been registered on this
fundamental issue in all the times it has been raised over
the past fifteen years. While questions of principle have
figured prominently in most public speeches on the subject,
such consensus would only be possible if all states recognised
that the continued functioning of diplomacy served their own
vital interests and that, as noted in the 1961 Vienna
Convention, such functions can only be carried out if certain
privileges and immunities were respected. All states appear
to have accepted that they are equally vulnerable to such
attacks. As Grant Wardlaw has pointed out, the nature of
international terrorism is likely to mean that attempts at
a global level to control these attacks will tend to focus on
39legal obligations rather than practical measures.
Wardlaw, 'Terrorism: How big a threat to peace', p.13.
Not even the most radical states have escaped attacks on their 
diplomats and diplomatic facilities. The Syrian Embassy in Rome 
was seized by terrorists in 1976, the Iraqi Embassy in Paris 
was seized in 1978 and the Iranian Embassy in London was taken 
over in 1980. The Libyan Embassy in Beirut has been blown up 
by a bomb and two Libyan diplomats abducted by radical Shiite 
Muslims. The Iraqi Embassy in Beirut was also bombed in 1981, 
leaving 20 dead and 100 injured.
Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p.103.39
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International legal measures of this kind will probably 
always lack effective sanctions and be subject to abuse 
but it is sufficient for the purposes of this study that 
states have demonstrated so clearly their willingness to 
develop a more elaborate body of international law on the 
subject of terrorist attacks on diplomats and diplomatic 
facilities. With each additional instrument the importance 
of diplomacy is underscored and the likelihood diminished that 
the institution itself will come under serious threat.
If these arguments are accepted, then it can be claimed 
that while diplomats and diplomatic facilities are facing 
increasing dangers from international terrorism, the institution 
of diplomacy is not. Both the terrorists and the states 
which support them recognise the continuing value of diplomacy 
and have made plain their feeling that it should be preserved. 
This is a fine distinction, and one that offers cold comfort 
to the diplomats and governments at risk. It is an important 
distinction, however, for from it flows an estimation of the 
scope and true nature of the threat posed to the international 
system by terrorism and the measures states need to take to 
respond to it. It is an important distinction too for the 
perspective it gives to the Reagan Administration's insistence 
that the world's current terrorist problem springs from the 
Soviet Union's desire to 'weaken liberal democracy and 
undermine world stability'.^  For if, as the US claims, 
international terrorists are attacking the institution of 
diplomacy - 'the process' - and the terrorists are ultimately 
controlled from Moscow, then it follows that the US is accusing 
the Soviet Union of attempting to undermine the institution 
of diplomacy. Yet, for all the Soviet Union's involvement 
with international terrorism over the past fifteen years, 
this is clearly not the case.
While the Soviet Union has shown little hesitation in 
using terrorist groups to weaken the capacities and resolve of
40 Shultz, 'Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies', p.3.
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the West, particularly in areas of strategic importance like
the Middle East, it has consistently displayed an ambivalence
41about certain kinds of terrorist operation. It has had 
to balance its interests in supporting anti-Western forces 
with opposition to terrorist activities and policies to which 
the Soviet Union itself is vulnerable, such as attacks on 
diplomats and diplomatic facilities. While it is true there 
are few terrorist incidents reported in Eastern bloc countries, 
after the US, Turkey, Yugoslavia and France, Cuba and the 
USSR are the victims of the greatest number of terrorist 
attacks against diplomatic targets. In addition, Soviet 
casualties from terrorist attacks have been exceeded only by 
US and Israeli casualties, a fact apparently forgotten by the 
Reagan Administration despite the fact that a significant 
proportion of these incidents occurred in the United States.^ 
The Soviet Union places as much value on its diplomatic 
processes as other states and thus shares with them an interest 
in seeing greater protection given to diplomats and their 
facilities. As early as September 1972 Soviet Foreign Minister 
Andrei Gromyko told the United Nations General Assembly that:
On the basis of positions of principle, the 
Soviet Union opposes acts of terrorism which 
disrupt the diplomatic activities of states 
and their representatives, transport 
communications between them and the normal 
course of international contact and meetings, 
and it opposes acts of violence which serve 
no purpose and cause loss of human life.43
The leader of the Soviet delegation emphasised this point when 
he told the same session of the UN that the Soviet Union was 
opposed to terrorism 'particularly violent acts committed
See for example Robert Freedman, 'Soviet Policy Toward 
International Terrorism' in Alexander, p.133 and p.142.
42 Terrorist Incidents Involving Diplomats , p.3 and Jenkins, 
Diplomats on the Front Line, p.5.
43 Quoted in Thompson, p.1285.
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, 4 4against heads of state and diplomats in foreign countries •
As W.S. Thompson has correctly observed, these are precisely
those functions of inter-state relations in which the USSR
4 5has almost as much at stake as any other country.
For all their posturing on other matters related to
terrorism, these and similar statements do not seem to be
simply rhetoric on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies.
They were among the first states to become party to the UN
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents, a step yet to be taken by a number of the US's NATO 
46allies. There is evidence to suggest that at various times 
the Soviet Union has attempted to restrain terrorist groups 
over which it exercises some influence and at times it has 
supported anti-terrorist measures in international fora which 
have been opposed by its terrorist clients.^7 In addition, 
there have been a number of examples of East-West cooperation 
to prevent attacks on diplomats and the hijacking of aircraft. 
The Soviet Union's security services enjoy a close working 
relationship with the US Secret Service over the protection 
of Soviet officials in America. The Cuba-USA Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and 
Other Offences is a remarkable example of how two states with 
widely varying attitudes on other matters can cooperate when 
they perceive shared interests. The Soviet Union shared a
Quoted in Freedman, in Alexander, pp.131-132.
45 Thompson, p.1285.
46 France, Belgium and the Netherlands, for example, have yet to 
become parties to the convention. See 'Treaties and Conventions 
Relevant to International Terrorism', Terrorism: An
International Journal 7:2 (1984), p.136.
47 Freedman, in Alexander, pp.122-123. Stephen Clissold has also 
claimed that the Soviet Union rebuffed advances from Croatian 
separatists in Australia in the late 1970s (Clissold, p.17).
48 As Rosen and Frank describe it, the US-Cuba agreement 
represents a remarkable 'obligation by a militant socialist state 
to extradite and subject to prosecution opponents of the world's 
leading imperialist state' . (Rosen and Frank, in Carlton and 
Schaerf, p.62.) The fundamental factor, here as elsewhere, is a 
common interest which outweighs ideology and short-term political gain .
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similar agreement with the Shah’s Iran and has since given
some practical assistance to the FRG on matters relating to
the hijacking of aircraft. ^  Even Bulgaria, implicated in50the attempted assassination of the Pope in May 1981, 
assisted in the capture of a number of international 
terrorists and their extradition to the FRG for trial in 1978.
This cooperation with the West has not stemmed from any 
altruism or allegiance to the sanctity of traditional diplomacy. 
Indeed, there is no place for international commerce, inter­
state diplomacy or even sovereign states themselves in the 
world order ultimately envisaged by orthodox Marxist 
ideologues. It is recognised, however, that all three are 
unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future and that the 
interests of the Soviet Union and its allies currently lie 
in accepting these realities and utilising them for their 
own benefit. Given the Soviet Union's investment in this 
system, any attack which seriously threatens it is likely 
to be to the detriment of the Soviet Union as much as, if not 
more than, other states. As Adam Watson has stated in a wider 
context, both the superpowers have so far recognised, explicitly 
or tacitly, that:
the preservation and effective functioning 
of their system and of international society 
must be given priority whenever the point is 
reached where it appears to be seriously 
threatened. This attitude is something 
more than prudence and restraint. It is 
a conscious raison de Systeme, the use of 
diplomacy to achieve the ultimate purpose 
of an international society of independent states.51
The Soviet Union does not appear ready to sacrifice the 
advantages its influence with terrorist groups currently gives
Peter Koch and Kai Hermann, Assault at Mogadishu (Corgi, 
London, 1977), p.76.
50 Los Angeles Times, 30 January 1983, p.l.
^  Watson, p.203.
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it, but it does seem anxious to preserve the vital elements
of this system. From its statements over the past four years,
however, the Reagan Administration appears to feel that the
USSR has abandoned any interests it may have had in the
existing world system and chosen instead to undermine it
through terrorist surrogates. In terms that US officials
have long applied to communism itself, terrorism is described
as a 'contagious disease' that will ultimately destroy
'civilisation itself'. Terror and counter-terror have been
cast in terms of an epic struggle between anarchy and
civilisation, totalitarianism and democracy, extremism and
5 3 .moderation, violence and diplomacy. This apocalyptic 
vision has consequences that reach well beyond the spheres 
of terrorism and state responses to it.
By concentrating upon international terrorism as political 
acts, rather than looking at the political, social and economic 
context in which it has arisen in various parts of the world, 
the US appears to have ignored the real complexity of the 
terrorist problem and obscured the root causes of much 
extremist discontent. By overlooking the US's own support 
for terror now and in the past, and by failing to see 
contemporary terrorism in a wider historical perspective, 
the Reagan Administration has also tended to view the current 
terrorist threat as something newer and more threatening 
to world order than appears to be the case. This is not to 
underestimate the dangers posed by terrorism today, but to 
argue against an over-reaction which could be far more 
destabilising than the problem which it is hoped to solve.
Recent US government statements remove the terrorist problem 
from the political arena by stressing its essential criminality, 
but at the same time place it firmly on the political agenda
Shultz, 'Terrorism and the Modern World', p.8.
5 3 See for example Dam, 'Terrorism in the Middle East', p.2. 
This point is made in greater detail by Schlesinger, Murdock 
and Elliott, p.l.
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5 4by treating it as a matter for global concern. International 
consideration of the terrorist problem is necessary and, as 
demonstrated by the New York Convention on the protection 
of diplomats, occasionally successful in focussing attention 
on areas of universal concern. By presenting the terrorist 
problem as a major factor in the East-West struggle, however, 
the Reagan Administration has publicly locked this entire, 
complex and highly sensitive issue into the wider competition 
between the superpowers. Attempts by the US and USSR to 
legitimise their own policies and delegitimise those of their 
opponent thus become of paramount concern and the deeper causes 
of terrorist violence, and the measures necessary to prevent 
it, become increasingly obscured. Terrorist attacks all 
over the world are perceived by the US as Soviet tests of its 
resolve and in order to maintain a reputation for strength, 
preserve its international prestige and keep its credibility 
with its allies the US has felt obliged to make a strong 
response. Unable to score any major political successes, 
however, the Reagan Administration has increasingly turned 
to military options.
In an address before the Park Avenue Synagogue in October 
1984, US Secretary of State George Shultz said that:
the essence of our response is simple to 
state: violence and aggression must be
met with firm resistance ... there is no 
question about our ability to use force 
where and when it is needed to counter 
terrorism. Our nation has forces prepared 
for action - from small teams able to 
operate virtually undetected, to the full 
weight of our conventional military might.
On another occasion Mr Shultz referred to international 
terrorism and spoke of the US's readiness to 'resort to arms 
on behalf of democracy against repressive regimes and
Schlesinger, Murdock and Elliott, p.2.
Shultz, 'Terrorism and the Modern World', p.15.
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movements'.56 These strong statements were doubtless designed
in part to reassure the American public and signal to foreign
governments the US's strength and resolve in the face of
continued terrorist provocation. Yet whether or not they
reflected a serious commitment to direct action, the Reagan
Administration's policy of 'active defence’ against terrorism
constitutes a threat to international order and world peace
as great as that posed by terrorism itself. For, if Mr Shultz's
speeches are found to be mere rhetoric, or if such policies
were discovered not to be feasible and abandoned, the
credibility of the US would be greatly diminished and, by
extension, the cohesion of the Western alliance would be
weakened. If these policies were seriously pursued, on the
other hand, their consequences would be even worse. A military
response of the kind being considered would clearly have little
significant impact on the terrorist problem. It 'would only
succeed in substituting the greater evil of full-scale war ...
for the lesser evil of terrorism'. As Carlos Marighela
instructed his proteges they should do in 1969, the terrorists
will have succeeded in turning a political problem into a
military one, except that in this case it is not the armed
forces of a single developing country that is involved, but
the full conventional military might of the world's greatest
5 8superpower, operating on a global scale.
Just as assassinations, kidnappings and torture by counter­
terrorist units have already done on a smaller scale, the kind 
of response being considered by the US would also serve 
to undermine the very codes of behaviour and international 
legal institutions which the Reagan Administration claims to 
defend. This would have consequences reaching far beyond any
Shultz, 'Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies',
pp.2-3.
57 Wilkinson, 'State-sponsored international terrorism: the
problems of response', p.298.
5 8 Marighela, 'Problems and Principles of Strategy' in For the
Liberation of Brazil, p.46.
116
terrorist campaign. International law is already a fragile
institution. It relies on the voluntary compliance of states,
in particular the observance of certain principles and
procedures by the most influential states in world affairs,
namely the superpowers. Thus the US shares a heavy
responsibility for the continued workings of international
diplomacy and other legal mechanisms which regulate and
59encourage peaceful contacts between states. Should the
US abandon these norms and resort to tactics similar to those
used by the terrorists and their state sponsors, then the
entire structure of ordered international society - including
diplomacy as it is now known - will be threatened to a greater
6 0degree than it is by terrorism already. There is a real
dilemma for the US here. It claims to cherish ’a world
61based on the rule of law' yet it is prepared apparently to
flout that law in the name of preserving it. Terrorists are
not vulnerable to moral force or to international laws in
the manner of states and can thus violate accepted behaviour
in the way that states like the US cannot. This asymmetry
is exploited by terrorists and their sponsors, yet unless
the disadvantages of this situation are accepted and the
distinction between states and terrorists is preserved, the
entire rule of law is undermined and the international order
6 2gravely destabilised. In this sense David Fromkin is
correct in saying that terrorism 'achieves its goals not
6 3through its acts but through responses to its acts1.
The conviction that international terrorism is essentially 
a form of surrogate warfare conducted by the Soviet Union 
appears to have led the Reagan Administration not only
Watson, p.40 and p.197.
6 0 Wilkinson, Terrorism: International Dimensions , p.4.
61 Shultz, 'The Challenge to the Democracies', p.2.
6 2 Jenkins, in Carlton and Schaerf, p.27.
^  Fromkin, p.692.
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to believe that terrorism can be defeated by an equal or 
greater application of military force, but also that the US 
can 'eventually stamp it o u t ' E v e n  allowing for the 
exaggeration usual in public statements of this kind, the 
whole thrust of the US's latest counter-terrorist program is 
towards defensive measures against terrorist acts and 
offensive measures against terrorist groups. Despite all the 
evidence to the contrary there still seems to be a conviction 
in American political and military circles that unconventional 
conflicts can be overcome by these measures alone. This 
approach suggests either a profound misunderstanding of the 
nature of terrorist violence or an excessive confidence in 
the capabilities of the US, or both. It also suggests an 
inability or unwillingness on the part of the American 
government to consider ways of preventing terrorism at its 
source. Increased protection against attacks, international 
cooperation and the capability to respond to particular 
incidents are all important, but none address the objective 
causes of terrorism which tend to be found in ideological 
and religious convictions, political, social and economic 
discontent. As has been demonstrated in numerous unconventional 
conflicts since 1945, many of which included American 
participation, unless these issues are addressed little 
progress can be made towards a lasting and peaceful solution.^
Some terrorists may have goals that are attainable in 
the long term but it is unlikely that states will ever be 
able to eliminate all sources of discontent, many of which 
have already been examined by national governments, regional 
organisations and the United Nations and found to be intractable. 
As Raymond Aron has said, 'he is not conquered who does not
Shultz, 'Terrorism and the Modern World', p.8.
6 5 This subject has been addressed by Andrew Mack, 'Why Big 
Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict',
World Politics 27:2 (January 1975).
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admit defeat'^ and there will always be irreconcilable
elements prepared to resort to violence. It must be recognised
too that the distinctions between psychopaths, idealists,
independent groups and state-sponsored groups are becoming
increasingly blurred, as are the forces motivating them. To
a degree, terrorism has become institutionalised, an integral
part of the international system that is 'simultaneously
6 7combatted, tolerated, and exploited' by states, in much 
the same way piracy was in earlier times. Emphasis is given 
to particular aspects of the terrorist problem as it suits 
a state's perceived national needs at the time. This is not 
to suggest that the quest for a solution to the problem of 
international terrorist violence should be abandoned, simply 
that any solution is likely to be imperfect and a long time 
coming. The need is for continued quiet diplomacy, moderate 
international initiatives and more imaginative solutions. 
Greater consideration could be given to the use of collective 
sanctions against states sponsoring terrorism and stronger 
reciprocal action in response to abuses of diplomatic 
privileges. Above all, a greater effort must be made to 
rebuild the confidence of state and non-state actors alike 
in diplomatic processes as the best means fairly and 
sympathetically to manage change. In this the role of the 
superpowers will be crucial, for unless they show a greater 
willingness themselves to place faith in negotiations and 
to abide by the conventions of diplomatic behaviour it is 
unrealistic to expect other states and non-state actors to 
do so.
States cannot afford to be sanguine about the problems 
posed by international terrorism, but terrorist attacks on 
diplomats and diplomatic facilities should not, as Michael 
Palliser has warned, be allowed to induce the belief 'that a
6 6  a o rAron, p.25.
6 7 Jenkins, New Modes of Conflict, p.14.
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code of practice which has developed over the centuries,
and which for the most part works well, is in imminent danger 
6 8of collapse'. It clearly is not. By its very nature 
diplomacy has been able to adapt itself to changing world 
conditions, accommodating new requirements and meeting fresh 
challenges. In some respects there has been a decline in 
the role played by traditional diplomacy in international 
politics, but the institution continues to flourish. Those 
revolutionary regimes which initially rejected conventional 
diplomatic processes, such as Russia and Libya, quickly 
found that they could not dispense with them and still live 
in a plural yet ordered society of states. Even if resident 
embassies should lose their importance or are transformed in 
character, states will continue to negotiate solutions to 
their problems, just as they did before the emergence of
7 0resident embassies and professional diplomatic services.
International society today is highly mobile, with 
power distributed among a number of centres. Even the smallest 
state can quickly assume global significance. Technological 
developments have made all states vulnerable to an 
unprecedented degree and safety can no longer be seen to lie 
in alliances or military strength. In such a situation not 
even the most powerful country can afford to ignore certain 
principles of statecraft. In addition, both state and non­
state actors are growing in number and becoming more 
interdependent. World politics is becoming increasingly 
complex and no state can isolate itself without harm to its 
own interests. This places a high premium on diplomatic 
contacts and skills. Diplomacy remains 'at bottom, the 
communications system of international society'71 and in the
6 3 Palliser, in Bull and Watson, p.352.
69 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.173 and Keens-Soper, p.914. 
7  ^ Watson, p.ll.
71 James, p.942.
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current international environment continues to play a vital 
role. Periods of low consensus, as now, serve only to 
emphasise that conflicts of interest are a major preoccupation 
of diplomats and, short of war, can only strengthen their 
traditional role.
In another sense too, it can be argued that diplomacy 
thrives on discord. Throughout history it has emerged from 
periods of heightened international competition stronger 
than before. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 was negotiated 
at the end of the Hundred Years War, the Congress of Vienna 
in 1815 took place during the Napoleonic Wars which convulsed 
the Old World and the 1961 Vienna Conference was held at the 
height of the Cold War. It is possible that the 1973 New 
York Convention will come to be seen as this generation's 
response to threats to diplomacy in a post-colonial era of 
revolution and socio-economic discontent. These international 
meetings and the legal instruments which flowed from them are 
all illustrative of the enduring concern felt by states, 
particularly in times of danger, to preserve an institution 
vital to them all. For as long as states remain wedded to 
their own interests in a world system, diplomacy will 
be needed. It 'meets the great secular need of mankind,
7 2the need for peoples to make arrangements with each other'.
Naturally, there is cause for concern in the blatant 
disregard for diplomatic norms by some states - old and new - 
and the use of diplomacy to excite differences rather than 
settle them, but despite the fond assumptions of Sir Harold 
Nicolson, George Kennan and others there has never been a 
golden age when diplomats were entirely free from danger, 
whether it be from individuals, groups or governments. In
R.B. Mowat, Diplomacy and Peace (Williams and Norgate, 
London, 1935), p.199.
73 C.B. Marshall, 'The Golden Age in Perspective', Journal 
of International Affairs 17:1 (1963), p.10 and Harold Nicolson, 
'Diplomacy Then and Now', Foreign Affairs 1 (October 1961), 
p. 39 .
121
addition, questions of power and prestige have almost always
figured in international negotiations and the institution
of diplomacy is not going to be unduly threatened if the
unspoken fear behind an agreement is one of a terrorist
bomb rather than the despatch of a gunboat or the launch of
a nuclear missile. As Raymond Aron and Martin Wight have
7 4shown, diplomacy has never been pure and while continued
efforts must be made to prevent abuses of the diplomatic
system it should come as no surprise if they should still
occur. There will continue to be challenges to the conventions
of diplomacy and terrorist attacks against diplomatic targets
75will most likely increase before they diminish, but 
diplomacy will survive as it has always done, insured against 
collapse by the recognition of all states that it continues 
to play a vital role in their affairs. Even if its component 
parts are threatened, the institution will remain secure, 
protected by established states and coveted by its attackers.
If terrorism will remain and diplomacy will survive, 
then it follows that the diplomatic profession will continue 
to be a dangerous one for the foreseeable future. Both 
sending and receiving states will need to give greater 
attention to the protection of diplomats and diplomatic 
facilities. Diplomats and their families too will need to 
accept that a career in diplomacy will expose them to the 
possibility of terrorist attack and while the risks can be 
reduced they can never be eliminated entirely. In these 
circumstances, perhaps the best that can be hoped for is that 
the terrorist problem can be managed in such a way that, like 
crime in the domestic context, the least harm is done to the 
fewest people, and that terrorism is not permitted to disrupt 
the normal functioning of international society.
^  Wight, pp.118-120 and Aron, pp.60-61.
75 'Embassies Under Siege', Newsweek, p.146. See also 
B.M. Jenkins, 'International Terrorism: Trends and
Potentialities', Journal of International Affairs 32:1 (1978), 
pp .115-12 3.
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POSTSCRIPT
The extent to which Australia and 
Australians have suffered terrorism 
is small when compared with what has 
happened in other places. But however 
much the absence here of the grosser 
tragedies that other communities have 
had to suffer justifies a feeling of 
relief, it does not justify complacency.
Mr Justice R.M. Hope
Protective S ecurity Review
(1979)
To date, Australia has been relatively free from the 
problem of terrorist attacks on diplomats and diplomatic 
facilities. Yet if this global threat to diplomats continues 
to grow, as seems likely, then it is equally likely that 
Australia as an active participant in the international system 
will not continue to enjoy its current good fortune. It is 
important, therefore, that the responsible authorities use 
the time now available to them to prepare for such attacks, 
both to Australian diplomats and diplomatic facilities overseas 
and to possible diplomatic targets in this country.
In March 1983, when Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden
received a report from his Department on the safety of
Australian diplomatic personnel overseas, he was reportedly
'stunned' at the high incidence of violent attacks upon them.'*'
While few, if any, of these attacks appear to have been at the
2hands of terrorists there can be little doubt that, sooner or 
later, this situation will change. If not to apply pressure
'Diplomats face high risk, says Hayden' and 'Dangers of 
diplomacy', The Age 25 March 1983, p.3 and p.13.
2 'Off the champagne trail: Diplomatic security abroad',
Australian Foreign Affairs Record 54:5 (May 1983), pp.167-168.
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directly on the Australian government, Australian diplomats 
or diplomatic facilities overseas could be attacked to win 
concessions from a receiving state or other governments, in 
the way that the diplomats of other states have been made 
instrumental targets in the past. Also, as other countries 
improve the security of their missions abroad, so Australian 
posts may be viewed as relatively 'soft' targets through which 
demands can be made on Australia's friends and allies. As 
terrorist attacks increase in scope and frequency, so too 
will the possibility of Australian officials becoming 
incidental victims, as nearly occurred in 1984 when Irish 
terrorists attempted to assassinate British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher. Canada's assistance to US diplomats in 
Tehran in 1979 was an exceptional case, but it is not 
inconceivable that at some time in the future Australia too 
may become involved in a terrorist attack upon the diplomatic 
assets of an ally.
As Peter Boyce has pointed out, 'what helps distinguish 
the latest form of guerrilla terrorism against diplomats 
is that such incidents are as likely as not to occur in 
countries which are not themselves direct targets of guerrilla4violence, but merely hosts to embassies which are'. The
relevance of this observation to Australia has already been
demonstrated by Mr Justice Hope's 1979 Protective Security 
5Review. Since 1966 there have been bomb attacks on the
The Australian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom was 
staying at the same Brighton hotel as Mrs Thatcher, when it was 
destroyed by an IRA bomb. The High Commissioner escaped with 
shock and minor injuries. These points have also been made in 
Andrew Selth, 'Diplomacy under siege in the face of terror', 
Canberra Times 21 April 1985, p.5.
4 Boyce, p.213.
5
Protective Security Review: Report (Unclassified Version), 
Parliamentary Paper No.397/1979 (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1979).
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diplomatic facilities of the United States, Yugoslavia, the
Soviet Union and Israel in various Australian cities and
violent attacks have been made on Indian and Turkish diplomats
resident here. A number of these incidents appear to have
been carried out by international terrorist groups. The Hope
Report stated that diplomats based in Australia were likely
to remain high priority targets for terrorists and that special7measures were required to provide for their safety. In 
addition, it needs to be remembered that Australia has been gused to train international terrorists for operations abroad9and has provided shelter for terrorists wanted elsewhere.
There is evidence too that Australia has been chosen in the 
past as the possible site of attacks against diplomatic 
missions and visiting heads of state.^ At times these links 
with international terrorism have caused considerable friction
Although it is listed in Terrorism: An International Journal
6:2 (1982) as an attack by terrorists, the murder of the Greek 
Consul-General in Sydney in November 1981 appears to have been 
a criminal assault quite unrelated to terrorism.
7 Protective Security Review, p.24.g Stephen Clissold cites the case of 19 Croatian guerrillas 
trained in Australia and Germany who were infiltrated into 
Yugoslavia in 1972. They were quickly hunted down by the 
Yugoslav authorities, who killed 15 outright and executed 3 
later. The last was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. In 
1978 Australian police surprised another 19 heavily armed 
Croatians allegedly 'making a film' while on their way to a 
training camp in New South Wales. As late as 1979 Croatian 
terrorist training camps were believed to exist in Australia. Clissold, pp.10-11.
9 A wanted member of the Baader-Meinhof Group was captured in 
Australia in 1981 by Australian and FRG police. See 
'International Terrorism', Address by the Head, PSCC, to the 
Joint Services Staff College, Canberra, 22 February 1983, p.22.
Protective S ecurity Review, p.23. It appears that the 
Yugoslav Prime Minister and the Japanese Prime Minister both 
faced a serious risk of international terrorist attack during 
their official visits to Australia in 1973 and 1974 respectively. 
Similar fears were held for the safety of the Turkish Foreign 
Minister, who visited Australia in April 1985.
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between Australia and other states, in one case almost 
leading to the severing of diplomatic relations.
Australia has consistently supported international
initiatives to protect diplomats and diplomatic facilities
and has taken a number of significant steps to meet its
international legal obligations in this regard. Australia
has become full party to the United Nations Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, and in 1976
12incorporated the entire convention into Australian law.
In the same year the Protective Services Coordination Centre
(PSCC) was established in Canberra to coordinate protective
security arrangements for both Australians and visiting
dignitaries and for countering terrorism in Australia,
13including attacks on diplomatic targets. PSCC shares close
contacts with the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
(ASIO), relevant Commonwealth Departments, the Australian
14Defence Force and with Federal and State Police Forces. A 
National Anti-Terrorist Plan has been developed and endorsed 
by all levels of Australian government and counter-terrorist
According to the British scholar Paul Wilkinson, some 
Australian political leaders have chosen to turn a blind eye to 
Croatian terrorist groups and their activities in Australia.
One Attorney-General is even alleged to have actively supported 
them because they were aggressively anti-communist. When a 
bomb exploded in the Yugoslav Travel Agency in Sydney in 1972 
and 15 people were injured, however, the Yugoslav government 
threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Australia 
unless a stronger stand was taken against Croatian extremists. 
Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism (Macmillan, London, 1974), 
pp.150-151.
12 See the Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976. 
The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, with all 
its Articles relating to the inviolability of diplomatic agents, 
had been incorporated into Australian law in its entirety by
the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1967.
13 Protective S ecurity Review, p.53. See also the Department 
of Administrative Services Annual Report 1981-82, p.54 and the 
Department of the 5 pedal Minister of State Annual Report 
1982-83, pp.10-11.
14 Protective S ecurity Review, pp.52-68.
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planning at the national level is examined and coordinated
through the Standing Advisory Committee for Commonwealth/State
Cooperation on Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV).
SAC-PAV was established in 1979 in the wake of the 1978
bombing incident outside Sydney's Hilton Hotel/ where a
Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting was being
held. SAC-PAV is supported by a number of specialised working
groups and subcommittees comprising representatives of all
15relevant Australian agencies. It has yet to be seen whether
16the creation of the Australian Protective Service in 1984, 
which left responsibility for the protection of the diplomatic 
community in Australia completely in the hands of the 
Australian Federal Police (AFP), will increase the AFP's 
capabilities in this regard or, by competing for scarce 
resources, diminish them.
Curiously, although these steps have been taken within 
Australia, much less attention has been given to the protection 
of Australian diplomats and diplomatic facilities abroad.
The funds allocated annually to the Department of Foreign 
Affairs for protective security, for example, have more than 
doubled (in purely numerical terms) since 1982/83 but started 
from such a low base that the amount is still only about 
A$3 million. Given the level of inflation during this period, 
the high cost of providing physical security and the fact 
that Australia now operates over 90 diplomatic posts, this
These contingency plans and working groups are usefully 
summarised in an address by T.H. Mooney, Assistant Secretary of 
PSCC's Counter-Terrorist Branch, entitled 'Australia's Approach 
to Counter-Terrorism' and included as Appendix 11 to Annex D
of the Report of the Proceedings of a Study on the Protection of 
the Australian Public from Ionising Radiation (Australian 
Counter Disaster College, Mt. Macedon, 1983), pp.175-176.
16 The formation of the new force was in part a reversion to the 
situation which existed prior to the amalgamation of the 
Commonwealth Police and the A.C.T. Police recommended by Sir 
Robert Mark in April 1978. Ironically, the latest move is to 
help overcome a problem Sir Robert himself identified, the 
difficulty of adequately providing all the protective services 
required in the National Capital. See Report to the Minister for 
Administrative S ervices on the Organisation of Police Resources 
in the Commonwealth Area and Other Related Matters (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1978).
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allocation seems very small. According to the Department's
last Annual Report, it is in fact less than half the sum
requested in its draft estimates for the 1984/85 financial
year. More has been allocated for the security of Australia's
diplomatic communications. Steps are being taken to improve
the security of Australian missions and residences in high
risk areas but a great deal remains to be done, both in terms
of upgrading premises and preparing staff and their families
for the kind of situations that they may face during their
18service overseas. It can only be hoped that these 
deficiencies are addressed before a terrorist attack on an 
Australian diplomat or diplomatic facility serves as a 
reminder of the need to give this matter a high priority.
In 1982/83 A$4.733 million was allocated for technical 
security and only A$1.8 million for protective security. The 
following financial year the figures had risen to A$5.287 million 
and A$2.9 million respectively. The estimates for 1984/85 
were for A$5.738 million for technical security and A$6.05 
million for protective security. Department of Foreign Affairs 
Annual Report 1983-84, p.42.
^  'Off the champagne trail', pp.167-168. In this context it 
is interesting to compare the report given of an address to 
the Foreign Affairs Womens' Association by a Department of 
Foreign Affairs security officer on 3 November 1983 with a 
similar briefing given to the (UK) Diplomatic Service Wives 
Association in the early 1970s by the Chief Clerk of the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office. It would appear that the Chief Clerk 
was a good deal more frank in his comments and considerably 
less sanguine about the prospects of being able to protect 
diplomats and their families, than was his Australian colleague. 
See FAWA Newsletter 48 (December 1983), pp.1-2 and McDermott, 
pp.64-65.
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APPENDICES
Appendices A-D are taken from the US State Department's 
publication Terrorist Incidents Involving Diplomats: A
5 tatistical Overview of International Terrorist Incidents 
Involving Diplomatic Personnel and Facilities from January 
1968 through April 1983, published in Washington in August 
1983. While some care needs to be taken with the statistics 
used by the State Department, as discussed earlier in this 
thesis, the material provided in the following lists are 
still considered useful.
Appendix E is taken from Ian Brownlie's collection of 
Basic Documents in International Law, pages 213-229, and 
Appendices F and G are reproduced from M. Cherif Bassiouni's 
study of International Terrorism and Political Crimes, 
pages 321-335. In all cases these documents have been 
checked against the original texts of the relevant 
international organisations.
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A p p en d ix  A
Table 1
Terrorist Incidents Involving Foreign Diplomats 
January 1968-ApriI 19S3, by Type
1963 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983* Totals Percent of 
Grand Total
Kidnaping 1 3 30 14 2 8 5 10 6 4 12 8 4 10 3 1 121 3.7
Barricade/
hostage
1 0 4 1 3 7 7 9 3 5 11 9 24 28 15 9 136 4.1
Bomoing 63 53 93 71 114 73 89 63 84 89 113 101 128 119 131 45 1.439 43.6
Armed attack 0 4 2 3 8 4 6 7 6 6 9 10 30 21 6 4 126 3.8
Hijacking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 7 1 15 0.5
Assassination ■> 2 5 10 3 3 5 5 6 14 11 11 15 29 22 21 2 169 5.1
Tnreat. hcax 11 10 42 35 61 63 17 15 41 28 65 61 135 123 1E9 60 939 29.9
Snioing 2 2 4 3 4 3 1 7 13 5 10 24 20 12 12 6 128 3.9
Otnerc 0 2 14 9 5 6 6 9 7 7 13 11 35 25 20 12 131 5.5
Total 60 79 204 145 200 174 136 131 174 155 265 241 409 357 404 140 3.304
• Includes incidents from January through April 1333. 
>> Includes attempted assassinations that faded.
'  Includes snootouts. smuggling, and so forth.
This tabie is Unclassified.
Table 2
Locations of Terrorist Incidents Involving Foreign Diplomats, 
January 1953-April 1933, by Type
North
America
Latin
America
Western
Europe
Eastern 
Europe/ 
Soviet Union
Sub-Sana ran 
Africa
Middle
East
Asia Pacific Other Total 
(  p e rc e n t)
Kidnaoing 2 57 14 0 13 26 7 0 2 121 (3.7)
Barricade /  hostage 9 58 41 2 1 21 3 0 1 136 (4.1)
Bombing 192 327 529 15 20 234 93 14 15 1.439 (43.6)
Armed attack 1 33 15 0 6 54 11 0 1 126 (3.8)
Hijacking 0 2 0 3 3 4 3 0 0 15 (0.5)
Assassination ■ 13 24 59 4 5 45 15 3 1 169 (5.1)
Threat, hoax 146 235 260 34 35 163 88 22 5 989 (29.9)
SniD ing 16 63 9 1 1 29 8 1 0 128 (3.9)
Otherb 24 44 45 4 12 33 16 0 3 181 (5.5)
Total 403
(12.2)
849
(25.7)
972
(29.4)
63
(1.9)
96
(2.9)
609
(18.4)
244
(7.4)
40
(1.2)
28
(0.8)
3.304
• Includes attempted assassinations that failed. 
b Includes shootouts. smuggling, and so forth.
This table is Unclassified.
Appendix B
Countries Whose Diplomats Have Been 
Victimized by International Terrorism
This list includes the names of each country whose foreign diplomats have been 
victimized by international terrorism. It is based on media coverage of these 
events and therefore may not cover countries that do not report incidents.
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burma
Canada
Cape Verde
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Dominican Republic
East Germany
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Gabon
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Kuwait
Laos
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
North Korea
North Yemen (YAR)
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Somalia
South Africa
South Korea
South Vietnam
South Yemen (PDRY)
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tanzania
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
USSR
Vatican City
Venezuela
Vietnam
West Germany
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zimbabwe
Taiwan
Appendix C
Locations of International 
Terrorist Incidents Involving 
Foreign Diplomats
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahamas, The
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Benin
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burma
Burundi
Canada
Central African Republic
Chile
China
Colombia
Corsica
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
East Germany
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Gabon
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kampuchea
Kenya
Kuwait
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Luxembourg
Malaysia
Malta
Martinique
Mexico
Morocco
Mozambique
Nepal
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria
North Yemen (YAR)
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Saudi Arabia
Scotland
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
South Africa
South Korea
South Yemen (PDRY)
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tanzania
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Upper Volta 
Uruguay 
USSR
Vatican City 
Venezuela 
West Germany 
Yugoslavia 
Zambia
Appendix D
Groups Allegedly Responsible
for Terrorist Incidents Involving
Foreign Diplomats, January 1968-April 1983
This list contains the names of organizations responsible either by claim or 
attribution for the incidents involving diplomats reflected in the statistics. Some 
of these events may have taken place without the approval or even the 
foreknowledge of the leaders of the organizations involved. Some claims of 
responsibility may be false, and some names may have been invented by 
organizations not wishing to link their own names with particular actions or by 
criminal or psychotic individuals who acted alone. In other cases organizations 
may have claimed credit for (or been blamed for) actions they did not commit.
Group
Acilciler (Urgent Ones, part of TPLP-F)_____
Action Directe__________________________
Alacran (Scorpion)_____________________
AI Fatah______________________________
AI Jihad al Islami_______________________
AI Saiga (Syrian controlled)______________
Ananda Marg__________________________
Anti-Imperialist Fighters for a Free Palestine
April 19 Movement (M-19)_______________
Arab Communist Organization____________
Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) 
Armed Revolutionary Party of the People
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of 
Armenia (ASALA)______________________
Army of National Liberation (ELN)________
ASEAN Moslem Liberation Front__________
Bandera Roja__________________________
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)_____
Bazargan Brigades_____________________
Black Crescent________________________
Black December Movement______________
Black June Organization_________________
Black September Organization (associated 
with Al Fatah)_________________________
Charles Martel Group___________________
Condor_______________________________
Croatian Liberation Movement (emigres)
Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP)_______________________
Dominican Popular Movement____________
Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution_______
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Group
El Condor______
El Poder Cubano
Eritrean Liberation Forces
Eylem Birligi Faction of TPLP-F__________
Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces 
(FPL)___________________________________
Farug______
February 28 Popular Leagues___________
Front for Liberation of Lebanon From Foreigners 
Greek Anti-Dictatorial Youth__________
Greek Armed Group for Support of 
Northern Ireland _____
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)_____
Hammer (and) Sickle Group_________
Holger Meins Kommando (RAF subgroup) 
Honduran Revolutionary Union (URP)
Honduran Socialist Party (PASO)
International Solidarity Command for Free 
Papua Movement
Invisible Ones
Iraqi Liberation Army-General Command______
January 12 Liberation Movement______
January 31 Popular Front_____________
Japanese Red Army (JRA)__________
Jewish Defense League (Wrath of God)_______
June 2 Movement (2JM) ___________
Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide 
(JCAG) _________________________
Kurdish Democratic Party _____
Latin American Anti-Communist Army______
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Brigades 
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) 
Lorenza Zelaya______
Mano Argentine National Organization Movement 
Maruseido
Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit 
(MLAPU, part of TPLP-F)___________________
May 15 Organization___________
Montoneros
Moro National Liberation Front
Mojahedin ___________
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)
Muslim Brotherhood________
National Liberation Alliance (ALN)
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National Front for the Liberation of Congo
(FLNC)________________________
National Democratic Popular Front _________
New Armenian Resistance
October 1 Anti-Fascist Revolutionary Group
(GRAPO)_______________________________
Peoples Revolutionary Army_______________
Peoples Army in Zaire (APOZA)____________
Peoples Strugglers_______________________
Petra Kraus Group_______________________
Polisario________________________________
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP)_________________________________
Popular Army Force (FAP)________________
Popular Forces of April 25 (FP-25)_________
Popular Liberation Army (EPL)_____________
Popular Revolutionary Bloc________________
Popular Revolutionary Movement
Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR)______
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA, 
Provos)________________________________
Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ)____________
Red Army Faction (RAF)__________________
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC)________________________________
Revolutionary People’s Struggle____________
Revolutionary Cells (RZ)__________________
Revolutionary Organization of the People in 
Arms (ORPA)__________________________
Revolutionary Student Front (FER)_________
Revolutionary Youth Union (Dev Gene)______
Soldiers of the Algerian Opposition Movement
Tupamaros_____________________________
Turkish People’s Liberation Army (TPLA) 
Turkish People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)
Uganda Freedom Movement______________
Ukrainian Nationalist Group_______________
United Popular Action Front_______________
United Liberation Front for New Algeria_____
Voice of the People (Halkin Sesi)__________
Workers Party of Guatemala (PGT-FAR)
A p p e n d i x  E
VIENNA C O N V EN TIO N  ON DIPLOMATIC 
RELATIONS
The States Parties to the present Convention,
Recalling that peoples of all nations from ancient times have 
recognized the status of diplomatic agents,
Having in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations concerning the sovereign equality of States, the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and the promotion 
of friendly relations among nations,
Believing that an international convention on diplomatic inter­
course, privileges and immunities would contribute to the develop­
ment of friendly relations among nations, irrespective of their differ­
ing constitutional and social systems,
Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not 
to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the 
functions of diplomatic missions as representing States,
Affirming that the rules of customary international law should 
continue to govern questions not expressly regulated by the pro­
visions of the present Convention,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
For the purpose of the present Convention, the following expres­
sions shall have the meanings hereunder assigned to them:
(a) the ‘head of the mission’ is the person charged by the sending 
State with the duty of acting in that capacity;
(b) the ‘members of the mission’ are the head of the mission and 
the members of the staff of the mission;
(c) the ‘members of the staff of the mission’ are the members of 
the diplomatic staff, of the administrative and technical staff 
and of the service staff of the mission;
{d) the ‘members of the diplomatic staff are the members of the 
staff of the mission having diplomatic rank;
(e) a ‘diplomatic agent’ is the head of the mission or a member of 
the diplomatic staff of the mission;
(f) the ‘members of the administrative and technical staff are the 
members of the staff of the mission employed in the admin­
istrative and technical service of the mission;
(g) the ‘members of the service staff’ are the members of the staff 
of the mission in the domestic service of the mission;
(h) a ‘private servant’ is a person who is in the domestic service of 
a member of the mission and who is not an employee of the 
sending State;
(/) the ‘premises of the mission’ are the buildings or parts of 
buildings and the land ancillary thereto, irrespective of owner­
ship, used for the purposes of the mission including the resi­
dence of the head of the mission.
Article 2
The establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of 
permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent.
Article 3
1. The functions of a diplomatic mission consist inter alia in:
(a) representing the sending State in the receiving State;
(b ) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending 
State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by 
international law;
(.c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State;
(d ) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments 
in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Govern­
ment of the sending State;
(e) promoting friendly relations between the sending State and 
the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural 
and scientific relations.
2. Nothing in the present Convention shall be construed as pre­
venting the performance of consular functions by a diplomatic mis­
sion.
Article 4
1. The sending State must make certain that the agrement of the 
receiving State has been given for the person it proposes to accredit as 
head of the mission to that State.
2. The receiving State is not obliged to give reasons to the sending 
State for a refusal of agrement.
Article 5
1. The sending Stare may, after it has given due notification to the 
receiving States concerned, accredit a head of mission or assign any 
member of the diplomatic staff, as the case may be, to more than one 
State, unless there is express objection by any of the receiving States.
2. If the sending State accredits a head of mission to one or more 
other States it may establish a diplomatic mission headed by a charge 
d'affaires ad interim in each State where the head of mission has not 
his permanent seat.
3. A head of mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the 
mission may act as representative of the sending State to any inter­
national organization.
Article 6
Two or more States may accredit the same person as head of mission 
to another state, unless objection is offered by the receiving State.
Article 7
Subject to the provisions of Articles 5, 8, 9 and 11, the sending State 
may freely appoint the members of the staff of the mission. In the 
case of military, naval or air attaches, the receiving State may require 
their names to be submitted beforehand, for its approval.
Article 8
1. Members of the diplomatic staff of the mission should in prin­
ciple be of the nationality of the sending State.
2. Members of the diplomatic staff of the mission may not be 
appointed from among persons having the nationality of the receiving 
State, except with the consent of that State which may be withdrawn 
at any time.
3. The receiving State may reserve the same right with regard to 
nationals of a third Stare who are not also nationals of the sending 
State.
Article 9
1. The receiving State may at any time and without having to 
explain its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the 
mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is
persona non grata or that any other member of the staff of the 
mission is not acceptable. In any such case, the sending State shall, as 
appropriate, either recall the person concerned or terminate his 
functions with the mission. A person may be declared non grata or 
not acceptable before arriving in the territory of the receiving State.
2. If the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable period to 
carry out its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, the 
receiving State may refuse to recognize the person concerned as a 
member of the mission.
Article 10
1. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving Stare, or such 
other ministry’ as may be agreed, shall be notified of:
{a) the appointment of members of the mission, their arrival and 
their final departure or the termination of their functions with 
the mission;
{b) the arrival and final departure of a person belonging to the 
family of a member of the mission and, where appropriate, the 
fact that a person becomes or ceases to be a member of the 
family of a member of the mission.
(c) the arrival and final departure of private servants in the employ 
of persons referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph 
and, where appropriate, the fact that they are leaving the 
employ of such persons;
[d) the engagement and discharge of persons resident in the receiv­
ing State as members of the mission or private servants entitled 
to privileges and immunities.
2. Where possible, prior notification of arrival and final departure 
shall also be given.
Article 11
1. In the absence of specific agreement as to the size of the mission, the 
receiving Stare may require that the size of a mission be kept within 
limits considered by it to be reasonable and normal, having regard to 
circumstances and conditions in the receiving State and to the needs of 
the particular mission.
2. The receiving State may equally, within similar bounds and on a 
non-discriminatory basis, refuse to accept officials of a particular 
category.
Article 12
The sending State may not, without the prior express consent of the 
receiving State, establish offices forming part of the mission in locali­
ties other than those in which the mission itself is established.
Article 13
1. The head of the mission is considered as having taken up his 
functions in the receiving State either when he has presented his 
credentials or when he has notified his arrival and a true copy of his 
credentials has been presented to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
the receiving State, or*such other ministry as may be agreed, in 
accordance with the practice prevailing in the receiving State which 
shall be applied in a uniform manner.
2. The order of presentation of credentials or of a true copy thereof 
will be determined by the date and time of the arrival of the head of the 
mission.
Article 14
1. Heads of mission are divided into three classes, namely:
[a) that of ambassadors or nuncios accredited to Heads of State, 
and other heads of mission of equivalent rank;
(/?) that of envoys, ministers and intemuncios accredited to Heads 
of State;
(c) that of charge d'affaires accredited to Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs.
2. Except as concerns precedence and etiquette, there shall be no 
differentiation between heads of mission by reason of their class.
Article 15
The class to which the heads of their missions are to be assigned shall 
be agreed between States.
Article 16
1. Heads of mission shall take precedence in their respective classes in 
the order of the date and time of taking up their functions in accord­
ance with Article 13.
2. Alterations in the credentials of a head of mission not involving any 
change of class shall not affect his precedence.
3. This article is without prejudice to any practice accepted by the 
receiving State regarding the precedence of the representative of the 
Holy See.
Article 17
The precedence of the members of the diplomatic staff of the mission 
shall be notified by the head of the mission to the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs or such other ministry as may be agreed.
Article 18
The procedure to be observed in each State for the reception of heads 
of mission shall be uniform in respect of each class.
Article 19
1. If the post of head of the mission is vacant, or if the head of the 
mission is unable to perform his function, a charge d'affaires ad 
interim shall act provisionally as head of the mission. The name of the 
charge d'affaires ad interim shall be notified, either by the head of the 
mission or, in case he is unable to do so, by the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs of the sending State to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the 
receiving State or such other ministry as may be agreed.
2. In cases where no member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is 
present in the receiving State, a member of the administrative and 
technical staff may, with the consent of the receiving State, be desig­
nated by the sending State to be in charge of the current administrative 
affairs of the mission.
Article 20
The mission and its head shall have the right to use the flag and 
emblem of the State on the premises of the mission, including the 
residence of the head of the mission, and on his means of transport.
Article 21
1. The receiving State shall either facilitate the acquisition on its 
territory, in accordance with its laws, by the sending State of premises 
necessary for its mission or assist the latter in obtaining accommoda­
tion in some other way.
2. It shall also, where necessary, assist missions in obtaining suitable 
accommodation for their members.
Article 22
1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the 
receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head 
of the mission.
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate 
steps to protea the premises of the mission against any intrusion or 
damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or 
impairment of its dignity.
3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property 
thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune 
from search, requisition, attachment or execution.
Article 23
1. The sending State and the head of the mission shall be exempt from 
all national, regional or municipal dues and taxes in respect of the 
premises of the mission, whether owned or leased, other than such as 
represent payment for specific services rendered.
2. The exemption from taxation referred to in this Article shall not 
apply to such dues and taxes payable under the law of the receiving 
State by persons contraaing with the sending State or the head of the 
mission.
Article 24
The archives and documents of the mission shall be inviolable at any 
time and wherever they may be.
Article 25
The receiving State shall accord full facilities for the performance of 
the funaions of the mission.
Article 26
Subjea to its laws and regulations concerning zones entry' into which 
is prohibited or regulated for reasons of national security, the receiving 
State shall ensure to all members of the mission freedom of movement 
and travel in its territory.
Article 27
1. The receiving State shall permit and protea free communication on
the part of the mission for all official purposes. In communicating with 
the government and the other missions and consulates of the sending 
State, wherever situated, the mission may employ all appropriate 
means, including diplomatic couriers and messages in code or cipher. 
However, the mission may install and use a wireless transmitter only 
with the consent of the receiving State.
2. The official correspondence of the mission shall be inviolable. 
Official correspondence means all correspondence relating to the 
mission and its functions.
3. The diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained.
4. The packages constituting the diplomatic bag must bear visible 
external marks of their character and may contain only diplomatic 
documents or articles intended for official use.
5. The diplomatic courier, who shall be provided with an official 
document indicating his status and the number of packages constitu­
ting the diplomatic bag, shall be protected by the receiving Stare in the 
performance of his functions. He shall enjoy personal inviolability and 
shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.
6. The sending State or the mission may designate diplomatic couriers 
ad hoc. In such cases the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article shall 
also apply, except that the immunities therein mentioned shall cease to 
apply when such a courier has delivered to the consignee the diplo­
matic bag in his charge.
7. A diplomatic bag may be entrusted to the captain of a commercial 
aircraft scheduled to land at an authorized port of entry. He shall be 
provided with an official document indicating the number of packages 
constituting the bag but he shall not be considered to be a diplomatic 
courier. The mission may send one of its members to take possession 
of the diplomatic bag directly and freely from the captain of the 
aircraft.
Article 28
The fees and charges levied by the mission in the course of official 
duties shall be exempt from all dues and taxes.
Article 29
The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be 
liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat
him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent 
any attack on his person, freedom, or dignity.
Article 30
1. The private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same 
inviolability and protection as the premises of the mission.
2. His papers, correspondence, and, except as provided in paragraph 
3 of Article 31, his property, shall likewise enjoy inviolability.
Article 31
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal juris­
diction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its 
civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(j) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in 
the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of 
the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
[b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is 
involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private 
person and not on behalf of the sending Stare;
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity 
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside 
his official functions.
2. A diplomatic agent is nor obliged to give evidence as a witness.
3. No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic 
agent except in the cases coming under sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) 
of paragraph 1 of this Article, and provided that the measures con­
cerned can be taken without infringing the inviolability of his person 
or of his residence.
4. The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the 
receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the 
sending State.
Article 32
1. The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of persons 
enjoying immunity under Article 37 may be waived by the sending State.
2. Waiver must always be express.
3. The initiation of proceedings by a diplomatic agent or by a person 
enjoying immunity from jurisdiction under Article 37 shall preclude
him from invoking immunity from jurisdiction in respect of any 
counterclaim directly connected with the principal claim.
4. Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect of civil or ad­
ministrative proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver of immunity 
in respect of the execution of the judgment, for which a separate 
waiver shall be necessary.
Article 33
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article, a diplomatic 
agent shall with respect to services rendered for the sending State be 
exempt from social security provisions which may be in force in the 
receiving State.
2. The exemption provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall also 
apply to private servants who are in the sole employ of a diplomatic 
agent, on conditions:
(a) that they are not nationals of or permanently resident in the 
receiving State; and
(b) that they are covered by the social security provisions which 
may be in force in the sending State or a third Stare.
3. A diplomatic agent who employs persons to whom the exemption 
provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article does not apply shall observe 
the obligations which the social security provisions of the receiving Stare 
impose upon employers.
4. The exemption provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article 
shall not preclude voluntary participation in the social security' system 
of the receiving State provided that such participation is permitted by 
that State.
5. The provisions of this Article shall not affect bilateral or multi­
lateral agreements concerning social security concluded previously 
and shall not prevent the conclusion of such agreements in the future.
Article 34
A diplomatic agent shall be exempt from all dues and taxes, personal 
or real, national, regional or municipal, except:
(a) indirect taxes of a kind which are normally incorporated in 
the price of goods or services;
(b) dues and taxes on private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of 
the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
(c) estate, succession or inheritance duties levied by the receiving 
State, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 39.
(d) dues and taxes on private income having its source in the 
receiving State and capital taxes on investments made in com­
mercial undertakings in the receiving State;
(e) charges levied for specific services rendered;
{f) registration, court or record fees, mortgage dues and stamp 
duty, with respect to immovable property, subject to the 
provisions of Article 23.
Article 35
The receiving State shall exempt diplomatic agents from all personal 
services, from all public service of any kind whatsoever, and from 
military obligations such as those connected with requisitioning, 
military contributions and billeting.
Article 36
1. The receiving State shall, in accordance with such laws and 
regulations as it may adopt, permit entry of and grant exemption 
from all customs duties, taxes, and related charges other than charges 
for storage, cartage and similar services, on:
(a) articles for official use of the mission;
(b) articles for the personal use of a diplomatic agent or members 
of his family forming part of his household, including articles 
intended for his establishment.
2. The personal baggage of a diplomatic agent shall be exempt from 
inspection, unless there are serious grounds for presuming that it 
contains articles not covered by the exemptions mentioned in para­
graph 1 of this Article, or articles the import or export of which is 
prohibited by the law or controlled by the quarantine regulations of 
the receiving State. Such inspection shall be conducted only in the 
presence of the diplomatic agent or of his authorized representative.
Article 37
1. The members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of 
his household shall, if they are not nationals of the receiving State, 
enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in Articles 29 to 36.
2. Members of the administrative and technical staff of the mission, 
together with members of their families forming part of their respec­
tive households, shall, if they are not nationals of or permanently 
resident in the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities 
specified in Articles 29 to 35, except that the immunity from civil and 
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving State specified in para­
graph 1 of Article 31 shall not extend to acts performed outside the 
course of their duties. They shall also enjoy the privileges specified in 
Article 36, paragraph 1, in respect of articles imported at the time of 
first installation.
3. Members of the service staff of the mission who are nor nationals 
of or permanently resident in the receiving State shall enjoy immun­
ity in respect of acts performed in the course of their duties, exemp­
tion from dues and taxes on the emoluments they receive by reason 
of their employment and the exemption contained in Article 33.
4. Private servants of members of the mission shall, if they are not 
nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State, be exempt 
from dues and taxes on the emoluments they receive by reason of 
their employment. In other respects, they may enjoy privileges and 
immunities only to the extent admitted by the receiving State. How­
ever, the receiving State must exercise its jurisdiction over those 
persons in such a manner as not to interfere unduly with the perfor­
mance of the functions of the mission.
Article 38
1. Except in so far as additional privileges and immunities may bt 
granted by the receiving State, a diplomatic agent who is a national 
of or permanently resident in that State shall enjoy only immunity 
from jurisdiction, and inviolability, in respect of official acts per­
formed in the exercise of his functions.
2. Other members of the staff of the mission and private servant' 
who are nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving Stan 
shall enjoy privileges and immunities only to the extent admitted b' 
the receiving State. However, the receiving State must exercise it 
jurisdiction over those persons in such a manner as not to interfen 
unduly with the performance of the functions of the mission.
Article 39
1. Every person entitled to privileges and immunities shall enjo*
rhem from rhe moment he enters the territory of the receiving State 
on proceeding to take up his post or, if already in its territory, from 
the moment when his appointment is notified to the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs or such other ministry as may be agreed.
2. When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immuni­
ties have come to an end, such privileges and immunities shall 
normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country, or on 
expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but shall subsist until 
that time, even in case of armed conflict. However, with respect to 
acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions as a 
member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist.
3. In case of the death of a member of the mission, the members of 
his family shall continue to enjoy the privileges and immunities to 
which they are entitled until the expiry of a reasonable period in 
which to leave the country.
4. In the event of the death of a member of the mission not a national 
of or permanently residing in the receiving State or a member of his 
family forming part of his household, the receiving Stare shall permit 
the withdrawal of the movable property' of the deceased, with the 
exception of any property acquired in the country the export of 
which was prohibited at the time of his death. Estate, succession and 
inheritance duties shall not be levied on movable property the 
presence of which in the receiving State was due solely to the pre­
sence there of the deceased as a member of the mission or as a 
member of the family of a member of the mission.
Article 40
1. If a diplomatic agent passes through or is in the territory of a third 
State, w'hich has granted him a passport visa if such visa was necess­
ary, while proceeding to take up or to return to his post, or when 
returning to his own country, the third State shall accord him inviol­
ability and such other immunities as may be required to ensure his 
transit or return. The same shall apply in the case of any members of 
his family enjoying privileges or immunities who are accompanying 
the diplomatic agent or travelling separately to join him or to return 
to their country.
2. In circumstances similar to those specified in paragraph 1 of this 
Article, third States shall not hinder the passage of members of the
administrative and technical or service staff of a mission, and of 
members of their families, through their territories.
3. Third Stares shall accord to official correspondence and other 
official communications in transit, including messages in code or 
cipher, the same freedom and protection as is accorded by the 
receiving State. They shall accord to diplomatic couriers, who have 
been granted a passport visa if such visa was necessary, and diplo­
matic bags in transit the same inviolability and protection as the 
receiving State is bound to accord.
4. The obligations of third States under paragraphs 1,2 and 3 of this 
Article shall also apply to the persons mentioned respectively in 
those paragraphs, and to official communications and diplomatic 
bags, whose presence in the territory of the third State is due to force 
majeure.
Article 41
1. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty 
of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the 
laws and regulations of the receiving State. They also have a duty' not 
to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.
2. All official business with the receiving State entrusted to the 
mission by the sending State shall be conducted with or through the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State or such other 
ministry as may be agreed.
3. The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner 
incompatible with the functions of the mission as laid down in the 
present Convention or by other rules of general international law or 
by any special agreements in force between the sending Stare and the 
receiving State.
Article 42
A diplomatic agent shall not in the receiving State practise for 
personal profit any professional or commercial activity.
Article 43
The function of a diplomatic agent comes to an end, inter alia:
(a) on notification by the sending State to the receiving State that 
the function of the diplomatic agent has come to an end;
(b) on notification by the receiving State to the sending State that, 
in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 9, it refuses to 
recognize the diplomatic agent as a member of the mission.
Article 44
The receiving State must, even in case of armed conflict, grant 
facilities in order to enable persons enjoying privileges and immun­
ities, other than nationals of the receiving State, and members of the 
families of such persons irrespective of their nationality, to leave at 
the earliest possible moment. It must, in particular, in case of need, 
place at their disposal the necessary’ means of transport for them­
selves and their property.
Article 45
If diplomatic relations are broken off between two States, or if a 
mission is permanently or temporarily recalled:
(a) the receiving State must, even in the case of armed conflict, 
respect and protect the premises of the mission, together with 
its property and archives;
(b) the sending State may entrust the custody of the premises of 
the mission, together with its property and archives, to a third 
State acceptable to the receiving State;
(c) the sending State may entrust the protection of its interests and 
those of its nationals to a third State acceptable to the re­
ceiving State.
Article 46
A sending State may with the prior consent of a receiving State, and 
at the request of a third State not represented in the receiving State, 
undertake the temporary' protection of the interests of the third State 
and of its nationals.
Article 47
1. In the application of the provisions of the present Convention, the 
receiving State shall not discriminate between States.
2. However, discrimination shall not be regarded as taking place:
[a) where the receiving State applies any of the provisions of the 
present Convention restrictively because of a restrictive appli­
cation of that provision to its mission in the sending State;
(b) where by custom or agreement States extend to each other 
more favourable treatment than is required by the provisions 
of the present Convention.
Article 48
The present Convention shall be open for all States Members of the 
United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies or Parties to the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State 
invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a 
Party to the Convention, as follows: until 31 October 1961 at the 
Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria and subsequently, 
until 31 March 1962, at the United Nations Headquarters in New 
York.
Article 49
The present Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of 
ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.
Article 50
The present Convention shall remain open for accession by any State 
belonging to any of the four categories mentioned in Article 48. The 
instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations.
Article 51
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day 
following the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of 
ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the 
deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession, 
the Convention shall enter into force on the .thirtieth day after 
deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 52
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States 
belonging to any of the four categories mentioned in Article 48:
(a) of signatures to the present Convention and of the deposit of
instruments of ratification or accession, in accordance with 
Articles 48, 49 and 50.
(b) of the date on which the present Convention will enter into 
force, in accordance with Article 51.
Article 53
The original of the present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, 
French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who 
shall send certified copies thereof to all States belonging to any of the 
four categories mentioned in Article 48.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being 
duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have 
signed the present Convention.
DONE AT VIENNA, this eighteenth day o f  April one thousand nine 
hundred and sixty-one.
A p p e n d i x  F
Convention to Prevent and Punish  the Acts of T erro rism  
T ak in g  the Form  of Crimes Against Persons and R ela ted  
Extortion  T h a t Are of In te rn a tio n a l Significance, Signed 
a t W ashington February  2, 1971
W HEREAS:
n p  he defense of freedom and justice and respect for the funda- 
mental rights of the individual that are recognized by the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of M an and the 
Universal Declaration of H um an Rights are primary duties of 
States;
T he  General Assembly of the Organization, in resolution 4, of 
June 30, 1970, strongly condemned acts of terrorism, especially the 
kidnapping of persons and extortion in connection with that crime, 
which it declared to be serious common crimes;
Criminal acts against persons entitled to special protection 
under international law are occurring frequently, and those acts 
are of international significance because of the consequences that 
may flow from them for relations among States;
It is advisable to adopt general standards that will progressively 
develop international law as regards cooperation in the prevention 
and punishm ent of such acts; and
In the application of those standards the institution of asylum 
should be m aintained and, likewise the principle of noninterven­
tion should not be impaired,
T H E  M EM BER STA TES OF T H E  O R G A N IZA TIO N  OF 
AM ERICAN STA TES HAVE AGREED U PO N  T H E  FO L­
LO W IN G  A RTICLES:
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Article 1
The Contracting States undertake to cooperate among them­
selves by taking all the measures that they may consider effecm'e, 
under their own laws and especially those established in this con­
vention, to prevent and punish acts of terrorism, especially kid­
napping, murder, and other assaults against the life or physical in­
tegrity of those persons to whom the State has the duty according to 
international law to give special protection, as well as extortion in 
connection with those crimes.
Article 2
For the purposes of this Convention, kidnapping, murder and 
other assaults against the life or personal integrity of those persons 
to whom the State has the duty to give special protection according 
to international law, as well as extortion in connection with those 
crimes, shall be considered common crimes of international signifi­
cance, regardless of motive.
Article 3
Persons who have been charged or convicted for any of the 
crimes referred to in Article 2 of this Convention shall be subject 
to extradition under the provisions of the extradition treaties in 
force between the parties or, in the case of States that do not make 
extradition dependent on the existence of a treaty, in accordance 
with their own laws.
In any case, it is the exclusive responsibility of the State under 
whose jurisdiction or protection such persons are located to de­
termine the nature of the acts and decide whether the standards of 
this Convention are applicable.
Article 4
Any person deprived of his freedom through the application of 
this Convention shall enjoy the legal guarantees of due process.
Article 5
When extradition requested for one of the crimes specified in 
Article 2 is not in order because the person sought is a national of
the requested State, or because of some other legal or constitutional 
impediment, that State is obliged to submit the case to its compe­
tent authorities for prosecution, as if the act had been committed 
in its territory. The decision of these authorities shall be communi­
cated to the State that requested extradition. In such proceedings, 
the obligation established in Article 4 shall be respected.
Article 6
None of the provisions of this Convention shall be interpreted 
so as to impair the right of asylum.
Article 7
The Contracting States undertake to include the crimes re­
ferred to in Article 2 of this Convention among the punishable 
acts giving rise to extradition in any treaty on the subject to -which 
they agree among themselves in the future. The Contracting States 
that do not subject extradition to the existence of a treaty with the 
requesting State shall consider the crimes referred to in Article 2 
of this Convention as crimes giving rise to extradition, according 
to the conditions established by the laws of the requested State.
Article 8
To cooperate in prevention and punishing the crimes contem­
plated in Article 2 of this Convention, the Contracting States ac­
cept the following obligations:
(a) To take all measures within their power, and in conformity 
with their own lawrs, to prevent and impede the preparation 
in their respective territories of the crimes mentioned in 
Article 2 drat are to be carried out in the territory of an­
other Contracting State.
(b) To exchange information and consider effective administra­
tive measures for the purpose of protecting the persons to 
whom Article 2 of this Convention refers.
(c) To guarantee to every person deprived of his freedom 
through the application of this Convention every right to 
defend himself.
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(d) To endeavour to have the criminal acts contemplated in 
this Convention included in their penal laws, if not already 
so included.
(e) To comply most expeditiously with the requests for extra­
dition concerning the criminal acts contemplated in this 
Convention.
Article 9
This Convention shall remain open for signature by the 
member States of the Organization of American States, as well as 
by any other State that is a Member of the United Nations or any 
of its specialized agencies, or any State that is a party to the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, or any other State that may 
be invited by the General Assembly of the Organization of Amer­
ican States to sign it.
Article 10
This Convention shall be ratified by the signatory States in ac­
cordance with their respective constitutional procedures.
Article 11
The original instrument of this Convention, the English, French, 
Portuguese, and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, 
shall be deposited in the General Secretarist of the Organization of 
American States, which shall send certified copies to the signatory 
Governments for purposes of ratification. The instruments of ratifi­
cation shall be deposited in the General Secretariat of the Organiza­
tion of American States, which shall notify the signatory Govern­
ments of such deposit.
Article 12
This Convention shall enter into force among the States that 
ratify it when they deposit their respective instruments of ratifica­
tion.
A rticle 13
T his Convention shall rem ain in force indefinitely, bu t any of 
the Contracting States may denounce it. T h e  denunciation shall be 
transmitted to the General Secretariat of the Organization of Amer­
ican States, which shall notify the other Contracting States thereof. 
One year following the denunciation, the Convention shall cease 
to be in  force for the denouncing State, b u t shall continue to be in 
force for the other Contracting States.
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A p p e n d i x  G
R E S O L U T IO N  A D O PT E D  BY T H E  
G EN ER A L ASSEMBLY
Convention on the Prevention and  Punishm ent of Crimes 
Against In te rnationa lly  Protected Persons, Includ ing  
D iplom atic Agents
The General Assembly,
Considering that the codification and progressive development 
of international law contributes to the implem entation of the pu r­
poses and principles set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of 
the United Nations,
Recalling that in response to the request made in General As­
sembly resolution 2780 (XXVI) of December 3, 1971, the In terna­
tional Law Commission, at its twenty-fourth session, studied the 
question of the protection and inviolability of diplomatic agents 
and other persons entitled to special protection under international 
law and prepared draft articles1 on the prevention and punishm ent 
of crimes against such persons,
Having considered the draft articles and also the comments and 
observations thereon subm itted by States, specialized agencies and 
other intergovernmental organizations2 in response to the invita­
tion extended by the General Assembly in its resolution 2926 
(XXVII) of November 28, 1972.
Convinced of the im portance of securing in ternational agree­
m ent on appropriate and effective measures for the prevention and 
punishm ent of crimes against diplomatic agents and other inter­
nationally protected persons in view of the serious threat to the
maintenance and promotion of friendly relations and cooperation 
among States created by the commission of such crimes,
Having elaborated for that purpose the provisions contained in 
the Convention annexed hereto,
1. Adopts the Convention on the Prevention and Punishm ent 
of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, includ­
ing Diplomatic Agents, annexed to the present resolution;
2. Reemphasizes the great importance of the rules of interna- 
national law concerning the inviolability of and special pro­
tection to be afforded to internationally protected persons 
and the obligations of States in relation thereto;
3. Considers that the annexed Convention will enable States to 
carry out their obligations more effectively;
4. Recognizes also that the provisions of the annexed Conven­
tion could not in any way prejudice the exercise of the legiti­
mate right to self-determination and independence, in ac­
cordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the U nited Nations and the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co­
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the U nited Nations, by peoples struggling against colonial­
ism, alien domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimina­
tion and apartheid;
5. Invites States to become parties to the annexed Convention;
6. Decides that the present resolution, whose provisions are 
related to the annexed Convention, shall always be pub­
lished together with it.
2202 plenary meeting  
14 D ecember 1973
The States Parties to this Convention,
Having in m ind  the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations concerning the maintenance of international 
peace and the promotion of friendly relations and cooperation 
among States,
Considering that crimes against diplomatic agents and other 
internationally protected persons jeopardizing the safety of these
persons create a serious threat to the m aintenance of normal inter­
national relations which are necessary for cooperation among 
States,
Believing that the commission of such crimes is a m atter of 
grave concern to the international community,
Convinced that there is an urgent need to adopt appropriate 
and effective measures for the prevention and punishm ent of such 
crimes,
Have agreed as follows:
A rticle 1
For the purposes of this Convention:
1. “ internationally protected person” means:
(a) a Head of State, including any m em ber of a collegial 
body performing the functions of a Head of State under 
the constitution of the State concerned, a Head of Gov­
ernm ent or a M inister for Foreign Affairs, whenever any 
such person is in a foreign State, as well as members of 
his family who accompany him;
(b) any representative or official of a State or any official or 
other agent of an international organization of an inter­
governmental character who, at the time when and in 
the place where a crime against him, his official premises, 
his private accommodation or his means of transport is 
committed, is entitled pursuant to international law to 
special protection from any attack on his person, freedom 
or dignity, as well as members of his family forming part 
of his household;
2. “alleged offender” means a person as to whom there is suffi­
cient evidence to determ ine prima facie that he has com­
m itted or participated in one or more of the crimes set forth 
in article 2.
Article 2
1. T he intentional commission of:
(a) a murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or 
liberty of an internationally protected person;
(b) a violent attack upon the official premises, the private ac­
commodation or the means of transport of an interna­
tionally protected person likely to endanger his person or 
liberty;
(c) a threat to commit any such attack;
(d) an attempt to commit any such attack; and
(e) an act constituting participation as an accomplice in any 
such attack shall be made by each State Party a crime 
under its internal law.
2. Each State Party shall make these crimes punishable by ap­
propriate penalties which take into acount their grave 
nature.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article in no way derogate from 
the obligations of States Parties under international law to 
take all appropriate measures to prevent other attacks on the 
person, freedom or dignity of an internationally protected 
person.
Article 3
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary 
to establish its jurisdiction over the crimes set forth in article 
2 in the following cases:
(a) when the crime is committed in the territory of that 
State or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that 
State;
(b) when the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) when the crime is committed against an internationally 
protected person as defined in article 1 who enjoys his 
status as such by virtue of functions which he exercises 
on behalf of that State.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over these crimes in 
cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and 
it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of the 
States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction 
exercised in accordance with internal law.
Article 4
States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the crimes set 
forth in article 2, particularly by:
(a) taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in 
their respective territories for the commission of those 
crimes within or outside their territories;
(b) exchanging information and coordinating the taking of ad­
ministrative and other measures as appropriate to prevent 
the commission of those crimes.
Article 5
U The State Party in which any of the crimes set forth in article 
2 has been committed shall, if it has reason to believe that 
an alleged offender has fled from its territory, communicate 
to all other States concerned, directly or through the Secre­
tary-General of the United Nations, all the pertinent facts 
regarding the crime committed and all available information 
regarding the identity of the alleged offender.
2. Whenever any of the crimes set forth in article 2 has been 
committed against an internationally protected person, any 
State Party which has information concernining the victim 
and the circumstances of the crime shall endeavour to trans­
mit it, under the conditions provided for in its internal law, 
fully and promptly to the State Party on whose behalf he was 
exercising his functions.
Article 6
1* Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the 
State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present 
shall take the appropriate measures under its internal law so 
as to ensure his presence for the purpose of prosecution or 
extradition. Such measures shall be notified without delay 
directly or through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations to:
(a) the State where the crime was committed;
(b) the State or States of which the alleged offender is a na-
tional or, if he is a stateless person, in whose territory he 
permanently resides;
(c) the State or States of which the internationally protected 
person concerned is a national or on whose behalf he 
was exercising his functions;
(d) all other States concerned; and
(e) the international organization of which the internation­
ally protected person concerned is an official or an agent.
2. Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in
paragraph 1 of this article are being taken shall be entitled:
(a) to communicate without delay with the nearest appropri­
ate representative of the State of which he is a national 
or which is otherwise entitled to protect his rights or, if 
he is a stateless person, which he requests and which is 
willing to protect his rights; and
(b) to be visited by a representative of that State.
Article 7
The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is pres­
ent shall, if it does not extradite him, submit, without exception 
whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to its competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in 
accordance with the laws of the State.
Article 8
1. To the extent that the crimes set forth in article 2 are not 
listed as extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty exist­
ing between States Parties, they shall be deemed to be in­
cluded as such therein. States Parties undertake to include 
those crimes as extraditable offenses in every future extradi­
tion treaty to be concluded between them.
2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the 
existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from 
another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, 
it may, if it decided to extradite, consider this Convention as 
the legal basis for extradition in respect of those crimes. Ex-
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tradition shall be subject to the procedural provisions and 
the other conditions of the law of the requested State.
3. State Parties which do not make extradition conditional on 
the existence of a treaty shall recognize those crimes as extra- 
ditionable offenses between themselves subject to the pro­
cedural provisions and the other conditions of the law of the 
requested State.
4. Each of the crimes shall be treated, for the purpose of extra­
dition between States Parties, as if it had been committed 
not only in the place in which it occurred but also in the 
territories of the States required to establish their jurisdic­
tion in accordance with paragraph 1 of article 3.
Article 9
Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out 
in connection with any of the crimes set forth in article 2 shall 
be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings.
Article 10
1. State Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure 
of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings 
brought in respect of the crimes set forth in article 2, in­
cluding the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary 
for the proceedings.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this article shall not affect 
obligations concerning mutual judicial assistance embodied 
in any other treaty.
Article 11
The State Party where an alleged offender is prosecuted shall 
communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, who shall transmit the information 
to the other States Parties.
Article 12
The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the applica­
tion of the Treaties on Asylum, in force at the date of the adoption
of this Convention, as between the States which are parties to those 
Treaties; but a State Party to this Convention may not invoke 
those Treaties with respect to another State Party to this Conven­
tion which is not a party to those Treaties.
A rticle 13
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning 
the interpretation or application of this Convention which is 
not setded by negotiation shall, at the request of one of 
them, be subm itted to arbitration. If w'ithin six months from 
the date of the request for arbitration the parties are unable 
to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of 
those parties may refer the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute 
of the Court.
2. Each State Party may at the time of signature or ratification 
of this Convention or accession thereto declare that it does 
not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of this article. T he 
other States Parties shall no t be bound by paragraph 1 of 
this article with respect to any State Party which has made 
such a reservation.
3. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance 
with paragraph 2 of this article may at any time withdraw 
that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of 
the U nited Nations.
A rticle 14
T his Convention shall be open for signature by all States, until 
December 31, 1974 at U nited Nations H eadquarters in New York.
A rticle 15
This Convention is subject to ratification. T he  instrum ents of 
ratification shall be deposited w ith the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.
Article 16
This Convention shall remain open for accession by any State. 
The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations.
Article 17
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day 
following the date of deposit of the twenty-second instru­
ment of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after 
the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification 
or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the 
thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its instrument of 
ratification or accession.
Article 18
1. Any State Party may denounce this Convention by written 
notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Denunciation shall take effect six months following the date 
on which notification is received by the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations.
Article 19
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all 
States, inter alia:
(a) of signatures to this Convention, of the deposit of instru­
ments of ratification or accession in accordance with articles 
14, 15 and 16 and of notifications made under article 18;
(b) of the date on which this Convention will enter into force 
in accordance with article 17.
Article 20
The original of this Convention, of which the Chinese, English, 
French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who 
shall send certified copies thereof to all States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly auth­
orized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this 
Convention, opened for signature at New York on December 14, 
1973.
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